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Ronald Reagan and the Mythology of American History 
 
Summary 
 
 
The concept of myth has been central to the interpretation of President Ronald 
Reagan. This is a complex and ambiguous association. Myth is variously defined, 
referring to fable and falsehood as well as symbolic narratives of memory and 
identity. It is also variously applied, to Reagan’s character, ideology, communication 
and legacy. Reagan’s relationship to American mythology has been incompletely 
defined, and is in need of a synthesis which shows the connections between its 
different facets and processes, while identifying the problems of such an approach. 
Analysing the extensive literature on Reagan, using his public papers and published 
writings, and based on original research at the Reagan Presidential Library and at 
Stanford University, this thesis considers the presence and functions of American 
myth in Reagan’s presidency in five distinct ways. Firstly, I look at the mythic 
narratives of Reagan’s life in his biography. Secondly, I define his own perception of 
American history. Thirdly, I describe his distinctive, but constrained engagements 
with national commemoration. Fourthly, I explore the politicised historical 
interpretations of two central events of his presidency, the end of the Cold War, and 
the Iran/Contra affair. Lastly, I examine how his presidential library works to define 
his varied meaning in American history and mythology. The thesis concludes by 
surveying Reagan’s meaning in twenty-first century America, and the tension 
between his national and partisan symbolism. Reagan built a reputation on his 
successful appeals to American myth, memory and identity and maintains a charged 
and contested symbolism. This association and this success have become the 
definitive factor of his image as his own mythology emerges in American national 
culture.  
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Introduction 
Ronald Reagan and the Mythology of American History 
 
History is a ribbon, always unfurling. History is a journey. And as we 
continue our journey, we think of those who travelled before us…Now 
we're standing inside this symbol of our democracy, and we see and hear 
again the echoes of our past: a general falls to his knees in the hard snow 
of Valley Forge; a lonely President paces the darkened halls and ponders 
his struggle to preserve the Union; the men of the Alamo call out 
encouragement to each other; a settler pushes west and sings a song, and 
the song echoes out forever and fills the unknowing air.1 
 
Ronald Reagan’s relationship to American mythology has been a layered association, 
involving his identity and ideology, his office, and his legacy. It has two fundamental 
subjects: Reagan’s mythologisation of America, and America’s mythologisation of 
Reagan. These, however, are connected in the way that Reagan has become a symbol 
of American myth; not just contained within it, but embodying its meanings and its 
processes in twentieth century America. This thesis defines this relationship and 
emphasises that connection, establishing that while myth is a vital concept for 
understanding Reagan’s presidency and legacy, it has also obscured him. Myth is a 
recurring concept in the scholarship and interpretation of Reagan, but it has been 
variously defined and diversely applied, and without attention to how its association 
with Reagan has affected his historical image. Myth has defined his rhetoric and 
beliefs, explained his political success, and described his continuing relevance to, and 
representation in, contemporary America. It is also a pejorative in the political 
arguments over the nature and consequences of the Reagan presidency. Yet, the extent 
and implications of the association of Reagan with American myth have not been 
fully explored. This thesis tests that association, establishing how Reagan interacted 
with the narratives and rituals of American myth, and how this has informed his 
interpretation and remembrance. 
 The closing lines, above, from his Second Inaugural Address indicate the 
processes and premises of Reagan’s relationship with American myth. It is a piece of 
rhetoric, an example of Reagan’s communication with America that appeals to the 
                                                 
1 Reagan, ‘Inaugural Address’, January 21, 1985, The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan.  
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/12185a.htm (accessed June 22, 2009).  
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common symbols of national history. It was also part of a ritual, the occasion of 
Reagan’s swearing in as president, its ceremony and environment heavy with the 
symbols of national foundation and continuity. It also represents an historic moment; 
an inaugural address is a conscious point of dialogue between the past and future, and 
an effort to define a presidency in those terms. It is, as such, a symbolic historical 
reference point for those looking back on the Reagan presidency. One rhetorician, 
William F. Lewis, identified a myth as a story of shared symbols that structures an 
argument and pointed to the Second Inaugural as an example of Reagan’s mythic 
expression. It was “based upon a story of America’s origins and its quest for 
freedom”, which communicated a common identity to its audience as well as a moral 
lesson.2 Others saw in Reagan’s words further implications that support his 
association with myth. Jon Roper described this passage as typical of Reagan’s 
“historical drama”; it was “a carefully crafted script: scenes from America’s past form 
a classic Reagan montage.”3 This was an allusion to Reagan’s Hollywood identity, an 
essential aspect to his perception as an emblem of American myth.  
 The comparison of Reagan’s rhetoric to a film script also hints at the 
fictionalisation of history – a recurrent theme in critical responses to Reagan that suits 
the pejorative meaning of myth as a falsification of history. Wilbur Edel’s critique of 
the Reagan presidency made much of his exceptional “ignorance of history” and 
“acceptance of fantasy in place of fact”. The image of George Washington praying in 
the snow at Valley Forge provided an example of this. Washington, Edel says, was 
never known to pray in public, and Reagan was reporting “as fact” a scene taken from 
a painting.4 Edel’s connection of Reagan’s words to national art history raises an 
interesting aspect to them beyond their inaccuracy. Due to the extremely cold weather 
of the inaugural weekend, Reagan delivered his address inside the Capitol rather than 
on its steps. The historical themes he evoked echoed in the Rotunda and the great 
series of commemorative paintings which encircled him and his audience. The only 
common subject was George Washington, but the speech and the images both 
expressed a heroic narrative of American history, of progress, triumph and expansion. 
Later paintings depicting the discovery, settlement and expansion of the colonial era, 
                                                 
2 Lewis, William F., ‘Telling America’s Story: Narrative Form and the Reagan Presidency’, Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 73 (3) (August, 1987), pp. 282-4. 
3 Roper, Jon, The American Presidents: Heroic Leadership from Kennedy to Clinton (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2000), p. 137. 
4 Edel, Wilbur, The Reagan Presidency: An Actor’s Finest Performance (New York: Hippocrene 
Books, Inc., 1992), pp. 5, 65. 
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accompanied the Revolutionary scenes. In the 1830s, Congress chose these subjects in 
an evasion of the politically controversial proposal to celebrate Andrew Jackson’s 
victory at New Orleans on the walls of the Capitol. As one representative argued: 
“You must go back until you meet events hallowed by time, and magnified and 
mystified by antiquity.”5 Contentious recent history was an issue for Reagan, as well, 
if not one revived in his Second Inaugural. The immediate environment, and more 
broadly the traditional themes and practices of American memory, supported the 
mythic narrative which Reagan described in his speech. Reagan’s relationship to 
American mythology was an interaction with existing structures and traditions, and 
his multifaceted myth is a contribution to those traditions.  
 While this quotation contributes to the symbolisation of Reagan, it does not 
represent his own work. The passage, written by Peggy Noonan, was included in the 
final draft after Reagan’s own attempt was considered an overly dry collection of 
facts and figures. Pollster and political advisor Dick Wirthlin felt the speech needed 
more “emotional hitting power”.6 Noonan was the central writer of many of the 
speeches which contributed to Reagan’s reputation for lyrical and emotive 
expressions of America’s past, its identity and future, including the Pointe du Hoc 
address at the commemoration of D-Day, the eulogy for the Challenger astronauts, 
and Reagan’s Farewell Address. Here, her words represent the collective effort of 
Reagan’s White House to ensure a visionary and presidential quality to his Second 
Inaugural. Two decades after he spoke them, these words informed his remembrance. 
On his death, the CBS anchor Dan Rather – notoriously critical of Reagan during his 
presidency – remembered him thus:  
 
He understood that, as he once put it, “History is a ribbon always 
unfurling,” and managed to convey his vision in terms both simple and 
poetic. And so he was able to act as a conduit to connect us to who we had 
been and who we could be.7 
 
                                                 
5 Fryd, Vivien Green, Art and Empire (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 42-7. 
6 Wirthlin, Dick, marginalia in memo to Darman, Richard G., “Inaugural Address Draft (1/10/85)” 
(January 15, 1985), ID# 286397, SP100, WHORM: Subject File, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 
Simi Valley; a brief account of this can also be found in Noonan, Peggy, What I Saw at the Revolution: 
A Political Life in the Reagan Era (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2003), pp. 189-91.  
7 Rather, Dan, quoted in ‘Reagan: Media Myth and Reality’ (June 9, 2004) FAIR: Fairness and 
Accuracy in Reporting, http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1832 (accessed June 22, 2009).  
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Five years later, the Democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, who had entered 
Congress during Reagan’s presidency, helped dedicate a commemorative statue to 
Reagan in the Capitol Rotunda. Reid, noting that the statue stood fittingly in the place 
where Reagan had begun his second term, quoted Noonan’s words, concluding: 
“President Reagan’s travels – from Dixon, Illinois; Hollywood; and Las Vegas to 
Washington, Berlin and beyond – left as enduring a legacy as anyone who has ever 
unfurled the long ribbon of our nation’s history.”8 Rather and Reid, once critics of 
Reagan, now remembered him in terms of his rhetorical employment of American 
myth, and his embodiment of America’s mythic connection with its past. This 
passage, then, indicates the mythic style of President Reagan’s rhetoric and historical 
understanding, their association with his biographical Hollywood identity, the efforts 
of Reagan’s staff to present him in congruence with the mythic quality of his office, 
and the centrality of his mythic appeal to his presidency. Each of these themes guides 
this thesis.  
 The diverse relationship between Reagan and American mythology reveals 
elements of a definition of “myth”. I define “myth” in this context as a commonly 
recognisable story about the past, which offers explanation of the present and 
direction for the future.9 More specifically, American mythology describes stories 
about the national past that make use of shared national symbols, and indicate 
American identity and purpose in the present. American mythology is present when 
Americans remember their collective experience through symbolic stories and images 
which explain their common identity, and draw instruction from it. With this 
definition, I can elaborate on the theory and methods employed here in relation to the 
idea of national memory and identity, and the relationship between mythology and 
history.  
 “Remembering the past,” argued David Lowenthal, “is crucial for our sense of 
identity: to know what we were confirms that we are.”10 National memory is the basis 
of national identity. Memory in this sense must be understood as an analogy, not an 
extension or repetition of the processes of individual memory. Maurice Halbwachs, 
                                                 
8 Reid, Harry, ‘Reid, Congressional Leaders Dedicate Statue of President Reagan’ (June 3, 2009), 
http://reid.senate.gov/newsroom/pr_060309_reaganstatue.cfm (accessed September 15, 2009).  
9 Henry Tudor’s useful survey of myth, its theories and its modern appearance, concluded that it could 
be described as an “account of the past and future in light of which the present can be understood”, and 
“a fairly ordinary human activity”. Tudor, Henry, Political Myth (London: Pall Mall, 1972), p. 139.  
10 Lowenthal, David, The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
p.197. 
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the sociologist who first described collective memory, emphasised that it was external 
to individuals, sustained in the discourse and practices of groups. It was a process, 
however, that was informed by, and informed in turn, personal memories.11 Since 
Halbwachs, the study of the physical and psychological process of individual memory 
has advanced to reinforce the analogy with collective memory. Rather than drawing 
from a consistently maintained store, the mind continually regenerates memories. 
Collective or social memory can also be understood as a process of “creative 
construction” developed in “conversation” with the present.12 This analogy has been 
extended to describe the structuring of social memory in meaningful narrative 
sequences, and of the expression of habit-memory in commemorative ritual.13 Such 
shared narratives and rituals are manifestations of myth, and it is through myth that 
memory can inform national identity.  
The processes of American memory and its implications for American identity 
have received important scholarly attention. Michael Kammen’s general history of 
American memory provides valuable insight into its changing practices, applications 
and meanings over the course of more than a century.14 Other scholars have taken a 
more specific focus, such as Emily Rosenberg on Pearl Harbor and Barry Schwartz on 
Abraham Lincoln, charting and decoding their subjects’ meaning in national memory 
through generations of Americans, demonstrating the variance in representations and 
functions of the past in national life.15 Such works are valuable here in their 
theoretical approach, and in their identification of the arenas, processes and themes of 
American memory, although they do not provide a model. The twenty years since 
Reagan’s presidency and the five years since his death are simply too short a time to 
portray the expansive, changing forms and focuses of collective memory in American 
culture, or, as Schwartz attempts, “the mechanisms sustaining the content of collective 
memory across time.”16 Instead, this is a contained study of Reagan’s mythic 
representations, the mythic representations of Reagan found within political and 
                                                 
11 Halbwachs, Maurice, The Collective Memory (New York: Harper & Row, 1980). 
12 Thelen, David, ‘Introduction’ in Thelen, David (ed.), Memory and American History (Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. ix-xii. 
13 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
14 Kammen, Michael, Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture 
(New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1991); Also see Kammen, In the Past Lane (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997).  
15 Rosenberg, Emily S., A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2003); Schwartz, Barry, Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
16 Schwartz (2000), p. 20.  
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historical culture, and the intersections between them. The connection is the basis of 
an emergent national memory of Reagan.  
Reagan’s mythic representations are straightforwardly defined, and have been 
already indicated as involving his rhetoric, his participation in commemorative ritual 
and ceremony, and the ideological and practical foundations behind them. These 
foundations can be understood using Reagan’s published writing, and the White 
House records of his presidential speeches and commemorative performances. The 
mythic representations of Reagan are a more diverse category which must be defined 
through an understanding of how myth and history converge. Myth derives 
conceptually and linguistically from the Ancient Greek µυθος, which within 
philosophical discourse stood in counterpart to λογος. The logic, reason and 
rationality of the latter contrasted the fantastical, the fictional and the absurd of the 
former.17 Where a historical representation of Reagan is fictionalised or dramatised, 
there is the potential of his mythologisation, where there is the suggestion of mythic 
truth. Mircea Eliade emphasised the distinction between the “true stories” of myth, 
pertain to explaining reality, and the “false stories” of fable.18 Though this related to 
the stories of archaic or “primitive” cultures, it is a useful point here. It is complicated 
with Reagan, who as an actor and ideologue is so associated with dramatic and 
fictional stories. When, in his representation, this association becomes the primary 
aspect of his life or presidency, when it makes him a story or a product of stories, this 
I interpret as myth.  
 The dichotomy of µυθος and λογος also makes a distinction between myth 
and objective, empirical history. In the mid-twentieth century, Ernst Cassirer 
understood myth as the enemy of reason, a struggle evident in the rise of fascism and 
the Second World War. However, he believed fascism to have its roots in the 
philosophies of history laid out by Thomas Carlyle and Hegel.19 “Systems,” suggested 
Mircea Eliade, which “set out to discover the meaning and direction of universal 
History” are mythic in their nature.20 This is not immediately relevant to Reagan’s 
historiography, which has not been directed by historicist theory. However, in the 
context of the national idea, where Reagan’s life and presidency discovers the 
                                                 
17 Overing, Joanna, ‘The Role of Myth: An Anthropological Perspective’, Hosking, Geoffrey and 
Schöpflin, George (eds.), Myth and Nationhood (London: Hustard Co., 1997), pp. 2-3. 
18 Eliade, Mircea, Myth and Reality (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), pp. 8-10. 
19 Cassirer, Ernst, The Myth of the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946). 
20 Eliade (1963), p. 135. 
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meaning and direction of American history, myth is recognisable. Eliade also 
addressed historiography as an exercise of mythic thought, seeing in “the endeavour 
to preserve the memory of contemporary events and the desire to know the past as 
accurately as possible” a mythic concern with origins, memory and identity.21 This 
idea has particular relevance to the purpose of historical preservation at the Reagan 
Library. Others have also noted the pervasive presence of myth in historiography. 
Elizabeth Tonkin has argued that “historians live by the myth of realism” and that the 
dichotomy between myth and history is false: “All understandings of the past affect 
the present. Literate or illiterate, we are our memories.”22 The narrative form of 
history, meanwhile, has been subject to the structuralist theory of Hayden White, 
which sees in the selection and plotting of historical fact an inevitable moral 
interpretation which might be described as myth.23 Claude Levi-Strauss argued that 
historiography “never completely escapes from the nature of myth.”24  
 These ideas about the philosophy of history, its social or national purpose, its 
subjectivity and relationship to memory, and its narrative form, all help identify 
mythic aspects within the historical literature on Reagan, but amount to a broad 
characterisation of myth. Moreover, the general category of Reagan’s historical 
literature is diverse. Its most overtly mythic branch consists of Reagan’s biography, 
due to the general narrative imperatives of the form of the life-story, and the specific 
symbolic conventions of presidential biography. Present in his biography, but more 
focused in the accounts of his presidency, is the high level of politicised interpretation 
that informs Reagan’s historical image. Within this partisan discourse, “myth” is a 
pejorative concept which emphasises the self-serving political bias of countering 
interpretations of Reagan. Most often, this has been applied to “conservative 
mythology” of Reagan, the collective efforts of politicians and authors to use a 
positive historical image of Reagan to vindicate and promote contemporary American 
conservatism.25 Conservatives, however, have made similar charges about liberal 
                                                 
21 Ibid, pp. 135-8. 
22 Tonkin, Elizabeth, ‘History and the Myth of Realism’, Samuel, Raphael and Thompson, Paul (eds.), 
Myths We Live By (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 25.  
23 White, Hayden, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987). 
24 Quoted in White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1985), p. 56. 
25 Longley, Kyle, Mayer, Jeremy D., Schaller, Michael and Sloan, John W., (eds.) Deconstructing 
Reagan: Conservative Mythology and America’s Fortieth President (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2007); 
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mythology of Reagan, propagated in the media and in the academy rather than 
through political organisations.26 There are two points here: first that the literature on 
Reagan’s presidency is often more polemic or tribute than history; the second is the 
pervasiveness of the concept of myth in the discourse on Reagan’s presidency, and his 
legacy and historical image. Historical accounts of Reagan must engage with myth, 
even where they do not take the mythic form of biography, or make a purposeful 
political argument. They must respond to Reagan’s mythic practice, but also the 
mythic context of his historical image. To write about Reagan is to write about myth, 
and consequently, to perpetuate Reagan’s fundamental symbolic meaning as an 
embodiment of American myth. The historical literature will be explored here in 
regard of these points; it will be considered categorically, and with an eye to 
demonstrating the pervasive theme of myth in Reagan’s interpretation.  
 A final issue remains. Essentially, why does Reagan demand mythological 
study above other presidents? Myth and symbolism relate to the presidency in four 
ways: in image management of a president (or candidate for president) who seeks to 
present an idealised version of himself to the American people; in the priestly, 
ceremonial role of the president to officiate over national traditions and ritual; in the 
symbolic role of the head of state to represent, even embody the nation; and in the 
retrospective creation of presidential heroes and icons in American culture. None of 
these processes began with Reagan, and all were observed before his presidency. 
Image-making has been a conscious aspect of the presidency at least as far back as the 
first popular campaigns by Andrew Jackson. Individual presidents developed the 
process with the institutional and technological growth of the news media, from 
Teddy Roosevelt’s and Warren Harding’s cultivation of journalists and formalisation 
of press relations, to Franklin Roosevelt’s employment of radio, and the management 
of his visual image to hide his disability, with the complicity of even hostile members 
of the press.27 The presidency of John Kennedy saw the full introduction of television 
to the White House, while that of Nixon saw the development of the carefully staged 
                                                                                                                                            
Bunch, Will, Tear Down This Myth: How the Reagan Legacy Has Distorted Our Politics and Haunts 
our Future (New York: Free Press, 2009). 
26 See, for example, D’Souza, Dinesh, Ronald Reagan: How an Ordinary Man Became an 
Extraordinary Leader (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997); Noonan, Peggy, ‘Why we Talk About 
Reagan’, Wall Street Journal (February 8, 2002), 
http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/pnoonan/?id=95001834 (accessed July 13, 2009). 
27 McDonald, Forrest, The American Presidency: An Intellectual History (Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 1994), pp. 428-47. 
  
14 
 
“pseudo-event”, such as H. R. Haldeman’s landscaping of Honolulu Airport in 
advance of the president’s greeting of the returning Apollo 13 astronauts.28 Reagan 
inherited such practices and developed them, as his predecessors had done. However, 
he became the “ultimate media president” and the “Great Communicator” based on 
his and his staff’s presentation of his presidency through media technologies and 
institutions.29 His exceptional reputation in this regard is not because of his skills or 
innovations, important as they may be, but because of what they represent in terms of 
his identity as a Hollywood actor. Reagan’s leadership and communication have been 
defined by the symbolism of America’s two greatest mythic institutions – the 
presidency, and Hollywood. The narratives of the “dream factory” and Reagan’s 
“star” persona have made his presidency more than usually descriptive of American 
myth.30 
  Reagan is also credited with refurbishing the symbolic presidency. As well as 
restoring the ceremony of the office that Ford and Carter had curtailed, Reagan, some 
claim, restored American confidence in the presidency.31 This diminishment was 
noted by Harold Barger in 1978, who nonetheless emphasised that the symbolic 
presidency, a mythic image which represented the continuity and character of the 
nation while raising unrealistic expectations of the man in the office, would remain a 
vital part of American political culture: “we continue to chase after the idealized and 
romanticized Presidency, mostly through an attachment to the chief of state image.”32 
Barbara Hinckley, meanwhile, in her study of the symbolic presidency, noted that 
while Americans claimed Watergate had reduced their confidence in the presidency, 
they gave no indication of that loss in more general responses to the institution.33 Her 
study, moreover, which considers the rhetoric and public activity of Presidents 
Truman through Reagan, makes no great claim about Reagan’s restoration or 
                                                 
28 Waterman, Richard W., Wright, Robert, St. Clair, Gilbert, The Image-Is-Everything Presidency 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 48-51; Reeves, Richard, President Nixon: Alone in the White 
House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p. 192.  
29 Wright and St. Clair (1999), pp. 53-4. 
30 For identification of the the layered, symbolic identity of the “star”, see Dyer, Richard, Stars, 
(London: British Film Institute, 1998). 
31 Cannon, Lou, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: PublicAffairs, 2000), pp. 121-2; 
D’Souza, Dinesh, Ronald Reagan: How an Ordinary Man Became an Extraordinary Leader (New 
York: Touchstone, 1997), pp. 201-2.  
32 Barger, Harold M., ‘The Prominence of the Chief of State Role in the American Presidency’, 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 8(2) (1978), p. 138. Also see Thompson’s description of the crisis of 
“illusion” and “despair” in the American presidency, Thompson, Kenneth W., The President and the 
Public Philosophy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981), pp. 9-28. 
33 Hinckley, Barbara, The Symbolic Presidency: How Presidents Portray Themselves (New York: 
Routledge, 1990), pp. 9-10. 
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reinvigoration of the office’s symbolic role. However, with individual style, agendas 
and circumstances, he operated within the institutional and cultural conventions of the 
presidency. Hinckley, however, fails to include commemorative events and speeches 
in her survey of presidential rhetoric and activity. More than any other president, the 
major events of Reagan’s time in office comprised acts of memory, such as the 
commemoration of D-Day, the visits to Bitburg Cemetery and Bergen-Belsen, and the 
Statue of Liberty centennial. Americans in the 1980s saw their president at regular 
intervals, beginning with his inauguration, make prominent statements about the 
meaning of their shared national memory.  
 This theme also relates to the final aspect of the mythic presidency – its place 
in American memory. The mythologisation, even deification, of certain American 
presidents was a well observed practice before Reagan’s presidency. Clinton Rossiter 
wrote in 1956 that the “final greatness of the American presidency lies in the truth 
that it is not just an office of incredible power but a breeding ground of American 
myth.”34 Thomas Bailey, in his study of presidential greatness, quoted the recently 
deceased Kennedy before including him in his narrative as a martyr in the pantheon of 
presidential “cults”: “A Nation reveals itself not only by the men it produces but also 
by the men it honors, the men it remembers.”35 For some, that the United States has 
honoured Reagan simply reveals the continued dominance of American conservatism, 
and particularly the efforts of a small group to make it happen. Will Bunch considered 
Reagan’s elevation in the two decades after his presidency exceptional in its 
deliberate, political and hasty nature: “this nation has never seen [this] kind of bold, 
crudely calculated, and ideologically driven legend-manufacturing”.36 The 
conservative movement’s efforts to commemorate Reagan and promote him as their 
emblem do seem unprecedented in their organisation and ambition. However, this 
ideological, territorial claim does not represent the full extent of Reagan’s 
mythologisation. Here, I hope to indicate how Reagan has negotiated with, and 
become part of, national myth. This, I argue, has involved a general acceptance of 
some of the achievements attributed to him by his supporters, but focuses on Reagan 
                                                 
34 Rossiter, Clinton D., The American Presidency (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 
p. 94.  
35 Bailey, Thomas A., Presidential Greatness: The Image and the Man from George Washington to the 
Present (New York: Appleton-Century, 1966), p. 3. 
36 Bunch (2009), p. 18.  
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as an emblem and agent of American myth, the storyteller who told the nation that 
“History is a ribbon, always unfurling…”.  
 Previous scholarship has identified mythic aspects of Reagan’s presidency, 
indicating his distinctiveness in this area, but none has synthesised his mythic practice 
with his mythic representation. Moreover, none has investigated how the 
interpretative association of Reagan with myth contributes to or reinforces his 
symbolism. A considerable amount of this literature was produced during the eighties, 
and thus engaged responsively with Reagan. As well as laying the foundations for 
future studies, this scholarship was part of his era, representing its interests and ideas 
as established by its president. A large portion of it represented literary and rhetorical 
interest in the iconography and narratives that Reagan employed in his speeches.37 
Such interest sought to explain the effectiveness of Reagan’s communication, and was 
partly driven, as William Lewis noted, by the political question: “How…can he be so 
popular when he is uninformed, irrational, inconsistent?”38 This question motivated 
Robert Dallek’s pre-emptive historical analysis of Reagan’s presidency, which used 
Richard Hofstadter’s theories of the paranoid style of American conservatism, to 
explain Reagan’s “nonrational” politics as symbolic and psychological gestures.39 
Reviewing Dallek’s obfuscating analysis, Garry Wills accepted the premise that 
“symbols have special meaning for Reagan’s administration,” but concluded that “the 
mystery remains.”40 Wills made his own effort to explain Reagan in his biography 
Reagan’s America (1987), which remains an influential analysis of Reagan’s 
engagement with American myth, but which offered a fundamentally symbolic 
representation of his life.41 Dallek, Wills and others contributed to a general sense of 
                                                 
37 The symbolic narratives of Reagan’s rhetoric are well demonstrated in Erickson, Paul D., Reagan 
Speaks: The Making of an American Myth (New York: New York University Press, 1985); and Lewis, 
(1987). For analyses of specific speeches see, for example, Moore, Mark P. ‘Reagan’s Quest for 
Freedom in the 1987 State of the Union  Address’, Western Journal of Speech Communication 53 
(Winter, 1989), pp. 52-65; Rushing, Janice Hocker, ‘Ronald Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ Address: Mythic 
Containment of Technical Reasoning’, Quarterly Journal of Speech 72 (4) (November, 1986), pp. 415-
33. A later and more critical study of the iconography and myth in Reagan’s rhetoric was Combs, 
James E., The Reagan Range: The Nostalgic Myth in American Politics (Bowling Green, OH: Bowling 
Green State University Popular Press, 1993). 
38 Lewis (1987), p. 280.  
39 Dallek, Robert, Ronald Reagan: The Politics of Symbolism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1984); also see Hofstadter, Richard, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1967). 
40 Wills, Garry, ‘Ronald Reagan: The Politics of Symbolism’ (review), The Journal of American 
History 71(2) (September, 1984), pp. 423-4.  
41 Wills, Garry, Reagan’s America: Innocents at Home (New York: Penguin Books, 2000). 
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Reagan’s unreality, finding in his presidency the material of myth, as well as its 
practice. 
 Reagan’s historical imagination is another foundation of his mythological 
interpretation. Some of this has been highly critical, attacking the amnesiac and 
distorting qualities of Reagan’s historical memory and its political application.42 Hugh 
Heclo was more nuanced, providing a valuable analysis of Reagan’s “philosophy of 
history”, which describes Reagan’s mythic definition and communication of the 
American past.43 These studies do not draw any connections between Reagan’s 
understanding and projections of American history and his own mythic 
representation, and neither do those which look at Reagan in myth. This latter 
category responds only to the phenomenon of conservative mythology of Reagan, 
largely seeking only to debunk it.44 Few have recognised, and none have attended to 
the non-partisan or leftist mythologisation of Reagan, which, though not so 
specifically tied to a political movement as conservative myth, still understands 
Reagan in primarily symbolic terms. This thesis provides a synthesis of the varying 
aspects of Reagan’s relationship to American mythology, considering areas and 
drawing connections which have been overlooked.  
 The thesis follows a loose, thematic chronology. The first chapter considers 
Reagan’s pre-political life and its representation in his biography, and the second, his 
historical thought as expressed during his political career. Chapters Three and Four 
address Reagan’s presidency, firstly its commemorative acts, and then its 
achievements and failures and their mythic interpretation. Finally, in Chapter Five, I 
look at Reagan in history and memory at his presidential library. Each part reveals 
Reagan’s relationship to mythology as a definitive factor of his presidency and its 
meaning, which draws on his specific identity as well as national traditions and ideas.  
 Reagan’s biographies represent a specific category of his literature, and are in 
turn part of the broader genre of presidential biography. Life-writing as a practice has 
inherent mythic potential, which is amplified by the symbolic weight of the 
                                                 
42 See, for example, Spitzer, Alan B., Historical Truth and Lies about the Past (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1996); Wallace, Michael, Mickey Mouse History and Other Essays on 
American Memory (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996). 
43 Heclo, Hugh, ‘Ronald Reagan and the American Public Philosophy’, Brownlee, Elliot W. and 
Graham, Hugh Davis, The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic Conservatism and its Legacies (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2003), pp. 17-39.  
44 As well as Bunch (2009) and Longley, Mayer, Schaller and Sloan (2007), see Dallek, Matthew, ‘Not 
Ready for Mount Rushmore’ (Summer 2009), The American Scholar.org, 
http://www.theamericanscholar.org/not-ready-for-mt-rushmore/ (accessed September 25, 2009). 
  
18 
 
presidency. Reagan’s life-story is thus subject to the mythic imperatives of its 
narrative form and of the traditions and symbolic conventions of presidential 
biography. His life explains his presidency, while his presidency is remembered 
through his life, each process infusing the story with a sense of inevitability, or 
destiny. The symbolic meaning of the presidency as a representation of America also 
results in Reagan’s life representing and revealing American history, as defined by 
themes of his leadership. Chapter One makes use of the broad range of Reagan’s 
biography, focusing on its portrayal of his pre-political life, and interpreting it in 
terms of existing biographical theory. Presidential biography has largely been 
overlooked as a genre, and while Reagan’s life has distinctive characteristics, this 
study also advances a new model of thinking about how pre-presidential lives are 
extensions of presidential and American myth.  
 Chapter Two uses Reagan’s speeches and the wealth of his published writings 
to construct a broad narrative of American history as he understood it. This 
reconfirms the mythic aspects of Reagan’s historical ideas, as established by Heclo 
and others, such as his dramatic expression, his fictive style, and his overarching 
belief in American destiny. Others have explored Reagan’s conception and projection 
of the images and events of America’s past to reveal their impact on American 
politics and on his political success, or to reflect on his psychology and character. I 
seek to establish the methods and form of Reagan’s historical approach, and measure 
the coherency against its evasions and contradictions. Reagan’s favoured stories 
emphasised a unified national identity, while avoiding evidence and themes of 
division, and his faith in American destiny The establishment of Reagan’s 
engagement with American mythology is essential to this thesis, and finding it in his 
perception, construction and uses of American history argues its intellectual 
significance for Reagan, without elevating or reducing him to a symbol of America’s 
mythic processes.  
 This establishment of Reagan’s appreciation of both history’s stories and 
processes provides a foundation for Chapter Three, which examines how Reagan’s 
presidency engaged politically with the American past in its commemorative activity. 
The themes of destiny and continuity in his first inaugural, of division in the national 
commemoration of recent history, and of unity and American moral identity in the 
remembrance of the Second World War, are the subjects of this study. Using White 
House records (and those of Reagan’s transition), this chapter lays out the procedural, 
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political and rhetorical decisions of Reagan and his staff as they responded to and 
sought to shape the trends of contemporary national memory. This examination 
reveals that while Reagan operated within the symbolic function of the presidency, its 
opportunities, constraints and demands, he also advanced it to the point that his 
engagement with national memory became a distinctive and defining aspect of his 
presidency. 
 Reagan’s commemorations brought myth to the fore of his presidency and to 
his subsequent interpretation. Chapter Four demonstrates that beyond this, myth was 
also a definitive factor in the interpretation of the political achievements and failures 
of his leadership. Here, I consider the partisan discourse, indicated above, in the 
commentary and historical literature which has reacted to Reagan and contributed to 
his mythological identity. The division in this discourse emphasises two “events” of 
Reagan’s presidency: his victory in the Cold War, as argued by conservatives, and the 
Iran/Contra affair, which revealed to the left the depths of his presidency. The 
political function of the Cold War argument has so far defined conservative 
mythology of Reagan, but here it is considered more broadly, as part of an argument 
about history. The mythological interpretations of Iran/Contra, meanwhile, which 
treat the event symbolically as a matter of image and truth, and in terms of ideals of 
American democracy and identity, are given fresh attention here. This chapter argues 
that partisan division has strengthened Reagan’s association with American myth, 
making him a contested historical symbol. 
 These themes of Reagan as a partisan and historical symbol are visited in 
Chapter 5 in terms of his representation by the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. I 
consider this institution historically, charting its creation and development since the 
beginning of Reagan’s presidency. This approach makes use of related collections at 
Stanford University, where its construction was first planned, and research done at the 
Reagan Library itself, which though it has no open material on its internal workings, 
has kept thorough press records of its development. My study reveals the multi-
functioned nature of the library – historical, commemorative and political – and 
argues that these competing purposes coalesce in their mythic treatment of Reagan. 
However, there is tension in this convergence, where Reagan’s presidency is both an 
indicator of the ideals and narratives of national history, and a vital symbol to 
contemporary Republican and conservative politics. This tension, which appears in 
various forms throughout the thesis, is reviewed in the conclusion in relation to 
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Reagan’s meaning in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, and of his death and funeral. 
This final question asks how Reagan might emerge as a national symbol, indicative to 
Americans of the broad themes of their history and identity, rather than the continuing 
activity of a particular political party, movement and philosophy. In answering this, I 
point to the central discovery of the thesis, that Reagan’s relationship to American 
mythology is in itself a mythic idea. Reagan’s national meaning, expressed in terms of 
renewed “optimism”, “patriotism” and his identity as the “Great Communicator”, is 
his symbolic representation of American mythic beliefs, narratives and practices.  
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Chapter 1 
“An American Life”: Ronald Reagan and Biography 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Reagan’s biography acts as an expression and extension of his presidential 
mythology. It tells his life-story to explain his presidency, while his presidency and its 
themes determine the narrative and meaning of his life. Biography reinforces the 
interpretation of Reagan’s leadership and representation of America as mythic 
operations, and affirms the idea of his presidency as an event of mythic importance to 
contemporary America. In each case, arguments about his national significance move 
beyond the immediate historic relevance of his presidency and into the personal 
history of his life. Here they become necessarily symbolic. The events of Reagan’s 
life are told in constant reference to those of his later leadership, while the 
representative nature of that leadership continues to act upon those events – as the 
presidency made Reagan representative of his nation, so it makes his life 
representative of national history. Biography represents a distinct area in which 
Reagan’s relationship to American mythology is expressed and realised. This arises 
not only from the specific interpretation and remembrance of Reagan, but also from 
the imperatives and possibilities of the life-story in general. Biographies of Reagan 
belong to the wider tradition of presidential biography, a genre which displays 
particular characteristics and problems, resulting from both the symbolic meaning of 
the presidency, and the nature of the biographical form. The mythic representation of 
Reagan’s life responds as much to him as to the demands of literary representation 
and to established mythic ideas about the American presidency. This chapter 
considers Reagan’s biography as a distinct field which advances Reagan’s 
relationship to American myth not only through its arguments, but also by subsuming 
him into a cultural form and tradition peculiarly bound by myth.  
 Presidential biography has been overlooked as a genre in the fields of both 
literary criticism and presidential history. Authors who have recognised it have 
discussed it in terms of the construction and perception of presidential images, but in 
limited contexts. William Burlie Brown and others have focused specifically on the 
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campaign biography, and its conformity to an ideal presidential life-narrative.45 
Edward Pessen also approached this narrative of humble beginnings and self-made 
success, but in terms of its inapplicability to most presidents, rather than its 
construction and representation in biography.46 Scott Casper’s examination of 
presidential biography, integrated within a wider American culture of biography, 
raised interesting points about the significance of such life-stories to the construction 
of national identity, but this related specifically to the nineteenth century, when, as 
Casper stresses, biography had different roles and expectations than in the twentieth 
century.47 A comparably thorough study of twentieth century American biography, 
much less presidential biography, has not been made, though in a review essay, Glenn 
Altschuler and Eric Rauchway observed how mythic expectations about the 
presidential life continue to govern presidential biography.48 Meanwhile, the wider 
literature on biography as a literary form contains discussions of its changing but 
continually problematic nature. These problems often relate to biography’s 
historiographical tensions. The form has ambiguous functions and narrative demands 
which put it at odds with the ideals of objective, factual history and which allow for 
the mythic representation of its subjects and the past. As a biographical subject, 
Ronald Reagan amplifies this process through his established status as a practitioner, 
symbol and focus of American myth. 
 This chapter examines how these problems appear in and affect Reagan 
biographies, in terms of their varying functions and forms. The first section introduces 
the idea of presidential biography, its shapes and its problems. The presidential 
childhood is the aspect of presidential biography that has the greatest representational 
traditions, and this can inform an understanding of how Reagan’s early life has been 
portrayed, promoted and critiqued, in campaign and historical biography. Here, myth 
exists in the association of Reagan’s life with pre-established images of the 
presidency, and of the American past in general. Related to this is the commemorative 
purpose of biography. The second section considers how authors have recounted 
Reagan’s life as an act of remembrance that responds to or seeks to inform American 
                                                 
45 Brown, William Burlie, The People’s Choice: The Presidential Image in the Campaign Biography 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960). 
46 Pessen, Edward, The Log Cabin Myth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). 
47 Casper, Scott E., Constructing American Lives: Biography and Culture in Nineteenth Century 
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).  
48 Altschuler, Glenn C. and Rauchway, Eric, ‘Presidential Biography and the Great Commoner 
Complex,’ American Literary History, 16(2) 2004, pp. 363-74. 
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collective memory. Thirdly, biography has certain creative opportunities, whereby 
Reagan’s life appears in fiction and its traditional American forms, and is received as 
fiction. Examples of this demonstrate in part the blending of Reagan’s life with 
American culture and its iconography, but also the sensitivity of his myth in the 
reception of these fictions. The final function of presidential biography to be 
considered is its operation as national biography, where the president’s life reveals 
American history through experience and association. Reagan’s life is rich in 
historical experience, but not only does this determine specifically themed national 
narratives, it also demands through Reagan’s presidential identity, as mythic actor or 
Cold War victor, a specific symbolic interpretation of that history.  
 
Presidential Biography and Reagan’s Childhood 
 
Reagan’s youth in Illinois during the early decades of the twentieth century has 
demonstrated to his biographers the roots and future echoes of his presidency, but it 
also conforms to the conventions of presidential biography and the myth of the 
presidential childhood. The basis for Edward Pessen’s study of presidential lives was 
to test “the most enduring and the most popular of American myths…that our most 
exalted leaders, in politics as in business, have risen from the most modest 
beginnings, owing their success above all to their own ability and their own 
performance.”49 The campaign trail has long propagated and reinforced this myth, 
producing biographies which promote their subjects for the office. Campaign 
biographies represent a small and distinct section of presidential biography, defined 
by the single purpose of electing a candidate. William Brown called them 
“propaganda” which appealed to and constructed the American idea of the presidency. 
Brown considered the choice of a president to be driven by symbolic needs, and that 
the biographies of candidates represent the effort to meet the symbolic requisites of 
the office. Campaign biographers “are engaged in the creation of a symbol…they 
create out of the raw material of a candidate’s real life the biography of an ideal 
citizen of the Republic.”50 The remarkably standard narrative that Brown describes 
has various aspects relating to ancestry, education, and character, but “no one theme 
in the entire range…stands out more strongly and consistently than this ‘self-made 
                                                 
49 Pessen (1984), p. 3.  
50 Brown (1960), pp. xi-xiv. 
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man’ ideal.”51 Central to this, meanwhile, is the emphasis on the hardship, real or 
exaggerated, that the candidate experienced in his youth. This developed in nineteenth 
century presidential elections where biographers stressed the humble rural origins of 
their candidates, emerging in the dominant symbol and cliché of the log cabin.52 In the 
twentieth century this saw translation, perhaps unsuccessfully, to the roots of Al 
Smith, whose poor urban environment was compared favourably to that of 
Springfield, Illinois.53 Poverty and hardship are the conditions from which the 
candidate successfully escapes, but are also valuable as indicators of character. The 
narrative is one that contains both the American everyman experience, and the 
American dream. The story continues to have relevance on the campaign trail, 
demonstrated in Bill Clinton’s 1992 convention film A Man From Hope, and 
evidenced in the 2008 campaign by Fred Thompson’s assertion that “I can out-poor 
any of them. I grew up under more modest circumstances than anybody on that 
stage.”54 
 Though Reagan’s campaigns did not attract the glut of biographical 
publications that had been standard in the years before television, the “log cabin 
myth” was still apparent. Only two books were published that could formally be 
called Reagan campaign biographies. The first is Where’s the Rest of Me? (1965), 
written at his transition into professional politics, which must be categorised 
differently, partly because it was neither written anticipating a presidential run, nor 
republished to benefit those in 1976 or 1980, but mostly because it is an 
autobiography. Though ghost-written, by the novelist and screenwriter Richard 
Hubler, its significance as a personal memoir distinguishes it from the ephemeral and 
single-minded campaign biography, notably as a lasting source for other biographers. 
More typical, though still distinctive for its reliance on Reagan’s own voice, is Helen 
Von Damm’s Sincerely, Ronald Reagan, which was first published in 1976, then 
reissued for the 1980 campaign. This fits some of the conventions of the campaign 
                                                 
51 Ibid, p. 53. 
52 This image had such perseverance that a biographer of Rutherford B. Hayes felt the need to 
emphasise that the brick house of his birth had a log-built extension. Ibid, pp. 53-6; also see Lepore, 
Jill, ‘Bound for Glory: Writing Campaign Lives’, The New Yorker (October 20, 2008), 
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53 Cornog, Evan, The Power and the Story (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), p. 76.  
54 Quaid, Libby, ‘Huckabee, Thompson Drop Gloves,’ The Seattle Times (January 12, 2008), 
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biography. Short and promotional, authored by a close subordinate, Reagan’s personal 
secretary, it offers exclusive insight into the candidate’s life, character and beliefs. 
Von Damm does this by constructing a loose narrative around extracts from Reagan’s 
personal letters to create “a fireside chat with the man who may become our next 
president”.55  
Largely a representation of Reagan’s political positions and philosophy, it is 
also built on essential biographical detail in which the archetype of Brown’s “ideal 
citizen” can be found. There is “a glamor” to Reagan’s public perception, built from 
his Hollywood and political careers, an image of a man “urbane, witty, warm, yet 
somehow aloof…But there is little in any of this that recalls the poor boy from small-
town Illinois.”56 Von Damm’s depiction of Reagan’s youth, drawing extensively from 
Where’s the Rest of Me? as well as from reminiscent letters, emphasises how the 
challenges and opportunities of his environment laid the ground for later success. 
Brown describes an ideal youth that combines constructive recreation with a serious 
attitude to education. In Von Damm, we see Reagan relate the benefits of his 
experiences hunting and participating in organised sports, and are told of the value he 
gives to his college education, through which he supported himself by working.  
Subsequently, his break into radio announcing during the depression is presented as a 
result of his perseverance, ingenuity and talent. Reagan’s life in his campaign 
biography thus conforms to the genre’s conventions.  
This demonstrates that even before his attainment of the presidency, Reagan’s 
life faced interpretation in terms of well-established myths about presidential lives. 
These myths may have singularly practical use in a campaign biography, but their 
prevalence and persistence also suggests a problem for the historical presidential 
biographer, who must respond to them even if the purpose of their narratives may not 
be so straightforwardly defined. Phyllis Auty, a biographer of Tito, has discussed a 
similar problem in writing the lives of communist leaders, which she defined as a 
distinct sub-genre that bears comparison with presidential biography. Noting strong 
similarities in the official versions of different leaders’ youths, again emphasising 
deprived childhoods and commitments to education, Auty noted that “many 
biographers have to cope with the problem of how to deal with the myth which has 
                                                 
55 Von Damm, Helen, Sincerely, Ronald Reagan (New York: Berkley Books, 1976). 
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taken over from the real person”.57 This is a central problem in presidential biography, 
and particularly the biography of Reagan, where his own specific mythic identity 
combines with that of the presidency to influence the representation of his life. 
 For some, this is not a problem, simply because they embrace the myth. In 
Peggy Noonan’s hagiography, Dixon is a heartland town that “was like a family that 
functioned well, a place that was peaceful, ordered, reliably affectionate.”58 This 
environment allows the young Reagan to make positive character choices despite the 
less stable circumstances of his family life. Though ordinary, these were also 
exceptional. His “beginnings were the most modest and lacking of any president of 
the past hundred years.” “Reagan,” she asserts, “is unique in that his family had no 
status or standing.”59 This statement is all the more meaningful for its tenuousness; 
Nelle Reagan had considerable standing in Dixon’s Christian community. The 
Hollywood biographer Anne Edwards, whose Early Reagan (1987) is still turned to 
for its thoroughly researched narrative of Reagan’s pre-political life, did not have 
Noonan’s overt political intention to celebrate Reagan. Presidential myth, though, was 
central to her account of the young Dutch Reagan, an “all-American boy” coming of 
age in small-town Dixon, “the backbone of the country”, before breaking free for the 
sake of his dreams. These quotes came from interviews with Dixon residents, with 
Edwards at once revealing and reinforcing the strength of belief in the American 
myths of the small town and presidential roots.60 The small-town was part of 
Reagan’s political narrative, as he expressed himself in the rhetoric of the culture 
wars: “a town where everyone cared about one another because everyone knew one 
another, not as statistics in a government program but as neighbours in need…No one 
on Dixon, Illinois ever burned a flag and no one in Dixon would have tolerated it.”61 
Dixon, meanwhile, has become a symbol in its economic and social decline for 
Reagan’s critics, who indicate Reagan’s harmful policies and uncaring distance from 
his roots and people.62 As Alonzo Hamby argued, it was “a measure of [Reagan’s] 
                                                 
57 Auty, Phyllis, ‘Problems of Writing a Biography of a Communist Leader’, Friedson, Anthony M. 
(ed.), New Directions in Biography (University Press of Hawaii, 1981), pp. 26-34. 
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political skill that he made us believe that he could have been a contented provincial 
nonentity.”63 Dixon’s small-town image resonates strongly with national and 
presidential myth, and thus is a vital part of Reagan’s biography, despite his own 
youthful efforts to escape it.  
By Reagan’s era, American biography had changed considerably since its 
roots in the nineteenth century, when its social function was more uniformly defined 
and accepted. Presidential biography, however, still echoed tradition. “Part of a 
multifaceted effort to create a national identity and culture”, biography had been 
produced and read for its didactic potential.64 The presidency was central to this, best 
represented by the prevalence of George Washington’s life-story, written by Parson 
Weems and others, as an exemplary narrative for personal and national moral 
instruction.65 In the twentieth century, American biography yielded as a means of 
ideological continuation, to become a more diverse medium under the influences of 
professional history, psychology and popular culture. Reagan’s biographies display 
these influences, but they are also guided by American interest in the presidency, 
which still carries symbolic weight. Altschuler and Rauchway have described in 
modern presidential biography a “great commoner complex”. This relates to the 
changing nature and perception of the presidency, which in a “more jaded age” 
authors are “more likely to criticize and debunk”, but whose increased power and 
complexity has increased the expectations of its office-holders. Reviewing recent 
biographies of Presidents William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson 
and John Kennedy, the authors describe how critical political history is still tempered 
by expectations of the symbolic presidency, causing biographers to seek the idea of 
the office, representative but extraordinary, within their subjects.66 
This symbolic weight is apparent in biographers’ efforts to account for 
Reagan’s presidency in his life-story. They are also complicated by a more general 
process of modern biography identified by Ira Bruce Nadel, a biographer of Leonard 
Cohen who explored the theory of his craft. Nadel described the “corrective impulse” 
of life-writers, which seeks to expose and level existing myths and images of the 
                                                 
63 Hamby, Alonzo L., Liberalism and its Challengers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 341. 
64 Casper (1999), p. 19.  
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subject.67 For him, this was biography’s first activity, but the second was “its own 
unconscious creation of new myths.” “Through fact and revision,” writes Nadel, 
“biography strives to demythologize the individual but inevitably, this becomes an 
ironic effort, since readers replace old myths with new if they read biography 
uncritically.”68 In relation to Reagan’s childhood, this is best represented by Garry 
Wills’s treatment in the first chapters of Reagan’s America. Wills approached Reagan 
with an interest in the iconic. His other work has looked at the lives and cultural 
meaning of Presidents George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Richard Nixon, as 
well as Jack Ruby and John Wayne. His narrative is directed by the close reading of 
Reagan’s own in Where’s the Rest of Me?, which he describes as “a political 
campaign waiting to happen”.69 This reading exemplifies the corrective impulse 
described by Nadel, but is defined by the author’s intention to reveal Reagan’s 
presidency, which for Wills is about myth.  
Wills takes as his starting point Reagan’s memory that his childhood 
“existence turned into one of those rare Huck Finn-Tom Sawyer idylls…when I 
learned the real riches of rags.”70 This allusion was echoed later by Von Damm: 
“Ronald…grew up living the semi-idyllic Tom Sawyerish life of the typical small-
town boy.”71 Wills begins by reminding the reader that Mark Twain’s world, 
represented in his “chronicles of superstition, racism and crime,” was far from idyllic. 
This suggestion of Reagan’s romanticisation of his own, and America’s past, 
however, is followed by the observation of “a special poignancy in his superficial 
gesture toward Huck Finn, since there is much of Twain’s Mississippi in Reagan’s 
background.” Partly a means of diverting the narrative to a portrait of the nineteenth 
century Mid-Western roots of Jack Reagan, this also allows an exploration of Ronald 
Reagan’s mythic origins. Wills describes the nostalgia of Mark Twain for an old 
America, combined with an enthusiasm for its progress. Twain’s world of the 
youthful and heroic frontier merged with advancing modernity implicitly reflects the 
ideological vision of President Reagan. Even as he seeks to deconstruct and debunk 
them, Wills portrays Reagan as born to the stories and symbols of America, 
reinforcing his thesis of Reagan’s presidency and confirming the presidency’s 
                                                 
67 Nadel, Ira Bruce, Biography: Fiction, Fact and Form (London: MacMillan, 1984), p. 9. 
68 Ibid, pp. 176-8. 
69 Garry Wills, Reagan’s America: Innocents at Home (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), p. 343. 
70 Reagan, Ronald, My Early Life (or Where’s the Rest of Me?) (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1984), 
p. 13.  
71 Von Damm (1976), p. 2. 
  
29 
 
symbolic hold on the narrative. Anne Edwards also opens with a Mark Twain 
reference, quoting him: “Among the three or four million cradles now rocking in the 
land are some which this nation would preserve for ages as sacred things, if we could 
know which ones they are.”72 In presidential biography, Reagan’s childhood can be 
made sacred in retrospect, and even if not reverently represented according to the 
conventions of presidential myth, it is still invested with national mythic meaning.  
 
 
Commemorative Biography 
 
In discussing their craft, biographers have demonstrated unease over its deviation 
from and distortion of historiographical purpose. Those concerned with the scholarly 
value of biography disdain hagiography, literally the life-writing of saints, which 
represents the form’s commemorative potential. Anthony Friedson, introducing the 
collected papers from the first international symposium on the nature and future of 
biography, excluded from this conversation the “hagiographers, or their cousins, the 
political image makers,” whose “conjuring of moral exempla has led to the formulaic 
harnessing of biography for religious or social ends.”73 Harold Nicolson described this 
problem more expansively in terms of his ideal of “pure biography”, which has “no 
purpose other than that of conveying to the reader an authentic portrait of the 
individual…Biography is rendered impure when some extraneous purpose intrudes to 
distort the accuracy of the presentation.” Nicolson was arguing for a rejection of 
biography’s origins, which was “the desire to commemorate the illustrious dead.” 
This “instinct” and “passion” had unfortunately been “endemic, and sometimes 
epidemic… it has infected biography throughout the centuries.”74 Commemoration is 
a strong theme of presidential biography, but represents a different process than 
straightforward political promotion. To some extent, all biography is commemorative, 
as long as its subject has some place in or claim on collective memory. To narrate a 
life is to remember it, and to present it to an audience is to ask for collective 
remembrance. In the case of presidential biography, where the subject is symbolic of 
national experience and identity, this is particularly relevant. However, here the focus 
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is on those biographies of Reagan defined by a commemorative purpose, and which 
make arguments about his place in national memory.  
  
 Commemoration can be seen as a purpose of Reagan’s official biographies, 
where the symbolic authority of the presidency imbues the accounts with national 
significance. The Ronald Reagan Presidential Museum is the prime example of 
Reagan’s commemoration, and carries his official and symbolic endorsement. There, 
Reagan’s life is presented as an American experience, an “American Journey, which 
can be remembered collectively through the artefacts on display. A similar process is 
at work in Ronald Reagan: The Presidential Portfolio (2001), which was produced 
with the cooperation of the Reagan Library, and which makes great use of the 
library’s collection of images and documents to produce a similarly authoritative and 
commemorative effect. The text is by Lou Cannon, and though largely abridged from 
his previous works, which are admiring but critical, it is a comparatively celebratory 
narrative. “The greatness of Reagan,” he concludes, “was that he held a shining vision 
of America inside of him, a vision he carried all the way from Dixon, Illinois, to the 
White House.”75 The book, however, distinguishes itself by offering the reader more 
than narrative interpretation, but a visual and aural experience of its materials, in its 
array of images, reproductions of documents and accompanying CD. It is not entirely 
unique, but a more sophisticated version of similar, unofficial retrospectives such as 
J.H. Cardigan’s Ronald Reagan: A Remarkable Life, published in 1995 and reprinted 
in a commemorative edition after Reagan’s death.76  Again, a sparse and celebratory 
text is accompanied on nearly every page by images of its subject. These almost all 
represent Reagan’s public life, with the greatest use of promotional Hollywood shots. 
There is little effort towards candid insight in the images, rather a consistently heroic 
portrayal which engages with the familiar iconography of American imagination, 
whether of Hollywood or the presidency. These books are intended to be looked at as 
much as read, experienced visually and emotionally as much as intellectually. They 
are commemorative objects in themselves, monuments of remembrance for the home.   
 Reagan’s own efforts to define his place in American historical memory are 
more ambiguous, as represented by his involvement in the production of his 
presidential autobiography and his authorised biography. An American Life (1990) 
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was ghost-written like his previous memoir, this time by Robert Lindsey, a writer of 
spy thrillers. Reagan seemed to display a genuine lack of interest in the task. After it 
was finished, he wrote to President Nixon, commiserating over the effort: “Dick you 
are so right about that writing a book business. Believe me I don’t want to even 
attempt another one.”77 His editor, Michael Korda, later wrote an account of its 
production, which revealed a certain amount of effort to see Reagan’s book conform 
to presidential tradition. The editorial team drafted a proposed outline which 
recommended “that it begin with a memorable opening line something like Nixon’s 
(‘I was born in a house my father built’), stress his humble origins, and achieve…the 
simplicity and dignity of [President Ulysses S.] Grant’s prose.”78 Reagan’s reticence 
resisted their hopes for introspection on the meaning and national significance of his 
background. As a memoir of the presidency, the book’s relevance has been 
superseded by the publication of his diaries, where largely unreflecting observation 
and detail benefits from its chronicle, rather than narrative form. As autobiography, it 
is not revelatory or frank and projects a bland self-assurance that yet does not betray a 
great concern with historical legacy. It is most interesting for Reagan’s consistently 
asserted belief in the destined path of his life. “Then one of those things happened,” 
says Reagan in an echoed refrain, “that makes one wonder about God’s having a plan 
for all of us.”79 Asides such as this reinforce, in part, his denials of presidential 
ambition, but they also chime with his frequently expressed belief in American divine 
destiny. In this way, he allows his life to become part of national history, and more, 
national purpose.  
  This lack of great personal interest in the construction of his historical image 
was also evident in the inception of his official biography, and the appointment and 
direction of its author, Edmund Morris. This idea, conceived and realised by Reagan’s 
advisers and friends, including Michael Deaver, Senator Mark Hatfield and the 
Librarian of Congress, Daniel Boorstin, had some precedence. As Morris described 
his expected role, as “the apparently conservative and scholarly author of a heroic 
presidential biography,” he would be “an ideal in-house historian to witness and 
record, à la Robert Sherwood and Arthur Schlesinger Jr., the daily drama of a 
presidency in action.” However, this specific appointment of a biographer during a 
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president’s term was unprecedented, indicating an early concern about Reagan’s place 
in American history and memory, while Morris’s identity as a biographer is 
significant. Morris was chosen on the basis of The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt (1979), 
a dramatic narrative which ends before its subject attains the presidency, and whose 
strength is in part its ability to find its subject both within the pace of American 
history but also in his own vision of America. The choice of Morris, “for better or 
worse, simply a narrative biographer,” may have brought unintended consequences, 
but it must have come with the anticipation that Reagan’s life would be told as 
American myth.80  
 This anticipation was valid. Dutch is a presidential biography that embraces its 
commemorative role. Morris’s innovative method of fictionalising his narrative was 
indicated and explained in the subtitle to the book: “A Memoir of Ronald Reagan”. 
Morris created a narrator who has shadowed Reagan from his youth, rather than just 
the three final years of his presidency, so that he could remember Reagan’s life, rather 
than merely recount it. Mark Maslan noted this in his analysis of the book, which 
convincingly argues that Morris’s methods appeal to a post-modern concept of 
national identity: “For Morris, memory is history as a medium of identity, and by 
inventing memories of Reagan, Morris seeks not so much to teach us about him as to 
enable us [as Americans] to identify with him.”81 Early on in Dutch, Morris expresses 
his concept of presidential biography: “Presidents, whatever their political symbolism, 
represent the national character of their era, and if we do not understand our leaders as 
people, we can never understand ourselves as Americans.”82 While he invents his own 
memories to allow this understanding, he also seeks it in Reagan’s memory. This is 
sharply introduced in the prologue, which recounts Morris’s accompaniment of 
Reagan in 1990 to his birthplace in Tampico, Illinois. Morris, the historian, corrects 
the president as he misremembers the details of his earliest days. Then, after 
witnessing Reagan’s quiet shock and quick retreat from the room of his birth, he 
reflects:  
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Who of us, forced so brutally to confront the nothingness from which we 
have sprung, would not have turned away as he did, knowing it to be 
indistinguishable from – indeed identical with – the nothingness that 
looms ahead?83 
 
Morris suggests the fragility of memory as a reliable representation of the past, but 
also the meaninglessness of the past without memory to explain it. His biography, a 
constructed memory of a mythic president, represents an attempt to reconcile this 
problem. By the end, the author has formed a less bleak understanding of Reagan’s, 
and thus America’s, ability to cope with the past.  
Peggy Noonan also indicated a mythic purpose to the recollection of Reagan’s 
life in the opening chapter of When Character was King. This book, though not an 
official production like Dutch, still carries an air of authority based on Noonan’s 
identity as a member of the Reagan administration. The first chapter relates a 
nostalgic reunion of administration members at the christening in 2001 of the USS 
Ronald Reagan. There is a personal pride in the distinction of this identity – “We 
were like veterans…We’d been in a war, and we had a leader”. Noonan, however, 
went beyond the sentimental reminiscences of Reagan’s staff to firmly associate 
Reagan’s memory with national identity, through the youthful crew of the aircraft 
carrier and their pride in its name. Influencing the knowledge of America’s youth was 
an expressed purpose of her biography. In the epilogue, she wrote: “The little bodies 
of children are the repositories of the greatness of a future age. And they must be 
encouraged, must eat from the tales of those who’ve gone before.”84 In a radio 
interview, meanwhile, she explained that her book, which sought to share and 
communicate her love for Reagan, was primarily a gift to young Americans who did 
not know him or experience his presidency.85 Noonan’s and Morris’s memoirs are 
remarkably different in style, tone and structure, but they share an assumption about 
the importance of Reagan’s life to American identity, and an understanding of the 
strength of using commemoration to convey this importance. 
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 Though both books were published before Reagan’s death, they each have the 
air of eulogy to them, a response to his advanced illness and expressed through the 
authors’ accounts of their last meetings with the president – which in the context of 
their commemorative purposes, take on broader significance. Noonan’s is an intimate 
encounter. Taking her son to meet Reagan (further evidence of her determination to 
bequeath the young with understanding) she struggles to express her admiration for 
him in a way he will understand: 
 
So I just looked at him, and then I think an angel whispered in my ear 
because I remembered the thing everyone understands, old people and 
little babies and everyone in between. I took his hand and said, “Mr. 
President, I just came to tell you that I love you. I want you to know that 
we love you very much.”86 
 
This is an intensely personal expression of the author, but she also, by using “we,” 
seems to speak on behalf of more than herself – the reader, perhaps, or the nation.  
This is an inclusive and cathartic remembrance. Morris’s meeting is characteristically 
more distant, but still invested with certain meaning. His final interview with the 
president was conducted one month after Reagan’s public announcement of his 
Alzheimer’s disease. Morris finds an absence in Reagan, remarking, “he had long 
since stopped recognizing me; now I no longer recognized him.” The author instead 
responds to objects – the original draft of the president’s final letter to the American 
people, a watercolour of Rock River – finding recognition in them, making them 
symbols of Reagan’s lost strength and genius. Later, he records an instance of when 
Reagan impulsively took a white miniature house from a fish tank – “He takes it 
home, clenched wet in his fist. ‘This is…something to do with me…I’m not sure 
what.’” The tragic irony of Reagan’s vanishing memory prompts the need to preserve 
his meaning: “I must now retreat from him, closet myself with books and cards and 
paper, and finish the Life he authorized me to write, nine years before.” The final 
meaning that Morris gives to Reagan’s life is based in fiction, revealed in a plot twist, 
but urged on the reader for its national significance. The reader discovers that the 
narrator was, anonymously, one of the swimmers whom Reagan had saved from Rock 
River while working as a lifeguard in his youth. Despite Reagan’s last words to him, 
that “I saved seventy-seven lives. And you know, none of ‘em ever thanked me!”, 
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Morris fails to acknowledge his debt and gratitude (because, probably, this creative 
twist had not yet occurred to him). Instead, he makes it a collective burden and 
metaphor of Reagan’s legacy - “Some day, I hoped, America might acknowledge her 
similar debt to the old Lifeguard who rescued her in a time of poisonous despair 
and…carried her ‘breastward out of peril.’”87 Both Morris and Noonan present their 
biographies as expressions of national memory, converting their personal memoirs 
into conduits for commemorative, American myth. 
 
 
Creative Biography 
 
The issue of fiction in biography is a complex one, though guided by a general rule 
against the invention of fact. In Reagan’s biography, which as well as the innovations 
of Edmund Morris has seen translation into America’s traditionally fictional media, 
the issue of fiction has both extended and contended with Reagan’s myth. André 
Maurois, who compared the expressive task of biography to that of portraiture, 
asserted that “under no account has the biographer a right to invent a single fact”, 
while Leon Edel similarly argued that the biographer is “allowed the imagination of 
form, but not of fact”.88 The assertion of the rule suggests a tension in the nature of 
representing a life, which according to Phyllis Rose is “as much as a work of fiction – 
of guiding narrative structures – as novels and poems.”89 This tension is the result of 
the narrative demands of the life-story, with its clearly defined structure and focus (an 
individual from birth to death), and the expectations it raises of coherent meaning. Ira 
Nadel drew on Hayden White’s theories of narrative to discuss the unique demands of 
plot and potential for creative interpretation in biography: 
 
Emplotment provides fact with fictive meaning while gratifying our desire 
to resolve our own sense of fragmentation through the unity or story of the 
lives of others – and implicitly our own. The fictive power of “story” 
provides us with a coherent vision of life.90 
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This was made manifesto in 1925 by Robert Littell (in the form of an imagined 
dialogue between novelist and biographer): “Our job is to make sense: that is the new 
biography…Of course the imagination distorts anything it touches, but only through 
imagination can the thing live at all.”91 This relates to the use of “creative fact” in 
biography, which describes the selection and shaping of factual detail to give meaning 
to the overarching story. The creative representation of Reagan’s life relates to these 
issues of form. However, as a specific subject, Reagan presents opportunities and 
hazards for his biographers in this respect. As a president, he is part of American 
cultural iconography and its traditions of fictional representation. As a president 
fundamentally associated with the production of fiction, in Hollywood film and in 
political narratives, the question of truthful representation can become a theme of his 
life. Meanwhile, as a current political symbol, his life and its representation can 
become political issues in which accuracy is vital. The formal nature of biography, the 
traditions of American culture, and the particular identity of Ronald Reagan, combine 
to give his life-story rich potential for creative and fictional representation – and for 
interpretation as fiction. In the sense of the fable, and of the ambiguity of truth, his 
mythological association is encouraged.  
Reagan’s life has seen representation in media traditionally associated with 
fiction. Ronald Reagan: A Graphic Biography (2007) represents part of the increasing 
effort to bring non-fiction to the expanding world of graphic literature, reflected in the 
name of its publisher, Serious Comics, whose other productions have included 
biographies of J. Edgar Hoover and Malcolm X. Graphic literature relies on coherent 
visual sequences which in turn allow for a dramatic narrative making use of action 
and the controlled passage of time. It is thus a form that favours the creative and the 
imaginative, not to mention the visually effective.92 It is also thoroughly associated 
with themes of American myth, best represented by its imperishably prominent 
superhero genre (with which Reagan had had some connection),93 but also through its 
frequent reliance on familiar iconography as a narrative tool. A Graphic Biography 
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represents the difficulty of reconciling the medium’s characteristics with factual 
biography. The authors avoid dialogue and dramatic sequences in favour of panels 
which simply illustrate the textual narrative, which is necessarily limited if relatively 
profuse. The potential of the medium is neglected through concern for the factual 
objectives of biography. Where the images are inventive, they mostly draw on the 
traditions and iconography of political cartoons. However, there is one attempt at an 
original realisation of Reagan’s own imagery, in the final page’s depiction of 
Reagan’s Farewell Address, where he is seen ascending towards the Shining City on a 
Hill.94 A second graphic biography of Reagan is to be released in October, 2009 by 
Bluewater Productions, who have also produced biographies of the Obamas. Reagan’s 
life is considered suitable for graphic literature, a testament not only to his continuing 
popular appeal or historical significance, but also his potential for visual, stylised and 
essentially mythic representation. This affinity, though, is tempered by the factual 
necessity of biography. 
 Reagan’s representation in film might seem more naturally suitable, but has 
proved more problematic. In one of his more successful Hollywood performances, 
Reagan played the role of the footballer George Gipp in the story about the Notre 
Dame coach, Knute Rockne: All American. This biographical portrayal had a renewed 
legacy during his presidency, which Godfrey Hodgson made the centre-piece in the 
narrative of his own biographical documentary of President Reagan in 1987. 
Accompanying the president on a trip to Notre Dame, the filmmaker and student of 
American politics witnessed “a revelation” as Reagan quoted in his speech his old 
lines from the film, “…go out and win one for the Gipper.” “One secret of Ronald 
Reagan’s political magic,” went the commentary, “lies in his knack of mixing a potent 
cocktail of reality and myth. His gospel is national uplift. But he deftly mixes it with a 
movie role he played sanctifying the Notre Dame football star of the 1920s”.95 
Hodgson’s film went on to draw heavily from Garry Wills’s thesis about Reagan’s 
embodiment of American myth. This indicates, for one, the prevalence of biography 
in American culture and myth, and re-emphasises the centrality of film and fiction to 
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Reagan’s own myth. It is perhaps strange, then, that Reagan’s life has not been a more 
common dramatic subject in American film. 
 Only one attempt has been made, the 2003 CBS miniseries, The Reagans. One 
other TV movie, produced by Oliver Stone, did depict the Reagan administration. The 
Day Reagan was Shot (2001), however, gave little screen-time to the president, 
focusing instead on Richard Drefyuss’s sympathetic portrayal of Alexander Haig. 
Other recent presidents have received more attention. Richard Nixon has seen varied 
representation in Oliver Stone’s engagingly paranoid Nixon (1995), the nostalgic 
comedy Dick (1999), and the intriguing look at television and the presidency in 
Frost/Nixon (2008). Bill Clinton has been obliquely represented in Primary Colors 
(1995), and will appear as a character in the forthcoming The Special Relationship. 
George W. Bush, meanwhile, was heroically portrayed in D.C. 9/11: Time of Crisis 
(2003) and less so in Oliver Stone’s second presidential biopic, W (2008). Though all 
of these have prompted criticism, none was met with the controversial reception of 
The Reagans, even though most were more deliberately and definitively political in 
their interpretations. The film was commissioned as a love-story, and its central theme 
is indeed the relationship between Ronald and Nancy Reagan, and the effects of 
public life upon their family. In this way it resembled more a celebrity biopic than 
political biography. Its producers, indeed, were experienced in the former, having 
made TV movies about Judy Garland, Dean Martin and Jerry Lewis.96 Scott Casper 
indicated a change in twentieth century popular American biography towards 
celebrity lives, more sensational than didactic.97 In the mid-century, the sociologist 
Leo Lowenthal conducted a study of such biographies in magazines, concluding that 
they provided no real “educational” benefit for the reader, no guide for life, but a 
comforting familiarity in the ordinary tastes and activities of otherwise elevated, 
glamorous lives.98 Reagan’s life belonged to this tradition as well as presidential 
biography, evidenced in Laurence Leamer’s Make Believe: The Story of Nancy and 
Ronald Reagan (1983), which Gore Vidal scorned for its Photoplay style. The 
Reagans, which begins in Hollywood and focuses on the personal relationships and 
drama of a famous family, continues this.  
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 Criticism of the film was largely anticipatory, based on reports of the contents 
of its script first published in the New York Times a month before its broadcast. The 
criticism developed into a conservative political campaign involving the RNC, 
Michael Reagan and Patti Davis, and the conservative media watchdog, the Media 
Research Center, headed by Brent Bozell. The pressure this brought saw CBS edit 
sections of the film, and shift its broadcast to the cable channel Showtime. The 
complaints surrounded the negative portrayal of Reagan’s character in fictionalised 
scenes, principally one in which he responds to the AIDS crisis with the comment, 
“they that live in sin shall die in sin”.99 Its portrayals may have had symbolic 
accuracy, and were certainly not wholly negative, but the film was vulnerable for 
three reasons. First, its origins were in Hollywood, the classic enemy of culture war 
conservatives, an issue emphasised by the fact that James Brolin, the starring actor, 
was married to Barbara Streisand, and that the writers were identified as “openly gay 
activists” and friends of the Clintons.100 Secondly, Reagan’s condition at the time, 
near death and defenceless, amplified any slur on him. The final reason related to 
problems of fiction, film and history. The film warns that it is “a dramatic 
interpretation of events based on public sources,” and that “some scenes and 
characters are presented as composites.”101 Such caveats did not satisfy Bozell, who 
suggested that fiction  and film had a command over American’s knowledge of their 
history, warning of “history-challenged Americans, those who could watch hysterical 
‘history’ films like Oliver Stone's JFK and actually swallow the nonsense”, and 
asking them to “read a book…or please don't bother to vote.”102 Jim Welsh expressed 
a similar sentiment in an essay about another Hollywood presidential biography, 
Jefferson in Paris (1995). Concerned with the reliance on film for history and 
biography in “postliterate, media-made America”, he asserted that such films were 
invested with “a whole lot of authority and responsibility”.103 Presidential biography 
in film has a perceived civic function resulting from its popularity and its power to 
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inform and shape American memory. This is based on its inherent use of dramatic 
interpretation, which in turn leaves it open to charges of falsehood, whether malicious 
or irresponsible. In this sense, it is analogous to Reagan’s presidency itself.  
 This has been a commonly made analogy, which has pervaded the 
interpretation of his presidency, and the biographical accounts of his Hollywood 
career. The influence of Reagan’s acting career has been observed in his presidential 
performance, image projection and the operation of his White House.104 Reagan’s 
film career has also been used to understand the substance of his ideology, based on 
his frequent reference to films in his public rhetoric. This ranged from direct 
quotations, such as when he dared Congress to send him a tax-raising budget, “Go 
ahead, make my day!”, to self-identification with his past roles as with George Gipp, 
to the use of science-fiction scenarios as part of diplomacy.105 Mike Wallace argued 
that Hollywood “was a major source of the mythic iconography he carried around in 
his political unconscious.”106 Reagan’s Hollywood identity extended beyond his 
presidency, to become an interpretative device to understand his era. Gil Troy’s 
history of how Ronald Reagan “invented” America in the eighties makes substantial 
use of film and television narratives to describe the era.107 In film scholarship, the 
eighties seem to be a uniquely cinematic age in which politics and Hollywood are 
inextricably bound under the symbolic image of Reagan.108 Reagan’s pre-presidential 
life, and its implications of his close relationship with American fiction and 
mythology, made an impact on the understanding of his presidency. Moreover, his 
presidency generated a biographical interest in the fictional products of his 
Hollywood career. 
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This interest was pursued furthest by the Berkeley political scientist Michael 
Rogin in his influential essay, ‘Ronald Reagan: The Movie’ (1987), which made a 
biographical analysis of Reagan through the films he made in Hollywood. Rogin 
detected an “uncanny slippage between life and film” in Reagan’s Hollywood years 
and his presidency, and suggests that he “found out who he was through the roles he 
played on film.” This self-discovery is partly political; Rogin made much of the 
themes of Murder in the Air (1940), its “merging of Communism and Fascism”, its 
“obsession with intelligence agents”, and most importantly its apparent presaging of 
the Strategic Defence Initiative. “Are we now being ruled by the fantasies of a 1940s 
countersubversive B movie?” he asked. However, he goes on to argue that Reagan 
gained more than ideology and policy from his film roles, but also his persona and 
sense-of-self. In other films, such as Knute Rockne: All American (1940) and The 
Hasty Heart (1950), Reagan was able to “acquire presidential stature” through 
expanding his persona to something more vulnerable and identifiable.109 His roles 
were solutions for his real psychological difficulties. In Rogin’s analysis, these films 
merge with and even replace Reagan’s own life, childhood and family relationships, 
giving him a personality, or self image, which can then see him through to the White 
House.110 It is Rogin, rather than the president, who discovers Reagan in his roles, and 
Rogin who conflates life with film as his subject becomes a text to be analysed. He 
does not make fiction of Reagan’s life, but treats it as fiction. There is a broader 
political purpose to this analysis. For Rogin, Reagan’s “uncanny slippage” is the 
embodiment of an ideological tradition of “demonology” and fantasy in American 
right-wing politics. While seeking to reveal the myths of American 
“countersubversion” and anti-communism in Reagan’s personal psychology, he 
mythologises his subject. 
The relationship between Reagan and film is also central to Dutch. Asked if 
his biography of Reagan might ever be made into a film, as has been discussed for his 
first volume of Teddy Roosevelt’s life, Morris responded that “large sections of it 
already are!”, referring to his presentation of parts of his narrative in the form of film 
script. He also revealed his initial idea to open the book with title cards: 
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Random House presents 
Dutch 
Starring RONALD REAGAN as Himself 
With Jane WYMAN – Nancy DAVIS etc. 
Written by Edmund MORRIS etc.111 
 
Morris’s use of an imagined screenplay, The Ronald Reagan Story, was only one of 
the innovative decisions that surprised and frustrated critics on its publication. The 
controversy that met Dutch never had the targeted political anxiety that The Reagans 
provoked, but it has been more sustained, and more serious in that it represented a 
rejection by Morris’s peers. Fred Greenstein offered a fairly typical response in 
dismissing Morris’s work as an “intellectual embarrassment” which “blurs fact with 
fiction, substitutes effusion for rigorous analysis, and is riddled with errors,” before 
going on to offer his own précis of Reagan’s life and significance.112 The biographer 
Anthony Holden, reviewing Dutch for The Observer, called it “a travesty of the 
biographer’s art.”113 Similarly, another presidential biographer, Joseph Ellis, 
concluded: “What Morris has done, in my opinion, is a scandal and a travesty.”114 The 
essential problem was that Morris had broken the fundamental rule of biography, and 
historiography, by inventing facts. The creation of his narrator included the creation 
of further characters, his family and friends, who act as alternate observers of Reagan 
and who are falsely referenced in the endnotes.  
  Morris’s fictions are about observation. His narrator is a self-conscious 
biographer, revealing to the reader his methods, purposes and difficulties. The reader 
is engaged with the biographical process, but Reagan is distanced as subject.115 
Morris’s invented characters are witnesses to Reagan’s life, a “biographical 
audience”. “A performer is not comprehensible unless he is witnessed, unless there’s 
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a spectator there,” Morris explained.116 The occasional representation of Reagan’s life 
in the form of a screenplay reinforces this. A central sequence of The Ronald Reagan 
Story depicts the years 1947-8, a turning point in Reagan’s life which involves his 
own near fatal bout with pneumonia and the death of his and Jane Wyman’s 
prematurely born daughter, his appearance before HUAC, and the end of his 
marriage. The decision to represent this dramatically, using “Hollywood’s most 
hackneyed narrative tricks” is a response to Reagan’s own cinematic language in his 
“memoirs and monologues”; the scenes are “authentic as well as cinematic”.117 
However, this authenticity relates to more than Reagan’s memory and self-image. 
Given Morris’s understanding of presidential representation of national character, the 
self-realisation through cinema is America’s as well. Morris hopes his readers will 
understand Reagan, and thus themselves, through a dramatic and fictionalised 
narrative. The mythic purpose of presidential biography is sought by arguing 
America’s reliance on imagination and invention to create meaning – a reliance 
symbolised by the subject, Ronald Reagan. The use of fiction as a method is unique to 
Morris, but it is a response to the subject of fiction in Reagan’s life, which, as a 
president, is unique to him. Reagan’s relationship to American mythology 
complicates his biographical representation. As a practitioner and symbol of myth he 
is a suitable subject for creative portrayal, but his status as a mythic icon makes such 
portrayal politically vulnerable, as well as historically unsound, when it strays from 
accepted fact.  
 
National Biography 
 
“Of History,” asked Thomas Carlyle, “the most honoured, if not honourable species 
of composition, is not the whole purport Biographic?”118 The concept of history as the 
sum of the actions of great men, which are understood through narratives of their 
lives, is a long outmoded idea. Yet, biography still acts as representative history. Even 
where its subjects are not heroic political actors, more obscure lives can indicate and 
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symbolise historical social factors.119 Presidential biography meanwhile is a field 
which inevitably presents America’s history through the lens of the lives of its 
leaders. If, as Nadel contends, “the principal interest in biography, the reason for its 
popularity with authors as well as readers, remains its ability to provide meaning for 
an individual’s life, transmitting personality and character through prose,” then when 
it deals with presidents, the interest must surely also be in national life and 
character.120 Such a method is employed by Alonzo Hamby in Liberalism and its 
Challengers (1992), where brief biographical treatments of political leaders amount to 
a synthesis of American history in the latter half of the twentieth century. In this 
narrative, the subjects – mostly presidents – are presented as the agents of continuity 
and change in American political culture, but also as symbols of it, typifying the 
century’s themes. As well as sharing psychological and social commonalities, these 
leaders all “reconciled within themselves both the traditional and the new in mid-
twentieth-century American culture.”121 Reagan, an ambitious self-promoter and 
master of television who nonetheless maintained a steady small-town faith, and who 
“express[ed] the divided mind of the American people”, was no exception.122 The 
events and directions of Reagan’s life, and those of the other subjects, indicate the 
trends and themes of American political history, as much as their achievements.  
 Reagan’s life can tell history in another way, simply through the association of 
his experience. This was expressed by Paul Kengor in his introduction to The 
Crusader (2006), a book which sought to define Reagan’s role in achieving victory 
over Communism:  
 
 A professor teaching a course on the twentieth century could tell much of it 
through Reagan’s experiences – from the seven-year-old boy joining a flag-
waving crowd welcoming home doughboys from WWI on the streets of 
Monmouth, Illinois in 1918, to the influenza epidemic that nearly took his 
mother in 1919, to the advent of radio, to the Great Depression, to the magic of 
Hollywood’s golden age, to the New Deal and the rise of the federal 
government, to World War II, and on to the Cold War, Communism, the bomb, 
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the Red Menace, and much, much more, all the way through his presidential 
races and the Cold War victory.123  
 
It is not Reagan’s involvement in most of these events which make him relevant to 
them; it is his crowning experience which makes his life a history lesson. Kengor 
himself did not attempt such a sweeping approach in his biography, God and Ronald 
Reagan (2004), which emerged as a side project from his Cold War study. It is an 
outlook most evident, though without the same celebratory tone, in Reagan’s 
America.124 “He spans our lives,” Wills wrote, “culturally and chronologically”.125 
The varied geography and profession of Reagan’s life affords insight into the central 
political and cultural events of the twentieth century, of which Reagan’s presidency is 
the culmination. The resulting narrative, however, is determined by Reagan’s 
experiences, and by the themes of his presidency. The Second World War, for 
instance, can only be represented in terms of his unusual military experience making 
propaganda and training films for the US Air Force. For Wills, this was about 
“illusion”, a “war service based on the principled defense of faking things.”126 
Reagan’s appearance in mobilising films such as International Squadron (1941) and 
This is the Army (1942), the exaggeration by the Hollywood media of Reagan’s 
service “off at war”, and the general efforts of the Office of War Information to 
demonize the enemy and celebrate America, provide insight into a discussion of 
President Reagan’s questionable memory of the war and the image-construction of his 
White House.127 The representation of America’s past is dependent on its being 
related to Reagan’s experience, but also relevant to his meaning.  
 The representation of national history through Reagan’s life involves more 
than his experience of particular events, but also his personal absorption of myths 
which define the process and significance of American history. Leon Edel, discussing 
the principles of his art, claimed that it was the biographer’s duty to seek out and 
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unlock the “inner” or “covert myth” of their subject – this is “a part of the hidden 
dreams of our biographical subjects…lodged in the unconscious.”128 Such an idea 
relates to the psychoanalytic developments in biography earlier in the century, but for 
Edel, a prominent defender of biography as a literary form, it was an empathetic, even 
poetic approach. Reagan’s biographers, even if they do not consciously follow Edel’s 
directive, do seek out his “inner myth” but find it rooted in national myth. Wills 
expresses this best in his treatment of an event during Reagan’s years at Eureka 
College, where he was involved in a student strike over budget cuts and faculty 
layoffs. The author’s approach was again essentially corrective, scrutinising Reagan’s 
own account of the affair and his role in it, as described forty years later in his 
memoir. Wills found that Reagan’s account was confused and that his role was 
exaggerated. From this, he drew conclusions about Reagan’s engagement with 
history:  
 
He had no respect for the density of the real and vivid piece of history he was 
living through. He converted it into a “historical” symbol, Paul Revere on the 
ride...Reagan would embody great chunks of the American experience, become 
deeply involved with them emotionally, while having only the haziest notion of 
what really occurred. He has a skill for striking “historical” attitudes combined 
with a striking lack of historical attentiveness.129 
 
Reagan’s memory of his own past was defined and expressed mythically, just as was 
his understanding of America’s past. Wills wrote that “Reagan gives our history the 
continuity of a celluloid Möbius strip,” and asked, “what happens if, when we look 
into our historical rearview mirror, all we can see is a movie?”130 Wills found Reagan 
in his Hollywood identity, which represented America’s mythological past. This 
argument was reinforced by Wills’s consistent use of Hollywood films, including 
Reagan’s own, to indicate and subvert Reagan’s ideology. While Law and Order 
(1953), for example, demonstrated Reagan’s faith in Western individualism, Santa Fe 
Trail (1940) demonstrated the vital role of the federal government in national 
westward expansion and development.131 Wills’s use of films as biographical tools 
resembles Morris’s observance of Reagan’s use of cinematic terminology to describe 
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the past events of his life, and the subsequent decision to then represent them 
cinematically. Both authors find their subject’s “inner myth” to be his investment in 
the symbols and structures of American mythology. That this is found not hidden in 
Reagan’s unconscious, but in the substance of his public performance, is indicative of 
his peculiar nature as a biographical subject. A consistently public figure, an actor, a 
politician and a president, Reagan is inextricably linked with national themes. He is 
representative of American history, not its chronology or its experience, but its role in 
American life.  
 Paul Kengor also makes a connection between Reagan’s life and American 
history, and between the covert and overt myths of president and country. This is 
centred around Reagan’s Christian faith, and its importance for understanding 
Reagan’s ideology and actions.132 In part, the book is a convincing argument that 
Reagan’s religion was a vital and constant part of his life, through which he 
understood the world and acted. However, it is also treated as a force of history, with 
Reagan’s life as a central story in a mythic American narrative defined by the Cold 
War. Kengor opens his narrative with the young Reagan at Dixon’s First Christian 
Church on January 20, 1924, in a scene weighted with portent, though unrelated to 
any significant act or event of Reagan’s life. The moment is important because “a 
continent away…fifty-three-year old Vladimir Ilych Lenin lay near death in an even 
colder – in many ways – Bolshevik Russia…As Lenin clung to life, twelve-year old 
Dutch Reagan clung to his hymnal.” This, Kengor elaborates, “was the start of a 
spiritual pilgrimage that would lead that boy in the front pew to a spot in front of a 
bust of a grim Lenin at Moscow State University sixty-four years later.”133 The 
dramatic juxtaposition establishes the themes and tone of the biography, where 
Reagan’s faith is continually framed in reference to the atheism and religious 
oppression of Communism, and his life is plotted in continual reference to his final 
victory over Communism.  
Reagan’s religious inheritance is also presented in terms of an American 
ideological tradition, which further indicates his historical importance. He took his 
religious beliefs from his mother and her church, the Disciples of Christ, and from a 
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novel, That Printer of Udell’s (1903), which prompted the young Reagan’s decision 
to be baptised. These influences provided grounds for an intellectual Christianity 
which defined for the young Reagan the roles of the individual and the church in 
society. Kengor also sought to establish another ideological influence, that of the 
founder of the Disciples of Christ, Alexander Campbell, a nineteenth century 
proponent of a millenarian, nationalist idea of a missionary American destiny. Kengor 
quoted Campbell’s assertion that the world looked to America for “its emancipation 
from the most heartless spiritual despotism ever”, and that “this is our special mission 
in the world as a nation and a people”. Campbell, he stressed, saw America as 
“beacon,” a “light unto the nations,” whose political institutions would provide 
inspiration for the overthrow of false religion and oppressive tyranny in Europe. 
Kengor concluded it was “quite likely” that Reagan was introduced to these ideas, 
which strongly imply, in the context of the author’s political argument, the mission of 
the Cold War. The destiny of Reagan’s presidency and triumph over communism is a 
strong theme of the biography, if not fully asserted. Kengor recounts a scene from his 
governorship where Reagan prayed with a visiting group of evangelicals. One of the 
group was overcome by what he identified as the Holy Spirit and was compelled to 
announce: “If you walk uprightly before Me, you will reside at 1600 Pennsylvania 
Avenue.” Kengor leaves this story standing – “Readers can make of this what they 
will.”134 The author identifies his subject’s “inner myth” as his faith in divine purpose, 
for himself and for America. Kengor lets this sense of destiny infuse his narrative, 
presenting Reagan’s life in terms of his later achievement, in the context of both 
American and Soviet history. Reagan’s life-story becomes an extended history of his 
presidency, and further, a representative history of his nation, as defined by himself.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Destiny is a common theme to Reagan’s biography, supported by the apparent 
inevitability of his presidency as it is read backward into his life-story. In Reagan’s 
America this is perhaps nothing more than a consequence of the method and form. 
The presidency is ever-present in the narrative, giving Reagan’s life no other purpose 
or meaning, but this self-conscious and overt hindsight.  For other biographers, this 
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ahistorical determinism is explicit. Noonan, denying the idea expressed by Dinesh 
D’Souza that Reagan was an ordinary man, said “he wasn’t like other people. There 
was some huge kind of destiny playing out within him.”135 Broadly speaking, this was 
a self-propelling destiny. A recurring dream that Reagan had until his presidency, of 
visiting a large white house that was for sale at a price he could afford, was 
“information from his subconscious” that “you can have the White House if you want 
it.”136 Edmund Morris made typically playful and ambiguous observations of the 
determined path of Reagan’s life. The presidency is hinted at in his early occupations. 
Briefly a surveyor, “he held the measure by which others more technically versed than 
he calculated the constructive possibilities of the mound he stood on. It was excellent 
training for a future president.”137 His performance as a swimmer and a lifeguard 
prefigured his “cool, unhurried progress through crises of politics and personnel.”138 
At one point, while reviewing with a friend in 1986 Reagan’s presidency of the 
Screen Actors Guild, Morris even traces the events of Reagan’s career by decade 
across the stars of the night sky, finally seeming to predict Iran/Contra – “his 
presidency’s heading into a black hole.”139 Beyond such blithe omens, Morris invests 
his narrative with a  strong forward motion in his repeated identification of Reagan 
with the questing knight Parsifal, the innocent fool: “All his life, Ronald Reagan has 
ridden a long road dissolving, at the limit of sight, into something scintillant yet 
ethereal.”140  
The sense that Reagan was pursuing a destiny reinforces the mythic nature of 
the narratives, tying Reagan, in Kengor’s case, to national destiny, and otherwise 
establishing that Reagan’s life has meaning – destiny cannot exist without purpose. 
Despite the varying purposes, methods and conclusions of these biographies, we can 
see common mythic representations of Reagan which result from the combined 
imperatives of the biographical form and the symbolic presidency. Biography is a 
medium which expresses and perpetuates the mythic conventions of a presidential 
life. These conventions have been applied to Reagan’s life, in support of his 
candidacy for the presidency, and in support of his presidency as a great one. 
Biography is a means by which presidents can be commemorated, their lives as 
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narratives which can be remembered as collective experiences. Reagan’s life is not 
only remembered by Peggy Noonan as an exemplary legend to guide and inspire 
future generations, but also by Edmund Morris as a means for Americans to 
understand how they remember their past, and thus understand themselves. Biography 
is also a creative form which has seen Reagan represented fictionally and across 
media, reinforcing him as a cultural icon, but demonstrating the sensitivity with which 
his memory is guarded. Overall, biography has allowed Reagan’s life to become an 
expression of American history and identity, whether in the positive, heroic terms of 
Noonan or Kengor, or in the more subtle arguments about American self-imagination 
put forward by Morris and Wills. Reagan’s relationship to American mythology is 
redefined in biography as one that has been extant throughout his life, while his life 
becomes part of the Reagan myth. This is the result of the nature of the form, the 
traditions and cultural meaning of the presidency, but also the contributing factors of 
Reagan’s own, unique presidential identity, as an American leader who represents the 
national mythic process.  
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Chapter 2 
“Call it Mysticism”: Reagan’s Perception, Expression and Use of the American 
Past 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Reagan’s perception of the American past has been interpreted in exclusively mythic 
terms. This has involved speculation about the mechanics of his personal commitment 
to fantasy and fable over fact, and the symbolic implications of this for American 
culture. More substantially, such interpretation has considered Reagan’s political 
success in terms of his contribution to American ideas about its past and future. Hugh 
Heclo argued that Reagan was a “man of ideas” who “was devoted to advancing not 
just a political program, party, or even movement, but a philosophy of history”. In 
some ways an expansion of Paul Erickson’s contemporary rhetorical study of 
Reagan’s expressions of American destiny, Reagan Speaks, Heclo made a valuable 
case for the historical substance, coherent framework and vital role in his political 
thinking of Reagan’s “master narrative”. This described thematically an ideology 
based on faith in the sacramental mission of America, the strength inherent in its 
founding principles, and the centrality of individual freedom to those principles.141 
These themes are fundamental to Reagan’s historical perception and expression, 
which are considered here in a new way, in terms of his specific understanding of 
American history, as a series of events and as a concept. This approach reveals more 
fully Reagan’s relationship to American mythology and his active involvement in it as 
he chose stories for, and omitted them from, his narrative, investing them with 
meaning and argument. This, though, is not a cynical manipulation of the past, but an 
approach ordained by an understanding of history, which found mythic value in its 
process and its role in national life.  
 This chapter follows a roughly chronological narrative of American history 
which emphasises the consistency of Reagan’s historical interpretation from 
America’s beginnings to his own experience of the Cold War. His understanding of 
America’s foundation is represented by his treatment of John Winthrop, the 
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Declaration of Independence and the broader subject of Western history. The Civil 
War and its legacy of regional and racial division in the twentieth century represent 
the themes which most challenged the coherence of his mythic narrative of national 
unity. The cultural disruptions of the 1960s and the Cold War’s confrontation with 
Communism abroad and liberalism at home, finally, were political challenges to 
which his philosophy of history represented a solution. This method sacrifices a 
chronological assessment of Reagan’s own political development, and in thus treating 
the expanse of Reagan’s expression as a near uniform source, it assumes a thematic 
consistency to his thought. This is excusable, as a remarkable consistency is apparent 
and will be demonstrated. However, the political and professional contexts of 
Reagan’s historical expressions are relevant, as are the alterations within them, when 
they occur.  
 To some extent, Reagan is treated here as a historian. Each subject is 
discussed in terms of his methods of selection or omission, his narrative style, his 
revisions, and his historical argument. This is a problematic idea for various reasons, 
not least because it is clear Reagan operated under a vastly different set of priorities 
from professional history. Reagan had a distant relationship to the discipline, and to 
professional historians. Those in his administration had essentially political functions, 
such as the historians of Russia, Richard Pipes and Susan Massie, who served partly 
to educate Reagan, but also to put their knowledge to use in the development or 
operation of Cold War strategy.142 Another historian in the White House, Edmund 
Morris, maintained a professional distance that was reciprocated in the president’s 
polite inscrutability. This relationship did not follow the precedent of that between 
President Kennedy and his court historian, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., with its self-
conscious awareness of future history.143 Reagan is also difficult to define as a reader 
of history, because he rarely spoke specifically about books or authors. Reagan’s 
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literary habits did not find the promotion or scrutiny that has met those of Presidents 
George W. Bush or Barack Obama. One presidential reading list was released to the 
Baltimore Sun but Reagan declined the suggestion of making the practice regular.144 
Lou Cannon touched on the question of Reagan’s reading, and the lack of knowledge 
about it: 
 
One reason that outsiders underestimated the extent of Reagan’s reading 
was that he often forgot the titles of books, even books he quoted. He also 
seemed to have a reader’s conceit that books were secret, personal 
treasures: he never cared, as far as I could tell, if anyone else knew that he 
was a reader.145 
 
A more fundamental problem with treating Reagan as a historian lies in the question 
of sources and authorship. Reagan wrote no histories, and thus examples of his 
historical thought must be gleaned from a variety of available sources of which the 
central example is his public speech. In the case of his presidency, his authorship is in 
question. William Ker Muir, Jr. estimated that the president spoke more than half a 
million prepared words each year, not including the hundreds of thousands of written 
messages attributed to Reagan.146 Such output, of course, depended on a large 
communications staff headed by around six speechwriters. Moreover, in the 
speechwriting process, the speech in question would be circulated within the 
administration to relevant agencies and individuals and receive their input, at the 
writer’s discretion. Though Reagan played a central part in it, presidential rhetoric 
represented a multi-agented process, and we must ask how far it can describe his own 
perceptions. This is a problem not fully resolvable except, where possible, with close 
attention to the construction of individual speeches. Meanwhile, Reagan’s presidential 
speeches cannot be considered removed from his personal beliefs. Firstly, his final 
editing and input, as well as his willing performance of the speech, indicates his 
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approval of and seals his ownership of the ideas within. Secondly, the speechwriters 
were not independently creative. “The Reagan speechwriters,” Muir asserted, “had a 
clear vision of how to please the president because, before entering the White House, 
he had written so much himself, good stuff that had inspired them.”147 
Presidential rhetoric must be treated cautiously, therefore, and with, where 
possible, an eye to its construction, but it can still represent the Reagan presidency as 
a multi-agented but coherent institution, with Reagan’s beliefs and ideology as its 
motive core. This rhetoric, moreover, is not the only source, there is also the “good 
stuff” that came before. Reagan’s pre-presidential political speeches extend back three 
decades, and though large gaps exist in the records from his period stumping for 
General Electric in the 1950s, he maintained remarkably consistent themes until his 
emergence as a political force.148 His public speeches following this period, which led 
him into the governorship, represent an established ideology and an effort to apply it 
to national politics, and thus where they use or approach historical themes, are 
valuable sources. Muir, and Thomas Evans, are not alone in referring particularly to 
Reagan’s 1964 address on behalf of Goldwater, now known as “The Speech”, as a 
central expression of his ideology, informed by his political development of the 
previous decade, and informing his speechwriters of two decades later. The latter half 
of the 1970s represent Reagan’s most productive period in terms of independently 
articulating his views to a national audience. As well as political speeches, Reagan 
made regular radio addresses and wrote newspaper articles, later published to redress 
Reagan’s poor reputation as an intellectual. These writings, as well as the collections 
of his private correspondence, contain indications of his historical thinking. Such 
sources contextualise and reinforce his presidential rhetoric and the conclusions 
drawn from it. 
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Foundations 
 
The historian of religion Mircea Eliade wrote that “myth narrates a sacred history; it 
relates an event that took place in primordial time, the fabled time of the 
‘beginnings’…Myth, then, is always an account of a ‘creation’”149 Accordingly, 
Reagan’s most frequent and important historical references were to America’s 
foundations, which he invested with vital and continuous meaning for American 
identity. The most famous example of this is Reagan’s indication and appropriation of 
John Winthrop, the early Puritan settler of Massachusetts. Reagan confirmed 
Winthrop’s centrality to his vision in the conclusion of his Farewell Address, when he 
recalled the phrase “the shining city upon the hill”, which Winthrop had written “to 
describe the America he imagined”.150 This phrase has since become reminiscent, 
even metonymic of Reagan’s political vision.151 In this, as Reagan’s most famous 
historical reference, it presents certain comprehensive difficulties, in that Reagan’s 
meaning has supplanted Winthrop’s, and that interpretations of Winthrop’s rhetoric 
are coloured with the resonance of Reagan’s. Significantly, “shining city” is not an 
accurate quote, but an embellishment. Reagan began his use of the phrase quoting 
Winthrop more or less directly, as here in an early example from 1969: 
 
On the deck of the tiny Arabella off the coast of Massachusetts in 1630, 
John Winthrop gathered the little band of pilgrims together and spoke of 
the life they would have in the land they had never seen: 
 
“We shall be as a city on a hill. The eyes of all the people are upon us, so 
that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken 
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and so cause Him to withdraw His present help from us, we shall be made 
a story and a byword through all the world.”152  
 
During his presidency, and with increased frequency in his second term, this 
sentiment appeared paraphrased in a wide range of speeches, with the additional 
adjective.153 Paul Kengor makes the convincing argument that this represented 
Reagan merging Winthrop’s words with the original source, the Sermon on the Mount 
from the Gospel of Matthew, where Jesus compares the city on the hill to a lamp, 
exhorting the faithful to “let your light shine before men”.154 Winthrop’s sermon and 
Reagan’s phrase are frequently held up as central examples of American 
exceptionalism, and often together as a demonstration of its ideological durability, 
with Winthrop’s manifesto representing its roots, and Reagan’s celebration its modern 
appearance. Both overtly Christian, and both prophetic, each suggests the potential 
exemplary perfection of America – while each man is also associated with its 
missionary determination.  
The meaning of this connection has been variously defined. Kengor sees it 
made by a tradition within American leadership to perceive America’s providential 
role. Godfrey Hodgson has recently labelled it a false one, where Reagan’s conception 
of Winthrop’s sermon is historically wrong, not only in detail but in the central point 
of the English Protestant’s identity and audience. “In their context and their meaning,” 
the two expressed ideas “have virtually nothing in common”.155 In an indirect 
response to Hodgson, Noam Chomsky has claimed a malevolent commonality. 
Winthrop began the American idea with suppression of Native Americans, while “the 
savage murderer and torturer Ronald Reagan…blissfully described himself as the 
leader of a ‘shining city on the hill’ while orchestrating some of the more ghastly 
crimes of his years in office.”156 The character or validity of the exceptionalism 
espoused is not in question here, however. The significance lies in how Reagan 
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approached an historical example, and made meaning from it. There are three 
important points regarding Reagan’s appropriation of Winthrop. Firstly, the 
consistency with which he remained with the theme indicates Reagan’s method – the 
identification and repetition of an image or story. His development of the reference, 
becoming less specific over the years, suggests an idle connection with the historical 
detail, even if the connection with the theme remained strong. The second point is the 
applicability of the image, used by Reagan in varied contexts and to varied audiences. 
Referring to Winthrop in his speeches to the Conservative Political Action 
Conference in the 1970s, Reagan aligned his message with the conservative 
movement, offering it as a reassurance and a call to arms, whether on the issue of 
limited government or Cold War leadership.157 A decade later, it could also be applied 
to a celebration of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s message – “Let all Americans of every 
race and creed and color work together to build in this blessed land a shining city of 
brotherhood, justice, and harmony.”158 Meanwhile, at the centennial ceremonies of the 
Statue of Liberty, the “shining city” was the beloved haven of the world’s 
immigrants.159 However, in each case the meaning drew from an assurance of destiny, 
and of America’s continuity, and this leads us to the central point. Reagan’s repetition 
of Winthrop’s sermon was an articulation of his belief in American destiny, and an 
implicit demonstration of its ideological validity – Reagan was simply rearticulating 
the basis and purpose of America’s foundation. His isolation, development, and 
personalisation of the message, meanwhile, both made it relevant to contemporary 
issues and connected him personally to it. Reagan’s use of Winthrop was constant but 
renewable, symbolic and fluid. It suggested a reverence for the meaning of America’s 
foundation, but was a recreation of that meaning. It is a fundamental example of 
Reagan’s mythic style of history, not least because of its retrospective effect.  
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John Winthrop’s speech was a single historical moment that became a 
symbolic event representing an American ideological continuity. The actual creation 
of the United States was a series of events that bred real political and institutional 
continuity as well as certain ideological legacies. However, Reagan was not drawn to 
the detail of the American Revolutionary War or of the political settlement that 
followed it, establishing the structure of the United States. Instead, he treated it 
abstractly, finding meaning not in its events but its ideas and their symbolic historical 
importance. It was history’s only truly successful revolution, “a philosophical 
revolution that changed the very concept of government,” and “the culmination of 
men's dreams for six thousand years,” driven by “this love of liberty, at the heart of 
our national identity”.160 This perception of the Revolution could be represented by 
one particular event, and idea, the Declaration of Independence. Writing at the end of 
Reagan’s presidency, Charles Kesler, a protégé of William Buckley, wrote of the 
symbolic importance of this document in the alignment of American political thought 
(and in the attainment of electoral success).  
 
Whether invoked rightly or wrongly…the great proposition enshrined at 
the heart of the Declaration, so touched with the majesty of Jefferson and 
Lincoln, so alive with the history and destiny of the American people, can 
still cast a spell on an American audience.161  
 
Kesler referred to what he saw as liberalism’s distortion and appropriation of the 
meaning of the document, particularly its claim that “all men are created equal.” 
Reagan, he said, was notable for rejecting the orthodoxy – accepted by conservatives 
– that the Declaration was a liberal document. Moreover, “his victories and defeats 
correspond to his success or failure” in appropriating the fundamental American 
symbol of the Declaration of Independence.162 There is a suggested comparison with 
President Lincoln, whose own meaningful relationship to the Declaration drew the 
attention of both Garry Wills and John Diggins. Wills identified the Gettysburg 
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Address as an ideological turning point in American history, where a president 
reached back and altered the foundation of America. By centring American history on 
the Declaration, with its promise of equality, Lincoln evaded and diminished the 
compromising language of the Constitution and gave a new shape to American 
identity. “Lincoln had revolutionized the Revolution,” and “undertook a new founding 
of the nation.”163 Diggins emphasised that “[w]here Jefferson’s Declaration was a 
manifesto of separation and dissolution, Lincoln reconceived it as a symbol of 
national unity.”164 President Lincoln thus sought not only to rewrite American history, 
but to recast the identity it fostered in the language of symbolism. The question 
remains, is a comparison with Reagan justified? Can he be seen to have taken, if not a 
similarly radical, then at least a similarly active approach to America’s founding in his 
national leadership? 
In some of his presidential reflections on the Declaration, Reagan interpreted its 
message in terms of the relationship between the individual and government, and its 
affirmation of the theistic foundations of American political beliefs. Such 
interpretations represent the conservative re-appropriation of the document to which 
Kesler referred. This was never, however, at the front and centre of Reagan’s public 
communication, but would emerge on relevant occasions, particularly around the 
Fourth of July. Reagan cannot thus be seen to be determinedly redefining the meaning 
of the Declaration, rather staying on message and applying it to whichever theme was 
on hand. Moreover, Reagan’s Independence Day messages more often discuss the 
theme of patriotic remembrance and celebration, a focus on commemoration which 
suggests his symbolic priorities. Reagan follows Lincoln in his appreciation of the 
Declaration as a symbol of national unity, and one through which contemporary 
messages can be made, but there was no argument, only association. The meaning 
Reagan found in the Declaration can also be seen in another example of his oft-
repeated parables. Again, a story recurs over a thirty year period, apparently told from 
memory, this time of the signing of the Declaration of Independence. Simply put, the 
signers waver at the last moment, nervous at the enormity and danger of the act, only 
to be roused by an unknown elderly speaker in the hall: 
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If my hands were freezing in death, I would sign that parchment with my 
last ounce of strength. Sign, sign if the next moment the noose is around 
your neck, sign even if the hall is ringing with the sound of the headman’s 
axe, for that parchment will be the textbook of freedom, the bible of the 
rights of man forever.165 
 
This version, from his CPAC speech of 1974, differs in language from that he 
recounted in 1952, but the tone of the admonition is the same, as is the dramatic twist 
of the story. The speaker is not just unknown, but has disappeared by the time the 
delegates turn back from the document, having been inspired by his words to sign. In 
each case, Reagan is happy to term the story a legend, but leaving the implication that 
the event may have had mysterious, even divine intervention – though the 
Declaration, Reagan says, was “miracle enough.” In the 1974 version, the audience is 
given the roots of the story. Reagan was told it by an unnamed “avid student of 
history,” though he confesses, “I never researched or made an effort to verify it.” 
Reagan repeated the story, in a shortened form, for the first Independence Day of his 
presidency. Amongst the now wider audience who heard it was a South Carolinian 
minister who wrote to inform the president of the identity of the speaker – John 
Witherspoon, one of the signers. Reagan wrote back: 
 
I am very pleased to have the more accurate information you have 
provided. If I use [the story] again or, I think I should say when I do, I’ll 
be pleased to now give full credit and recognition.166 
 
It seems that Reagan never did use the story again, at least to a public audience. The 
theatricality of the story, with its sense of prophecy and destiny, was diminished by 
the imposition of historical fact.  
 It is clear, then, that Reagan did not approach the event of the Declaration of 
Independence with any historical rigour, favouring the needs of drama over 
sourceable fact. This is reflective of a common and much commented upon trend in 
Reagan’s historical representation. His speechwriter, Ken Khachigian, said that 
“Reagan has a sense of theater that propels him to tell stories in their most theatrically 
imposing manner.”167 Referring to his occasional accounts of fictional Second World 
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War stories as factual events, Reagan justified his ahistorical expression in terms of its 
moral meaning and “common sense”: 
 
Maybe I had seen too many war movies, the heroics of which I sometimes 
confused with real life, but common sense told me something very 
essential – you can’t have a fighting force without an espirit de corps.168  
 
The Declaration of Independence was thus a story through which he could inspire 
American morale. The mythic nature of Reagan’s perception of the Declaration goes 
beyond the style of this rhetorical representation, however. There was a dramatic 
event laden with meaning and portent, but this was defined by the content of the 
document. Reagan perceived and valued the importance of this content, understanding 
America’s foundation in terms of the potential and success of its ideas, but he did not 
engage with it in an intellectual or political sense. He did not, like Lincoln, try to 
redefine the political meaning of the document and its place in national ideology. For 
Reagan, its place in national ideology was not an intellectual issue, but an 
iconographic one. It was the moment which confirmed America as an idea, and was 
thus of great symbolic importance. Reagan may have found in the Declaration 
affirmation of his conservative and Christian values, and may have used it to support 
them rhetorically, but he did not learn his conservatism from the document, and nor 
did the document challenge his conservatism. He found no ambiguity in 
understanding and celebrating the Declaration as the political birth of the United 
States, even if the Constitution, which “tied up some of the loose ends…a dozen years 
after the Revolution,” was the document which created its political structure and 
which informed his political principle.169 Each performed a role in the mythic 
narrative of American foundation, which Reagan adhered to first, then used 
politically.  
 No discussion of Reagan’s perceptions of America’s historical foundation 
would be complete without consideration of his relationship to the American West. 
The West formed a central part of Reagan’s political image and identity, suggesting a 
brand of conservatism that emphasised independence, toughness, individualism and 
enterprise. This image was in part an expression of his regionalism, which was most 
visible in his frequent trips to his Californian home, Rancho del Cielo, where for 
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almost a year of his presidency he dressed in western attire, rode horses, cut brush, 
and signed legislation. This environment was more than a backdrop for photo 
opportunities. It reportedly made Reagan “more ideological” while he was there.170 It 
was a fondness complicated by his acting career, and his own participation in the 
recreation of the West in Hollywood and on television. Richard Slotkin argued that 
Reagan’s claim to his western image was “based entirely on references to imaginary 
deeds performed in a purely mythic space.” 171 Furthermore, the Frontier Myth, as 
recreated on screen, was inherent to Reagan’s presidency, informing his foreign and 
economic policy. We have seen similar argument from Garry Wills, who used 
westerns as a means of framing Reagan’s politics and ideology and revealing the 
contradictions within them. Janet Fireman took the idea further, suggesting that 
Reagan’s presidency revived and fuelled Western themes across American culture.172 
These ideas all relate to the projection and perception of Reagan’s image, and with the 
exception of Wills and his interest in Reagan’s inner myth, give little attention to 
Reagan’s personal interest in, knowledge of and understanding of the historic West.  
 Slotkin’s point about Reagan’s imaginary deeds was in comparison to the 
actual frontier experience of his nineteenth century predecessors William Henry 
Harrison and Teddy Roosevelt. Further comparisons can be made to consider the 
intellectual and ideological responses of American leaders to Western history. 
Roosevelt supplemented his western adventurism with scholarly ambition. The 
Winning of the West (1889-96) was the pinnacle of his literary career, and for Edmund 
Morris was “the first comprehensive statement of his Americanism, and, by extension 
(since he ‘was’ America), of himself.”173 Meanwhile, though Woodrow Wilson in his 
written national histories emphasised the vitality of America’s interdependent 
political economy rather than the vigour of its individual pioneers, also found in 
westward expansion “the moral of our history”.174 In each man’s case the writing of 
history was an endeavour of political expression and discovery, and their western 
narratives went on to inform their national policy. For another president, a 
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contemporary of Reagan’s, the West had more personal but equally ideological 
meaning. Lyndon Johnson would speak of the Western landscape and the history that 
it held. In his 1964 campaign book, My Hope for America, he recalled his childhood 
self contemplating the Texan sky and earth and what they had witnessed: “I remember 
the men who captured my native soil from the wilderness. They endured much so that 
others might have much. Their Dream was for the children. Mine, too, is for the child 
even now struggling towards birth.”175 In his 1965 State of the Union address, he 
evoked the same theme after asking how he had found the guidance to lead his 
country – “The answer was waiting for me in the land where I was born.”176 
Compared to these presidents who had sought out their ideology in Western history, 
Reagan might fail the tests of authenticity and curiosity. No writer of history, he did 
not offer a coherent intellectual interpretation of America’s expansion to the West and 
its political implications. No son of pioneers, he did not inherit what might be called a 
frontier ideology. However, Reagan invested in western history, and did so beyond 
the roles he played or coveted on screen.  
 Books on the American West, and in particular Californian history, took up 
considerable space on the shelves at Rancho del Cielo.177 Reagan’s reading habits are 
obscure, but it appears that the subject held particular interest for him beyond the 
practical historical and economic reading he did, which informed his politics and gave 
substance to his communication. It was a romantic, personal and ideological pursuit 
that was complemented by his fondness for cultural representations of the west. As a 
boy, he read Zane Grey and encountered the frontier poems of Robert Service which 
accompanied him throughout his life.178 In a letter to Peter Aviles, a young disabled 
man who had expressed his interest in presidential history, Reagan claimed also to be 
a “history buff”, but one whose main interest was in the history of the West. 
Expanding on this, he referred to “some historian” who said of the American West 
that “it was the most unusual march of empire in world history. It wasn’t led by the 
military but by settlers who bet their lives and the lives of their families as they 
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opened up the West in the face of hardship and hostile Indians.”179 This suggests 
Reagan’s lack of interest in both the specific identity of historians, and the 
development of historographic discourse about the American West. However broad 
his reading, what he gained from it was an exceptionalist platitude about Western 
strength and virtue in its independence from government. The contrary interpretation, 
of federally enabled expansion, has been central to Western history and was 
advocated by Wills who claimed that Reagan was unaware of the mythic nature of the 
western imagery and iconography he adhered to.180 It is true that he believed in the 
myths, but not so clear that he did not recognise them as myths. Reagan seemed aware 
of his romantic infatuation with the fictional west, and what it meant. Wills cites a 
passage from Where’s the Rest of Me? as evidence of Reagan’s mythic historical 
perception:  
 
I was a “cavalry-Indian” buff. I thought then, and think now, that the brief  
post-Civil War era when our blue-clad cavalry stayed on a wartime 
footing against the plains and desert Indians was a phase of Americana 
rivalling the Kipling era for color and romance.181 
 
That he refers to a historical period as “Americana” and frames it in terms of a literary 
reference is demonstrative of his approach to the era. However, this statement was 
made in the context of Hollywood in the immediate post-war period, and the debates 
at the time over what type of movie Americans would respond to. Reagan offers his 
thoughts on the subject to demonstrate his understanding of the American mood at the 
time and the stories it favoured, noting that the industry did then turn to this genre 
(though disappointingly, excluding him).  
 It is perhaps a consequence of this appreciation that Reagan rarely referred 
substantially to the historic West in his political rhetoric. Containing no definitive 
events or texts such as John Winthrop’s speech or the Declaration of Independence, 
Reagan did not draw specific ideas from the West. This history was indefinite, 
ephemeral and thematic, and expressed mostly in the context of his image rather than 
in the subject of his communication. Exceptions to this, such as Reagan’s address at 
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the memorial service for the Challenger astronauts, were metaphorical appeals rather 
than explicit claims of continuity. “We think back to the pioneers of an earlier 
century,” suggested Reagan, “along the Oregon Trail, you could still see the grave 
markers of those who fell on the way, but grief only steeled them to the journey 
ahead. Today the frontier is space and the boundaries of human knowledge.”182 The 
Old West was recalled non-specifically, and evoked in spirit rather than detail – 
though still to indicate the moral example of national identity. At one notable event in 
1983, Reagan had cause to address explicitly the theme of the West and its meaning. 
Opening the “The American Cowboy” at the Library of Congress, an exhibition as 
much about myth and image as about history, Reagan remarked that: 
 
America's heart is on display here. This exhibit explores both the reality 
and the myth of the American West. And both are important. Here are 
more than the bits and pieces of a rough and gritty life, but the tangible 
remnants of a national legend. 
 
The objects on display, both social artefacts and cultural representations, were “part of 
our national identity,” evoking themes of “integrity, morality, and democratic values.” 
Further, the president quoted Henry Steele Commager: “Americans, in making their 
Western myths, were not put off by discrepancies with reality. Americans believed 
about the West not so much what was true, but what they thought ought to be true.”183 
Here Reagan seemed to acknowledge his own mythic understanding of the West, but 
defended it by emphasising its moral function, and aligning it with greater national 
beliefs. This reflection, though, was the product of his speechwriters, who responded 
to Reagan’s image and interpreted its meaning. Here, Reagan’s perception of the past 
was a construction of his presidency, based on a largely unspoken mythic discourse. 
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Division  
 
Each of the above historical references indicated for Reagan themes of common 
national identity and purpose. They described shared destiny and acted as shared 
examples, reinforcing national unity. The eras of John Winthrop, the Revolution and 
of Westward expansion might easily be used to explore themes of religious, regional, 
political and ethnic division in American history. It is not the purpose here to charge 
Reagan with a lack of nuance in his historical treatments of these subjects, but 
considering that unity was a central theme of his historical narrative, we must ask how 
he dealt with American history where division was paramount. The primary and 
connected examples of the Civil War specifically and America’s racial divisions more 
generally received evasive responses from Reagan which created contradictions in his 
mythic expressions. Wilbur Edel complained that “it is hard to imagine anyone 
dropping in on [Reagan]…and finding him immersed in volume three of Douglas 
Southall Freeman’s biography of Robert E. Lee,” a reference to Harry Truman’s 
historical interest.184  This might be true, but perhaps more because of Reagan’s 
aversion to the subject matter than reading history in general. While the conflicts 
between the US Cavalry and Indians in the post-war West could represent an era of 
colonial romance which Reagan wished to recreate, and the exploits of soldiers in the 
First and Second World Wars could become the basis for expressing national identity 
to later generations, it was rare that the Civil War was referenced, even less explained 
by Reagan. This reticence is apparent in a snatch of conversation with Margaret 
Thatcher caught candidly by attendant reporters’ microphones. The Prime Minister 
questions Reagan on the legacy of division that the war holds in the contemporary 
United States. Reagan, though, seems unwilling or unable to expand on the war’s 
continued relevance, and simply seems aghast at its carnage.185 The Civil War did not 
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fit into his myth of America, and he was unwilling to reflect on its paramount 
significance to national identity, which raised issues of regional and racial division.  
 Unsurprisingly, Reagan’s most extensive association with the American Civil 
War was on-screen. In The Last Outpost (also released as Cavalry Charge) (1951), he 
starred as a Confederate officer stationed in the West. The denouement of the film 
sees the brotherly union of North and South in the face of an Apache attack. The 
Santa Fe Trail (1940) is the more significant film, more successful and cited more 
often, including by Reagan himself who rewatched the film during his presidency and 
was proud of the film, despite playing second lead to Errol Flynn.186 Reagan played 
the role of a young George Custer, a companion to Flynn’s J.E.B. Stuart, on the trail 
of the abolitionist John Brown in Kansas and Virginia. Reagan acknowledged the 
historical and chronological inventions of the story, noting that his role paid “less 
attention to the truth” than his previous portrayal of George Gipp. It did not appear to 
bother him any more than it did the writer, Robert Buckner, who said he didn’t give 
“a damn about ‘strict historical accuracy’ if it hamstrings the story.”187 As Stephen 
Vaughan discusses, the story was an “appeal for national unity” in face of the threat of 
war, based on themes of military honour and loyalty.188 This unity is represented in 
terms of the Civil War, with the friendship between Custer and Stuart presaging 
reconciliation, while the narrative seeks to absolve the South of its belligerence and 
rebellion. Its central expression of nationalist sentiment is given to Jefferson Davis, 
who speaks at the cadets’ graduation, while blame for the conflict is placed firmly on 
Raymond Massey’s fanatic John Brown, whose enmity toward the Union and the 
Constitution is emphasised throughout. The sin of slavery is also absolved through the 
motives and methods of John Brown. Stuart’s assurances that only the South 
understands the problem and will solve it in its own way and own time are supported 
by the words of a wide-eyed freed slave rescued from John Brown – “Old John 
Brown said he’s gon’ give us freedom, but, shuckins! If this here Kansas is freedom, I 
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ain’t got no use for it, no sir!”189 While such archaic and uncomfortable racial 
representations do not appear to have marred Reagan’s enjoyment of the film, this 
may have been offset by his own character’s rational, if passive, abolitionism, and 
moreover by his off-screen efforts in SAG to oppose discrimination and protect the 
interests of Hollywood’s black actors.190  
 The themes of America’s regional and racial divisions impacted on Reagan’s 
political career even as he personally and cognitively avoided them. His conservative 
alliance included Southerners who preserved a distinct regional identity informed by 
memory of the Civil War. In the Reagan Administration, this was represented to an 
extent by Pat Buchanan, who claimed to have inherited “a belief in the greatness of 
the Confederacy,” but whose nostalgia for the Old South or the segregated 
Washington, D.C. of his childhood was tempered by an admiration of Lincoln and a 
highly qualified respect for the Civil Rights movement.191 However, a stronger 
representation of neo-Confederacy was not politically possible, as demonstrated by 
the withdrawal of the nomination of Melvin Bradford for the chairmanship of the 
National Endowment for the Humanities in 1981. The Texan scholar had received the 
nomination as a reward for his support during the primaries and to mollify 
conservative dissatisfaction with Reagan’s choice of Sandra Day O’Connor for the 
Supreme Court. Bradford’s historical outlook, which condemned Lincoln and 
apologised for slavery, offended too many, including the neoconservative Irving 
Kristol, who led a campaign to quash his nomination. He was quickly replaced for the 
post by William Bennett.192 Reagan made no public comment on this, and never 
engaged with any issue of Confederate memory, but in more general and less overt 
ways he did make political appeals to Southern history and identity.  
 This is most famously exemplified by the decision to open Reagan’s 1980 
campaign with a speech in Neshoba County, Mississippi. The site of the murder of 
three Civil Rights activists in 1964, Neshoba was a symbol of violent racism and the 
backlash to Civil Rights legislation. Reagan’s speech included an advocacy of states’ 
rights, and a promise to restore them. These comments were specifically added to the 
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stump speech for the benefit of the audience, and the appeal to Southern 
segregationist sentiment was clear.193 It does not necessarily describe Reagan’s own 
perception of America’s racial division, but his expressed understanding of its history 
is murky, contradictory and often dependent on his audience. This is all the more 
apparent when he referred to it in relation to his own life. In a letter to one 
conservative supporter in advance of his presidency, he explained his departure from 
the Democratic Party: “I was a Democrat when the Democratic Party stood for states 
rights…Today it is the party that has changed.”194 Reagan suggests that he made a 
political stand on states’ rights – which in the context of the time of his conversion in 
the early sixties would mean a stand against Civil Rights. Yet in the aftermath of his 
election, he claimed to the mother of a young black campaign aide that his 
dissatisfaction came from another source: 
 
One of the things that disturbed me over the years was my party’s 
indifference to the situation in the South, where blacks were denied their 
constitutional rights for so long. And, of course, the South was a one-party 
region, solidly Democrat. It seemed that Washington would do nothing to 
upset that situation.195 
 
Both claims are disingenuous. Reagan did not leave the Democratic Party over its 
abandonment of “states’ rights” or its neglect of African Americans in the South. 
While he had turned against the active federal government constructed by FDR, this 
was grounded in issues of tax and regulation, not Civil Rights. His earlier liberal 
activism against discrimination did not make demands for federal intervention in the 
South, but involved either an emotive response to the Ku-Klux Klan as a fascist (and 
essentially foreign) organisation, or the cautious, but positive union action on behalf 
of black Hollywood actors.196 Informing the character of all these responses, of 
course, was his emergent anti-communism, the greatest factor in his shift to 
conservatism and the Republican Party. His contrasting remarks above suggest a 
willingness to please his audience. Yet in comparison to the consistency with which 
he evoked and interpreted other national themes and events, this suggests a real 
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uncertainty over where he stood on racial division in America. This correlated with 
his inability to incorporate its history into his mythic understanding of the American 
past.  
A comment from his debate with President Carter shows a problematic 
resolution to this difficulty. In response to a question about America’s future as a 
multi-racial society, Reagan responded:  
 
I believe in it. I am eternally optimistic, and I happen to believe that we've 
made great progress from the days when I was young and when this 
country didn't even know it had a racial problem.197 
 
Like much of Reagan’s language, this sentiment was not original. In 1978, in a radio 
address eulogising the black Air Force General Daniel James, Jr., he referred to 
James’s childhood in Florida, “in an America that had not awakened to the fact it had 
a racial problem”.198 The idea is blithe and confusing. It acknowledges “a racial 
problem” and implies an appreciation of the civil rights successes of recent decades. 
His reference to “this country”, however, seems exclusive. As Carter pointed out, 
African Americans were certainly aware of a racial problem in early twentieth century 
America. The suggestion, then, is that in a strange evasion of the problem just 
acknowledged, “this country” equates to white America.  
The phrase becomes more problematic, considering that Reagan prided his 
family on its rejection of racial intolerance and discrimination in the Illinois of his 
youth; it seems unlikely that he would exclude himself from “this country”. The 
comment can be read in relation to another of his epithets, also historically untrue – 
“We [the Reagans] were opposing bigotry long before there was a civil rights 
movement.”199 In these statements, Reagan promotes his own anti-racist identity and 
celebrates progress, but denigrates the Civil Rights movement for being an overdue, 
recent invention, and absolves white America of responsibility for racial oppression 
because it had not “awakened” to racial division. These ideas are expressed in an 
incoherent and inaccurate narrative of twentieth century history, which again alters 
depending on his audience. Reagan found difficulty in expressing his own opposition 
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to racism, not only because of his political allegiance to Southern conservatives, but 
because it demanded the recognition of entrenched and definitive division in 
American history. This is apparent in the vivid contrast between his consistent, 
constant and coherent mythic narratives of American unity and the fragile, 
contradictory and rare attempts he made to explain the history of race in America. 
 
 
History and Ideology 
 
Reagan approached the events of the past without professional rigour or intellectual 
curiosity, but with the intuition of an ideologue. We have seen the themes of his 
ideology in his responses to and expressions of American history. The events of the 
past informed, confirmed and challenged his conception of an exceptionalist national 
identity based on the continuity and destiny of the philosophy of freedom. His 
approach to these narratives, however, was also informed by an ideological 
conception of history itself. This can be understood in terms of his conservatism, 
where history holds two conflicting meanings. First, there is history as the past, where 
it is valued as the repository of tradition. Secondly, there is history as a process, where 
its implications of progress are distrusted, even resisted. These ideas relate to broad 
themes in conservative philosophy but can be illustrated by Reagan’s own philosophy 
of history and its applications in his political career. 
 At the very end of his presidency, Reagan made a rare statement on his beliefs 
about the role of history in American society. In his Farewell Address, in the “great 
tradition of warnings in presidential farewells,” he cautioned that while his presidency 
had reinvigorated an optimistic patriotism in America, this had not been 
“reinstitutionalized.” “Those of us who are over 35 or so years of age,” Reagan 
recalled, “grew up in a different America. We were taught, very directly, what it 
means to be an American. And we absorbed, almost in the air, a love of country and 
an appreciation of its institutions.” This knowledge, gained from family, community, 
school and popular culture had eroded in modern America since the cultural 
disruptions of the sixties. For Reagan, the solution to this problem was in how the 
country related to its past: 
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So, we've got to teach history based not on what's in fashion but what's 
important -- why the Pilgrims came here, who Jimmy Doolittle was, and 
what those 30 seconds over Tokyo meant…  
 
If we forget what we did, we won't know who we are. I'm warning of an 
eradication of the American memory that could result, ultimately, in an 
erosion of the American spirit. Let's start with some basics: more attention 
to American history and a greater emphasis on civic ritual.200 
 
Reagan thus ended his presidency with a nostalgic, traditionalist appeal to lost values 
and practices. He claimed that the issue had “been on my mind for some time,” but it 
was the first time he had specifically addressed it.201 This was resonant with 
contemporary partisan discourse, and the increasing rhetoric of the “culture wars” that 
began to dominate political issues in the late eighties. This focused on the use and 
appropriation of patriotic symbols, and would grow to bring attention to the public 
representation of history, and its teaching in schools.202  
It echoed intellectual as well as partisan conservative arguments. The same 
year, Russell Kirk argued that tradition, “the element of continuity which enables each 
generation’s wisdom to profit from the wisdom of preceding generations,” was 
eroding and under attack in all areas of American society and culture, and demanded 
of conservatives its determined defence and promotion.203 Two years earlier, Allan 
Bloom had published The Closing of the American Mind (1987), which more 
specifically lamented the abandonment of tradition in education, and its effect on the 
moral climate of American society. This had informed the attack by William Bennett, 
Reagan’s Secretary of Education, on Stanford University in 1988, whose rebranding 
of its core “Western Civilisation” course to “Cultures, Ideas and Values” he described 
as “an assault on Western culture and Western civilization.” 204  
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 Reagan’s jeremiad thus added to others which all feared a disconnection to the 
ideas and practices of the past, and the consequences for the moral character of the 
nation and its people. This was, though, a theme which had helped define Reagan at 
the beginning of his political career. While Alan Bloom experienced personally the 
disruptions on American university campuses which led to the situation he critiqued 
twenty years later, Reagan was confronting them politically in California. The higher 
education issues which Reagan addressed as candidate and then governor centred on 
budget issues and the introduction of tuition fees, and subsequently on law and order 
on the campuses of the University of California and the state colleges, rather than the 
substance and methods of traditional education. However, the theme of opposing 
ideas about knowledge and learning – and, indeed, the importance of American 
history – seems to have been current throughout. In one confrontation with Berkeley 
activists demonstrating against his tuition fee plans, he asserted that he would 
“represent the people of this state” who “do have some right to a voice in the 
principles and basic philosophy that will go along with the education they provide.”205 
This division over educational “philosophy”, implicitly generational, referred largely 
to methods of education. Reagan defended discipline and respect for the authority of 
the institution against the revolutionary, auto-didactic activity on the campuses of 
Berkeley and San Francisco State. 206 It was also, however, ideological. For Reagan, 
the loss of discipline was inseparable from the loss of tradition and the ideas held 
within. In 1969, he described the causes of the chaos: 
 
It began with those who, in the name of change and progress, decided they 
could scrap all the time-tested wisdom man has accumulated in his climb 
from the swamp to the stars. Simply call its constricting tradition and 
morality the dead hand of the past and wipe it out as a discipline no longer 
binding on us.207 
 
Later, Reagan expanded on these thoughts to a significant audience – the readership 
of The Pegasus, the college newspaper of his alma mater, Eureka. The governor 
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responded by letter to an article which had criticised the dedication of a field house to 
the conservative enemy of California’s leftist students. Reagan defended himself with 
an account of the degeneration found on California’s campuses, and with reference to 
his own views on academic freedom and his own experience as a student. Referring to 
Depression-era Eureka, he insisted: “Never has the past been so open to quest[ion] as 
it was in that long time ago.” However, he went on to argue the importance of the 
past: 
 
True ed[ucation] is societys [sic] attempt to enunciate certain ultimate 
values upon which individuals & hence society may safely build. When 
men fail to drive toward a goal or purpose but drift the drift is always 
toward barbarism. You have every right to ask the reason behind the 
mores & customs of what we refer to as civilization. Challenge we can 
afford. You have no right & it makes no sense to reject the wisdom of the 
ages simply because it is rooted in the past.208 
 
Such knowledge, Reagan argued, was the basis of freedom, in that it ensured the 
ability to make free choices. This point suggests a nuance to Reagan’s understanding 
of American tradition and its assurance of an American future. American identity, 
defined by individual freedom and the democratic system and expressed in the stories 
of American foundation, would survive not only by Americans remembering and 
adhering to their past, but through their free choice to do so. This choice would affirm 
at once the meaning and the continuity of the American myth of freedom. In the 
context of Reagan’s belief in American destiny, a divinely ordained national role, this 
raises a paradoxical problem that is more fully revealed by considering Reagan’s 
understanding of history as a process.  
 This again relates to a wider framework of conservative thought from which 
Reagan drew as he defined himself politically. In the mid-century, Reagan’s 
conversion to conservatism coincided with the launch in 1955 of what would become 
the movement’s most influential journal. The National Review was conceived as a 
weapon in battle against the historical process, and over its meaning. Its founder 
William Buckley, later a close friend of Reagan’s, pledged in its first edition to “stand 
athwart history, yelling Stop”. Such a sentiment suggests a concession towards the 
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idea that history, as a process, has a discernible direction, even if offered with some 
irony. Even as the communist is mocked for his “inside track to History,” and even as 
the task of opposing him is joined with a “considerable – and considered – optimism,” 
the extent to which the Review’s opponents have defined history, or historical trends, 
is conceded. 209 Buckley was faced with an even greater acceptance of history’s 
certain course in one of his prospective contributors, Whittaker Chambers. As they 
discussed the planned journal, Chambers asked him what its purpose would be given 
that “the West is doomed, so that any effort to save it is correspondingly doomed to 
failure.”210 Chambers’ attitude was peculiar, however. The suggestion that 
communism was inevitable, or that progress equated to history, largely became for 
conservatives a central point of contention. Buckley wrote in 1970 when the optimism 
with which he began the National Review was beginning to look justified, “friction 
arises…when two essentially different attitudes toward history are rubbed together.” 
Those of the Right accepted that history, at least as represented by the twentieth 
century, was “tendentious,” falling towards monolithic government, the surrender of 
the self, and indeed, apocalypse. The difference lay in that conservatives met such 
drift with a happy defiance, while too many others would “submit” to the apparent 
imperatives of the twentieth century.”211  Such defiance went back to  Friedrich 
Hayek, who in The Road to Serfdom (1944), offered the idea that the exercise of state 
planning contained an inexorable trend towards totalitarianism, but did not offer the 
theory as a statement of inevitability – “if [it] were, there would be no point in writing 
this”.212 Indeed, he attacked the “myth” that the increase of state planning and 
diminishment of competition was not a course chosen out of free will, but the 
inevitable consequence of technological and industrial advancements.213 Hayek saw 
an historical awareness of the emergence of totalitarianism and the defence of the 
traditions of freedom as the means to prevent or divert the trends he perceived. 
 Buckley, Chambers and Hayek all provided central texts in Reagan’s 
intellectual development as a conservative anti-communist. While the National 
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Review offered affirmative reaction to the issues of the day, Chambers, despite his 
pessimism, offered in his autobiography, Witness (1952) evidence of the religious 
nature of the Cold War as a conflict of faiths.214 From Hayek, meanwhile, Reagan 
gained a model for understanding the threat of totalitarianism within a democratic, 
liberal government. Connecting these was an understanding of history, reflected in 
Reagan’s early rhetoric that is defined in reference and opposition to the idea of 
inevitability and of progress as represented by liberals and socialists and which 
offered an alternative model based on faith in American destiny. In the early sixties, 
Reagan’s political speeches warned of the encroaching socialism represented by the 
spectrum of federal programmes installed under the New Deal and now embraced by 
the liberals of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. “We can lose our freedom 
all at once by succumbing to Russian aggression,” he told the Fargo, North Dakota 
Chamber of Commerce in January, 1962, “or we can lose it gradually by instalments – 
the end result is slavery.”215 He insisted one could not equate liberals with 
communists, but his depiction of an America increasingly planned and controlled 
pointed towards a future where the differences between it and the Soviet Union would 
be so marginal that accommodation rather than confrontation would be the only 
course (this, he implied, was the Cold War strategy of some unnamed officials). Such 
a situation was the basis for his advocacy of Barry Goldwater two years later in the 
nationally televised address known later to many simply as “The Speech”, but titled 
“A Time for Choosing”. The choice was between “up and down – up, man’s age-old 
dream, the ultimate in individual freedom consistent with law and order, or down to 
the ant heap of totalitarianism.”216 The binary choice with which American history 
was faced still shaped Reagan’s thoughts when he stood defeated at the Republican 
National Convention in 1976 and spoke to the assembled delegates. Here his speech 
was spontaneously given, though it is clear that its central theme, that of a time 
capsule he had contributed to for the bicentennial, had been clearly thought through. 
The concept was of writing a letter to the Californians of the tricentennial, and what 
they would know when they read it: 
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Will they look back with appreciation and say, “Thank God for those 
people in 1976 who headed off that loss of freedom?  Who kept us now a 
hundred years later free?  Who kept our world from nuclear destruction?” 
And if we fail they probably won’t get to read the letter at all because it 
spoke of individual freedom and they won’t be allowed to talk of that or 
read of it.217 
 
Again the current moment is a moment of choice. In a radio address on the same 
theme later that summer Reagan defined it as between the Republican Party platform 
of “fiscal responsibility, limited gov[ernment], and freedom of choice” and Congress’ 
way – “the road to ec[onomic] ruin and state control of our very lives.”218 
Interestingly, the fate of nuclear destruction and the fate of totalitarian subjugation 
were offered indiscriminately.  
 Reagan’s autobiography, An American Life contains frequent affirmations of 
his belief, given to him by his mother, “that God has a plan for everyone and that 
seemingly random twists of fate are all part of His plan.” A page later, Reagan asserts 
that he learned from his father “that individuals determine their own destiny; that is, 
it’s largely their own ambition and hard work that determine their fate in life.”219 This 
paradox in Reagan’s perception of his life-story is neither observed nor reconciled. 
Similarly, Reagan never reconciled the contradiction existing between his rhetoric of 
choice, and his rhetoric of destiny. In “A Time for Choosing”, Reagan echoed 
Franklin Roosevelt in offering America a “rendezvous with destiny”, where the nation 
could exercise the “right to make our own decisions and determine our own destiny.” 
Here, in the ascendancy of the New Frontier and the Great Society, Reagan offered a 
choice between the preservation of Lincoln’s “last best hope on earth,” and the onset 
of darkness.220 Paul Erickson described this as a “double vision of the future,” an idea 
which was “as old as the country itself,” conforming to a tradition of American 
jeremiad which drew equally on the concept of special national destiny and the danger 
of straying from this path.221 Ten years later, however, Reagan de-emphasised the 
cautionary aspect of the myth, concentrating on its promise of destiny. With his 
political credentials and ambitions established, Reagan spoke to the first annual 
                                                 
217 Reagan, ‘Republican National Convention, August 19, 1976’, PPPR, RRPL, 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/8.19.76.html, (accessed March 26, 2009). 
218 Reagan, ‘Shaping the World for 100 Years to Come’, Skinner, Anderson and Anderson (eds.) 
Reagan, In His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan that Reveal his Revolutionary Vision for 
America (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), pp. 9-10.  
219 Reagan, An American Life (1990), pp, 20-22.  
220 Reagan (October 27, 1964). 
221 Erickson, Reagan Speaks (1985), pp. 86-93. 
  
78 
 
Conservative Political Action Conference when the uncertainty after the failures of 
President Nixon demanded a new confidence in the conservative movement. In a 
speech which articulated the prophecies of John Winthrop and the unnamed John 
Witherspoon, Reagan shared a belief which he would repeat while running for 
president in 1976, and which would be revived for frequent use in the last years of his 
presidency: 
 
You can call it mysticism if you want to, but I have always believed that 
there was some divine plan that placed this great continent between two 
oceans to be sought out by those who were possessed of an abiding love 
of freedom and a special kind of courage.222 
 
The speech reassured his audience of continued national greatness, and of America’s 
continuing role as the leader of the free world. “We cannot escape our destiny, nor 
should we try to do so,” Reagan concluded. The choice of self-destruction was not 
mentioned here, in favour of a determined optimism based on the inevitability of 
America’s destiny.  
 This alteration of his message became more pronounced during his 
presidency. This is apparent in his more frequent affirmations of America’s destiny, 
but also in his responses to Communist determinism. While before he had rejected the 
teleological certainty of Communism, he had recognised and feared its potential grip 
on history. As president, he expressed a reversal of the trend. Reagan’s speech at 
Westminster in 1982 has survived, for some, as central evidence of his insight in 
perceiving the weakness of the Soviet Union and foresight in predicting its 
collapse.223 Without the benefit of hindsight, it was a significant argument for 
adopting a “sense of history” which challenged and rejected Soviet determinism, and 
instead envisioned a “march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-
Leninism on the ash-heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the 
freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the people.”224 Reagan presented this 
argument for a shift in historical thinking in more certain terms the following year, 
employing religious concepts for his audience at the Annual Convention of the 
National Association of Evangelicals. Presenting Whittaker Chambers’ idea of a 
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Communistic faith that must be met with the strength of true Christian faith, Reagan 
declared: 
 
I believe we shall rise to the challenge. I believe that communism is 
another sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages even now 
are being written. I believe this because the source of our strength in the 
quest for human freedom is not material, but spiritual.225 
 
Reagan was now not simply arguing against Communist teleology, but offering an 
alternative teleological model. The religious aspect to Reagan’s concept of 
predestined history was central, to the extent that he flirted with the idea of imminent 
Armageddon.226 Reagan never addressed the central contradictions to his expressed 
perceptions of history – that free will was led by destiny, and that his rejection of 
communistic determinism was undermined by his promotion of religious national 
determinism. Nor did he address the inconsistencies in the emphasis, tone and 
meaning of his expressions, where uncertainty turned to certainty and fear turned to 
optimism. To recall Whittaker Chambers, intellectual coherency was not the central 
issue here, it was faith. Reagan’s understanding of prayer, which was expressed in his 
autobiography alongside his mother’s faith in God’s plan, was “to have dreams and 
believe I could make them come true”.227 Reagan believed in the religious dimension 
to the Cold War. Faith not only divided the opposing ideologies, but was a weapon in 
the conflict. As Reagan fought the Cold War, his faith in America’s religious mission 
and its destined outcome grew stronger along with US military spending. The 
coherency of Reagan’s historical perception lay in its mythic foundation, the belief 
that the past was a story to be applied to the present, to provide direction for the 
future.  
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Conclusion 
 
Returning again to Reagan’s Farewell Address, we have a sense of what he meant 
when he called for “more attention to American history.” He did not mean 
professional history, to which by qualifying “not what’s in fashion,” he expressed 
some disdain. The historiographical process could not, or did not, convey “what’s 
important.” Reagan wished America to attend to history in the way that he did. This 
meant the informal absorption, “almost in the air,” of the meaning of the American 
past through community and intergenerational contact, and through the dramatic 
expressions of American culture. The subjects he indicated suggest his priorities. The 
“30 seconds over Tokyo” referenced a movie, which itself recounted a Second World 
War mission that was mostly symbolic in its purpose. He wished Americans to know 
“why the Pilgrims came here,” an appeal for the continued relevance of America’s 
early inception quickly followed by the misquotation and misrepresentation of John 
Winthrop. Reagan’s perception and representation of the past was ahistorical and 
sometimes fictional, it was selective, and it was articulated for dramatic effect. It was 
driven by the priorities of myth. What was important about the past was not what 
might explain the difficulties and challenges of modern America, but what could be 
used to overcome them. This, however, meant that the evasion of history incongruous 
with Reagan’s master narrative meant the neglect of contemporary problems it had 
wrought. As far as Reagan recognised division in American society, he saw it as the 
result of an abandonment of the values and wisdom contained in and represented by 
the past. To restore and reconcile America, Reagan hoped to use the stories, words 
and iconography of the past, interpreted and represented loosely, but valued 
consistently. As well as specific narratives, he also offered a model of historical 
process that at once rejected the determinist concept of progress and offered the 
certainty of destiny. At the least, the success of this idea must be recognised in that it 
allowed Reagan to think beyond the Cold War, refusing the permanence of 
Communism or the inevitability of nuclear conflict. Finally, though Reagan spurned 
common concepts of historical progression, his admonition for America to turn to the 
past was not a call for regression. Frequent amongst the ideas of the Revolution which 
Reagan recalled were those of Tom Paine, “We have it in our power to begin the 
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world over again.”228 This irked Left and Right alike – Wilbur Edel saw Reagan’s 
celebration of a deist and proto-socialist as ignorance, George Will as “nonsense”.229 
However, renewal, positive action and advancement were central themes to Reagan’s 
overarching myth of American destiny – “as long as we remember our first principles 
and believe in ourselves, the future will always be ours…We meant to change a 
nation, and instead, we changed a world.”230 
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Chapter 3 
“Like the Gettysburg Address”: The Reagan Presidency and National 
Commemoration 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the commemorative acts of his presidency, Reagan could promote his mythic 
understanding of America’s past in the official rituals of American memory. He did 
this habitually, confirming myth as a vital characteristic of his presidency. However, 
the representative and reactive nature of his office placed constraints and presented 
challenges to his efforts to define American memory in his vision. Here I consider 
three areas of Reagan’s commemoration which reveal the various influences on his 
actions, decisions and expressions in the realm of national memory. These influences, 
ranging from the imperatives of presidential tradition, to the varied interests of 
contemporary American life, to the political and philosophical motives of Reagan and 
his staff, represent the audience and foundation of the symbolic presidency. Firstly, 
Reagan’s inauguration was a ceremony which recollected America’s past through 
traditional symbol and ritual. Reagan was bound to the traditions of the occasion, 
remembering national foundation and continuity by echoing his predecessors in 
performance and word. Still, Reagan indicated in his first presidential act that 
symbolic memory would characterise his leadership. Secondly, I consider how 
divisive recent memory challenged Reagan in his first term, in the form of the 
movements to create a national holiday in honour of Martin Luther King and a 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial on the Washington Mall. Here, Reagan’s political 
identity was consumed by his presidential role. This role demanded that he consecrate 
national memory and frame it in terms of national unity, rather than pursue divisive 
political argument. Lastly, Reagan’s commemorations of the Second World War in 
Europe during the middle of his presidency represent his expansion of the presidential 
commemorative role. His initiation of events to mark the fortieth anniversaries of D-
Day in Normandy and VE Day in Germany introduced memory to international 
statesmanship, and placed the observance of national memory in the control of the 
White House, where previously the presidential role had been largely passive and 
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reactive. While the successes and failures of these events depended on their 
congruence with the interests of national memory, they became definitive acts of his 
presidency.  
 The presidential role in commemoration can be defined institutionally and 
historically. Researching these events in the White House records reveals Reagan’s 
general absence from the decision-making and planning that shaped them. His was a 
performative role, but based on the interests and actions of a multi-agented 
presidency. Commemoration became the business of no single individual or 
department. It covered a range of areas, from advance planning, to communications, 
to speechwriting, and even, on occasion, the National Security Council. Meanwhile, it 
frequently came into the jurisdiction of the wider administration, specifically the 
Departments of State and the Interior. It was also not confined to the executive, often 
attracting the interest or demanding action of Congress, as well as of private initiative 
or public opinion. The presidential role was not independent.  
 While there have been no systematic efforts to reveal the general function of 
the presidency in national commemoration, the scholarship of American memory has 
indicated this interdependence. Michael Kammen noted that “the variable role of 
American presidents as arbiters of tradition” has been overlooked by historians, but 
his own narrative only offers suggestions.231  Often, they are on the sidelines with 
only a potentially symbolic, consecrative role, such as in Calvin Coolidge’s 
enthusiastic but uneventful observation of Mount Rushmore’s creation. In the other 
great presidential commemoration of the 1920s, the dedication of the Lincoln 
Memorial, President Harding presided over the event in a similarly consecrative role. 
His appearance with President Taft, who was chair of the memorial committee, 
emphasised a partisan aspect to the celebration of a Republican president, but Harding 
dutifully articulated a national theme of unity and reconciliation in his address – 
though one that alienated African Americans, who watched from a segregated 
audience.232  
Franklin Roosevelt’s “enduring pursuit of the Lincoln image”, meanwhile, 
suggests the active role a president can take to advance a politically beneficial 
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narrative of the past and to appropriate the glamour of its icons.233 Though Kammen 
has suggested that the most successful presidents “have been the ones most likely to 
manipulate, ‘improve’, or even distort their nation’s collective memory,” he has also 
pointed out that they cannot “reorient a society’s sense of the past without 
considerable assistance – not to mention the society’s willingness or even desire for 
reorientation.”234 This relates also to the sheer length of time involved in the creation 
of commemorative projects, compared to the relatively short lived presidential term. 
Another example of the presidential role and its limitations in commemoration 
can be seen in President Kennedy’s involvement in the Civil War Centennial. The 
White House’s intervention in the controversy over segregation during Charleston’s 
1961 hosting of the Civil War Centennial Commission represented in part a political 
stance in support of Civil Rights, but also an equivocal compromise to evade political 
controversy.235 Presidents might have political power and will to arbitrate 
commemorative conflict, but it is used in mind of other political needs and 
considerations. Finally, Paul Erickson suggested a more esoteric constraint on the 
president, that “the traditions of our civil religion manipulate each president”, limiting 
and controlling his “symbolic acts and utterances”.236 In accordance with the symbolic 
nature of the office, the president must serve in ritual and rhetoric as a representative 
of national unity and continuity, themes which must be adopted into his political and 
commemorative messages. The president thus faces institutional, political and 
symbolic constraints, even as he may seek to employ the icons of national memory, 
and the bully pulpit that commemorative leadership provides, to his political 
advantage.  
 
Inauguration and Commemorative Tradition 
 
Presidential inaugurations are legal ceremonies which officially confirm presidents to 
a term in office. They are also national rituals which affirm America’s democratic 
system and its exceptionalist identity. Robert Bellah identified in 1967 the presidential 
inaugural as a central ritual of American civil religion, using President Kennedy’s to 
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demonstrate the themes and presentation of America’s national religious thought, and 
myth.237 Bellah focused on the religious aspect and tone, but I consider inaugurals as 
presidential commemorations, and commemorations of the presidency. Inaugurations 
recall America’s foundation through the symbol of the presidency, which at the same 
time represents American continuity. Reagan’s first inaugural in January, 1981, 
demonstrates these themes in its engagement with traditions of the symbolic 
presidency. As well as providing a legal and commemorative ritual in which new or 
returning presidents submit to precedent, the inauguration allows the president also to 
define his own leadership and anticipate his place in history. As expressions of 
continuity, the ceremonies look to the future as well as the past. Reagan in his first 
inaugural thus established himself within a general narrative of the presidency 
through the traditions of the ceremony, but also sought to make use of the overtly 
historic event to define and distinguish his presidential identity. To a great extent this 
was a matter of defining the times and its crises, and his solutions and their 
fundamental ideology. Reagan also, however, significantly characterised his 
presidency as one attentive to American myth and memory. We have already seen an 
element of this in his Second Inaugural Address, but here the focus is on his first 
presidential expression, where Reagan’s election represented transition and his 
leadership could only be imagined and anticipated.   
 Inaugurations are a combination of rhetoric and ceremonial ritual. At 
Reagan’s, each was significant for both their innovations and observations of 
tradition. Inaugural ritual has broadly followed the model of George Washington’s, 
with an oath-taking ceremony, a speech, and public festivities, but has altered 
moderately in certain details, and vastly in scale. The celebration of Reagan’s 
swearing-in in 1981 was eventually costed at an unprecedented $16.3 million, five 
times that of Carter’s, and increased to around $20 million in 1985. Inaugural costs 
steadily increased following Reagan, vastly expanding again in 2009, when $170 
million was spent on Barack Obama’s inaugural.  Nevertheless, for Haynes Johnson 
and others, “the costliest, most opulent inauguration in American history” was an 
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effective indicator of the start of the gilded Reagan era.238 To cover the costs of its 
plans, the Presidential Inaugural Committee, chaired by Robert Gray and Charles 
Wick, raised funds through private donations, the sale of tickets for its many 
celebratory events, and through merchandising. The marketing of memorabilia 
demanded that the event be promoted in terms of it historic significance. Though a 
fairly bland concept when applied to a collectable license plate, this was fully 
expressed in A Great New Beginning (1981), the official book of the event:  
 
[The inauguration] is a shining testament to a system of government that 
recognizes that its greatness lies in the hearts and the spirit of its 
people…[It is a] time to reflect on past glories and to hold true to the 
traditions and customs we share as a people united…[It is] a joyful 
celebration of the ideals and aspirations that have maintained and 
sustained the nation through more than 200 years…The Inauguration of 
Ronald Wilson Reagan…represents a new birth…a time to rekindle not 
only the ethereal flame of hope and promise, but to assure the reality of 
accomplishment and deeds realized and to come.239 
 
This reflected the dual vision of the inaugural, its attention on both the hallowed past 
and the glorious future – each connected by the symbol of President Ronald Reagan. 
This symbol, undefined as yet by any presidential action, was expressed in various 
ways.  
The planners were conscious of the potential symbolism of the inaugural 
parade, a tradition that had developed from spontaneous accompaniment of President 
Jackson as he travelled from the Capitol to the White House in 1829. Its first 
organised examples, for the inaugurations of Presidents Grant and Garfield in 1869 
and 1881, were fully militarised events, triumphal expressions of a national identity 
defined by the Union’s victory in the Civil War, which recalled Abraham Lincoln 
reviewing the troops assembled to defend Washington in 1861. The tradition 
persevered, but expanded to become a more varied expression of national culture.240 
The political implications of the military aspect became a concern for the committee, 
and the idea was floated that the parading servicemen substitute their rifles for flags. 
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One chair, Robert Gray was worried about the appearance of Soviet-style 
belligerence: “It would seem out of place to have tanks or missile launchers in the 
parade and the governor believes the same about sidearms. We are a patriotic nation 
not a militaristic one.” Besides the idea’s impracticality, Charles Wick was concerned 
with the alternative political symbolism of the gesture: “Governor Reagan has 
stressed military strength, preparedness and morale – peace through strength. This 
might suggest an emasculation of that strength.”241  
The Parade Committee also decided veterans organisations would not 
participate. “Despite my loyalty as a veteran,” the committee chair reported, “I do not 
envision a rerun of World War II, Korea or Vietnam in this parade.”242 The committee 
may have hoped to avoid political provocation – just eight years before, Nixon’s 
inaugural parade was attended by some 60,000 anti-war protestors. Such exclusions, 
though, also reflected the plan for “a short, snappy spectacular staged for TV appeal”, 
and limited to sixty minutes.243 This direction, which would be familiar to all 
Reagan’s subsequent commemorations, was presented in terms of democratic 
symbolism. Gray and Wick announced that they would host a “shared inaugural,” 
open and accessible to the people. “Some past inaugural celebrations have been 
labelled ‘people’ events,” they argued, “but realistically that meant the people who 
could be in Washington, D.C. Television is the way to reach the most people, and 
most events are being planned with television in mind.” As well as the parade, this 
applied to the evening’s inaugural balls, images of which would be projected by 
satellite to signed-up parties across the nation – an “historic first”.244  This populism 
countered criticism of the balls’ elitist opulence. The ritual celebrations of the 
inauguration were planned with deliberate attention to their political symbolism, but 
this was defined by a wariness of provocative or divisive imagery – a nationalist 
compromise was sought.  
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 Just as the parade responded to presidential tradition, incorporated nationalist 
themes, and projected Reagan’s distinctive identity – in its television-friendly format 
and references to Western history – so did the inaugural address. The conventions of 
inaugural addresses had changed since the nineteenth century, reflecting the changing 
nature of the presidential role, and becoming more specifically political and populist, 
rather than philosophical and reflective. Jeffrey Tulis has identified Woodrow 
Wilson’s articulation of the “legitimating doctrine” in his first inaugural of visionary 
and moral presidential rhetoric, addressed directly at the nation: “This is the enterprise 
of the new day; To lift everything that concerns our life as a nation to the light that 
shines from the hearthfire of every man’s conscience”.245 This determination of 
presidential leadership as the visionary and moral definition of the nation was revived 
by Franklin Roosevelt, with his assurance that the “warm courage of national unity” 
and “old and precious values” would create a “rounded and permanent national 
life”.246 The model of defining and engaging with the American people continued 
through the inaugurals of the twentieth century, as well as addressing their problems 
in terms of national identity and character. Reagan responded to this precedent in his 
identification of American’s problem as the power of the federal government: 
 
The crisis we are facing today…require[s]…our best effort and our 
willingness to believe in ourselves and to believe in our capacity to 
perform great deeds, to believe that together with God's help we can and 
will resolve the problems which now confront us. And after all, why 
shouldn't we believe that? We are Americans.247  
 
Reagan’s message related specifically to the times and to his political ideology, but 
also performed the precedented, mythic role of the inaugural address. 
 The content of Reagan’s speech distinguishes itself from preceding first 
inaugurals due to its surprising lack of emphasis on foreign policy and the 
international situation, especially considering the renewed state of Cold War and 
Reagan’s own definitive stances. Where Eisenhower made a call-to-arms, and 
Kennedy projected a grand imperial vision, Reagan gave but two brief sections, 
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mirroring Kennedy’s more expansive language, which offered loyalty to America’s 
allies, and peace to its enemies. He also departed from Nixon’s and Carter’s attempts 
to address the spiritual crises of the American people – “raucous discord” and 
“recognized limits”.248 Reagan, instead, addressed Americans as “heroes” whose 
“values sustain our national life” and whose problems “result from unnecessary and 
excessive growth of government”. Yet in defining the occasion as evidence of 
American continuity, exceptionalism and destiny, Reagan echoed his predecessors. 
Reagan began by reflecting that “in the eyes of many in the world, this every-four-
year ceremony we accept as normal is nothing less than a miracle” in its peaceful 
transition of power. It represented “the continuity which is the bulwark of our 
Republic”. Kennedy saw his inauguration as “a celebration of freedom – symbolizing 
an end as well as a beginning – signifying renewal, as well as change as well.”249 
Nixon indicated “the majesty of this moment. In the orderly transfer of power, we 
celebrate the unity that keeps us free.”250 Carter, quoting his old school teacher, 
expressed the “inner and spiritual strength of our nation” that the ceremony 
represented: “We must adjust to changing times and still hold to unchanging 
principles.”251 Each president, as others had before them, understood the moment of 
inauguration to represent continuity and renewal, within which the foundations and 
future of American democracy were recalled.  
 Where Reagan’s address echoed its precedents, it reflected its construction. 
The chief speechwriter, Ken Khachigian, read an anthology of inaugural addresses in 
preparation for his task. Khachigian advised the president-elect against citing his 
predecessors - “Nobody quotes great men quoting other great men.”252 The 
annotations he made, though, reveal the practical and intellectual process of 
discovering Reagan’s ideology within this canon, finding, for example, the principles 
of national unity in Jefferson’s words, of exceptionalism in Harding’s, of efficient and 
frugal government in Coolidge’s, and of anticommunism in Truman’s.253 This also 
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suggests a comprehension of the commemorative nature of Reagan’s inaugural 
address, that it would immediately evoke and belong to tradition and to memory. “It’s 
a magic moment, an historical moment,” Khachigian told reporters of the 
speechwriting process, emphasising Reagan’s role in it, and claiming that it was the 
president-elect who had read the book.254 This early projection of Reagan’s 
presidential image stressed his connection to the tradition and continuity of American 
democracy in anticipation of a commemorative ritual which would affirm him as part 
of national history, future and myth.  
 Khachigian canvassed advice from a range of other professionals, both from 
Reagan’s Californian circle and his own contacts from the Nixon White House. Dick 
Wirthlin advised that “visionary addresses describe the lessons of the past to give 
meaning to the present and hope for the future.”255 Ray Price spoke from experience 
as President Nixon’s “principal collaborator” on his inaugural addresses. In an 
advisory memo to Reagan, he defined the inaugural as “the supreme sacrament of the 
democratic system” which “speaks to the moment and to history, to this time and to 
all time.”256 Another Nixon wordsmith, Dick Moore, gave some more specific advice 
on how to articulate these mythic themes. Reagan was to break with tradition and 
speak from the western front of the Capitol, an indication of his roots, and of the 
“New Beginning”. Moore went to see the spot where the speech would be delivered 
and was struck by its view over the Mall and its presidential monuments. Moore 
wrote to Khachigian that he was “more convinced than ever that it could add an extra 
new dimension to the Inaugural Address, both visually and rhetorically.” In some 
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suggested language, he had the president call attention to “the spiritual presence of 
these immortal Americans,” Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln.257  
Khachigian was impressed, and incorporated the idea into his final draft for 
Reagan as a closing theme.258 On the day, Reagan described the “magnificent vista” 
in front of him and its “shrines to the giants on whose shoulders we stand.” He 
indicated the monuments and gave illustrations of his forebears’ character and 
achievements. These were expressive of national identity. Washington, as a “man of 
humility who came to greatness reluctantly”, reflected Reagan’s understanding of 
America’s rise to power. Jefferson signified the Declaration of Independence, for 
Reagan the dramatic birth of American freedom. The Lincoln Memorial offered a 
more cryptic meaning: “Whoever would understand in his heart the meaning of 
America will find it in the life of Abraham Lincoln.” This was presumably a reference 
to Lincoln’s exemplary journey of self-improvement from log cabin to the White 
House, rather than his troubled engagement with, and ultimate destruction by 
American division. Reagan followed the mythic panorama to the unseen graves of 
Arlington, and gave a final story of America’s exemplary past which was his own 
addition to the speech. “Under one such marker,” Reagan said, “lies…Martin 
Treptow”, a young American soldier who died in the First World War. The president 
quoted from Treptow’s diary: “I will work, I will save, I will sacrifice, I will endure, I 
will fight cheerfully and do my utmost, as if the issue of the whole struggle depended 
on me alone.” Treptow was not buried in Arlington, but this was an unproblematic 
detail for Reagan.259 
This dialogue with the commemorative architecture of the surrounding 
landscape was an original expression and indicative of the mythic identity Reagan 
would bring to the White House. It was not common for new presidents to directly 
invoke their heroic forebears, but Reagan made three of them central images of his 
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address.260 More significantly, he recalled them through the context of national 
memory. His address did not present them as historical examples, but as mythic icons. 
Similarly, while other presidents made references to the sacrifice of soldiers, this was 
usually in the immediate context or aftermath of war, and in general terms. Reagan 
honoured an individual soldier dead sixty years, making him representative of a 
willing, patriotic citizenry on a level with the presidential symbols of Washington, 
Jefferson and Lincoln. These concluding images were, for some, indicative of 
Reagan’s Hollywood style. Garry Wills remarked that it was the first inaugural 
address to have “internal camera directions”.261 Lou Cannon described a “cinematic 
quality” and emphasised Khachigian’s incorporation of a film quote Reagan had 
mentioned into the speech’s closing line: “After all…we are Americans.”262 Reagan 
elevated national memory in his address, indicating the centrality of myth to his 
presidency – an idea that his Hollywood identity accentuated and reinforced. At the 
very start of his presidency, Reagan indicated to Americans his appreciation of the 
past as a source of mythic iconography and narrative.  
 
 
 
Recent Memories of Division 
 
Americans indicated to President Reagan in his first term their interest in the complex 
and divisive events of the recent past. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
division in American history was not something that Reagan easily reconciled with 
nationalist myth. As president, Reagan was charged with representing national unity 
and hoped to foster national optimism. As a politician, he had been involved in these 
divisions, often associated with one side. By the time of Reagan’s election, the 
movement to commemorate Martin Luther King, Jr. with a national holiday had seen 
legislation introduced in every session of Congress since his death, and passed in 
several states. In the week before his inauguration, Reagan was contacted by Senator 
Harrison Williams who informed the President-elect that he and other senators would 
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be reintroducing the legislation that year, and urged him to “give his deepest 
consideration into taking a leadership role in this matter.” King “embodied and 
embraced the fundamental principles that are the very basis of America’s national 
identity,” and Reagan could demonstrate his commitment to all Americans through 
supporting his commemoration.263 However, such a demonstration was not 
forthcoming. Reagan had publicly opposed the idea and would continue to do so until 
the bill was passed overwhelmingly by Congress in August, 1983. His opposition has 
been attributed to conservative principle, that “Reagan simply could not see why 
government workers should have another day off.”264 However, the president showed 
sympathy to Jesse Helms’ efforts to expose King’s communist affiliations – 
subsequent to the bill passing – while writing to Governor Mel Thompson of New 
Hampshire, an early critic from the right: “On the national holiday you mentioned, I 
have the reservations you have but here the perception of too many people is based on 
an image and not reality. Indeed to them the perception is reality.”265 
 Reagan’s reality of Dr King was rooted in the images and perceptions he 
gained during the 1960s. Reagan had opposed the Civil Rights legislation of the 
Johnson administration. This position can be aligned with the conservative reasoning 
of Goldwater, who questioned interpretations of “civil rights” and argued that change, 
“however desirable, should not be effected by the engines of national power.”266 
There is no evidence that Reagan was an ideological racist, less a segregationist, but 
there is no doubt over his distrust of federal power in effecting solutions, or that he 
was a staunch supporter of the tenth amendment.267 However, other factors were 
involved in his political responses to the Civil Rights movement. On King’s 
assassination, Reagan called it “a great tragedy that began when we began 
compromising with law and order and people started choosing which laws they’d 
break.”268 After the assassination, and after Robert Kennedy’s, Reagan met privately 
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with Californian African American leaders with apparently instructive and 
constructive results. Yet, the same year, during his first presidential run, he was 
unwilling to dissociate himself too far from the law and order messages of his 
potential rival, George Wallace, leaving him open to charges of racism.269 Running 
for president twelve years later, he objected to the Voting Rights Act (which his 
administration would unsuccessfully try to water down on its renewal in 1982) on the 
grounds that it was “humiliating to the South”.270 Reagan’s image of King was 
complex. Sympathetic with those who suffered racial discrimination, and relatively 
active as governor in helping them, he was ideologically opposed to their efforts at a 
federal level. Moreover, he still defined King’s Civil Rights movement in terms of 
riots and crime, and aligned himself politically with King’s greatest opponents – 
Southern conservatives.  
 After the vote on the King Holiday in August, 1983, which was passed in 
Congress with such support that Reagan’s threatened veto was impossible, Reagan 
supported through innuendo Senator Jesse Helms’ attacks on King’s moral character 
and political allegiances. In response to a question about whether King had been a 
communist, the president asked: “We’ll know in about thirty-five years, won’t 
we?”271 Reagan’s hostility to the national commemoration of his contemporary 
stemmed variously from conservative sensibility, to his own antipathy to King’s 
political stance, to allegiance to his most active political base. When the bill was 
passed, Reagan was required by his office to enact it, and to do so in positive terms. 
This was not the first time that the president was so obliged. After the passage of the 
renewed VRA, the president signed it with a statement fully praising the act as a 
practical and symbolic ensurance of American democracy, and playing down “the 
differences over how to attain the equality we seek for our people.”272 Meanwhile, 
Reagan had made a statement following a commemorative re-enactment of the march 
on Washington, D.C., conveyed by the White House to Coretta Scott King, 
emphasising that “the values that were appealed to [at the 1963 march] are shared by 
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us all,” not just a minority of African Americans.273 These statements suggested the 
means by which Reagan could establish King as a central figure in American 
memory, to make him representative of national ideals and myths. At the signing 
ceremony on November 2, Reagan celebrated King’s life, but also celebrated 
America: 
 
As democratic people, we can take pride in the knowledge that we 
Americans recognized a grave injustice and took action to correct it. And 
we should remember that in far too many countries, people like Dr. King 
never have the opportunity to speak out at all.274 
 
Such language not only made King’s efforts a unified American achievement, 
affirming King’s own rhetorical claims and obscuring the opposition to the civil rights 
movement, but defined them as a product of the American system, as opposed to its 
indictment. In the drafting process of the remarks, there was conscious effort to soften 
the contradiction of Reagan establishing Martin Luther King Day. Mike Horowtiz 
from the OMB wrote to Ben Elliot suggesting that with some edits, the speech “could 
assert the President’s basic beliefs while still accordingly full honour to King [sic.].” 
While his suggestions to omit the term “racism” from the remarks were rejected, the 
idea to change “civil rights” for “equality of rights” was followed.275 There was a 
subtle effort not only to de-emphasise King’s politics and the Civil Rights movement, 
but to align him with Reagan’s conservative, patriotic values. By 1986, when Martin 
Luther King, Jr. Day was first nationally celebrated, Reagan was, as we have seen, 
associating King with the “shining city”, but was also urging a young pen-pal that 
King “was a great man we must always remember.”276 Reagan had absorbed King, 
through the commemorative process, into his own mythic narrative of America. 
Michael Kammen argued that the commemoration of King “filtered” and 
“depoliticised” his memory, sidelining his critical stances in favour of a bland heroic 
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image.277 It should also be said that the commemoration also tempered conservative 
criticism of King, causing Reagan, at least, to discard his political opposition to the 
Civil Rights movement of the sixties and accept it as part of a celebratory American 
narrative. The central point here is that Reagan, through his role as an officiator of 
national commemoration, was led by the momentum of an external memory 
movement to promote and incorporate an idea about America’s recent past, against 
the wishes of his political base, and even his own instincts. However, according to his 
reconciliatory role as president, and to the mythic imperatives of his ideology, he did 
this by emphasising a nationalist theme of unity, defining King as a symbol of that 
unity and his memory as a means of maintaining it.  
 The memory of the Vietnam War represented another prominent American 
division with which Reagan the politician was highly and purposefully associated, but 
from which Reagan the president had to formulate a narrative of national unity. As 
John Diggins wrote, it “haunted the American mind in the Reagan eighties,” 
dominating both political and cultural arenas.278 Responses to the national experience 
of the war found form in film and literary representations, as well as political debate 
over both specifically related issues, such as the influx of Vietnamese “boat people” 
or the emotive and quixotic POW/MIA movement, and the more general formulation 
and criticism of foreign policy.279 The story of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial has 
become a central example of the vivid but conflicting memory of the war in America. 
Reagan’s role in this story has been variously defined. In the actions of James Watt, 
the Secretary of the Interior, to stall the project after its design offended 
conservatives, John Bodnar saw evidence of his binary theory of the conflict between 
official and vernacular memory. Watt’s actions represented “the powerful and 
dominant interests of patriots and nationalists” and interfered with the expressions of 
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“ordinary people and ordinary emotions.”280 While Watt has largely represented 
Reagan’s involvement in the affair, the White House in fact played an important role 
in seeing the memorial completed over the objections of conservatives.  
 When Reagan took office, the idea of building a national monument to 
Vietnam Veterans amongst the “shrines to giants” of the Washington Mall had been 
approved by Congress and by President Carter.281 A competition to choose the design 
of the memorial was completed on May 1, 1981, when the young architecture student 
Maya Lin’s design was announced as the winner. Her plan for a sunken, reflecting 
wall met the competition’s criteria in the prominence it gave to the inscriptions of 
names of America’s war dead, in its “horizontal” coherence with its environment, and 
its apolitical nature.282 This last judgement, however, would become seriously 
contested. One of the first effective public arguments against the memorial was made 
by Tom Carhart, a veteran, sometime volunteer for the VVMF and unsuccessful 
entrant in the design competition. At the first Fine Arts Commission hearing on the 
memorial, Carhart read an emotional statement that denounced the design as a “black 
gash of shame” which would speak to future generations only of the dishonour and 
disgrace in which America held her veterans. He also invoked Reagan, aligning 
himself and the veterans for whom he claimed to speak with the president’s 
description of the war as a “noble cause”.283 This characterisation came from a speech 
Reagan gave to the Veterans of Foreign Wars while on the campaign trail the previous 
year: 
 
We dishonor the memory of 50,000 young Americans who died in that 
cause when we gave way to feelings of guilt as if we were doing 
something shameful, and we have been shabby in our treatment of those 
who returned. It is time we recognized that ours, in truth, was a noble 
cause.284 
 
This provoked controversy in the heat of an election, but it was consistent with 
Reagan’s support of the war since its beginning – one that honoured the soldiers and 
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the cause, if it did not always translate into political support for the war’s domestic 
prosecutors. As governor, Reagan corresponded with soldiers and wore a POW/MIA 
bracelet.285 In his interregnum, Reagan reminded his radio listeners of the Vietnam 
veterans and dead, framing his position on Carter’s draft-dodger amnesty in terms of 
their sacrifice, defending their conduct in the war, and recalling their suffering as 
prisoners of the Viet-Cong.286 
 Carhart could thus align his protest with the established position of the 
president, giving it a symbolic authority. His stand prompted a growing clamour of 
reaction from conservative pundits, politicians and citizens, including a number of 
veterans, which saw in the design an unwelcome message of national guilt that further 
denigrated those who fought. Using these terms, the opponents of the memorial might 
have expected presidential support. Representative Henry Hyde (R., Illinois) acted on 
this, writing an appeal for intercession to Reagan in January, 1982, signed by thirty-
one of his colleagues. The letter stated that the design “makes a political statement of 
shame and dishonour, rather than an expression of our national pride at the courage, 
patriotism and nobility of all who served.”287 Hyde received no official White House 
response. Reagan’s support, meanwhile, had also been sought by the memorial’s 
makers and supporters. Before the design had been chosen, the VVMF had failed to 
gain any promise of Reagan’s ceremonial participation, but had enlisted Nancy 
Reagan to a central role in their fundraising efforts.288 This fact was offered by 
Reagan’s staff as an assurance of his support for the project in a polite rejection of a 
request by Senator John Warner (R., Virginia) for the president to endorse the design 
at a press conference, after the outburst of protest prompted by Carhart in October, 
1981.289   
 While Warner, an early booster of the VVMF and central, along with Senator 
Charles Mathias (R., Maryland), to the memorial’s realisation, received this quiet but 
uncommitted support, the opponents found sympathy from James Watt, who had 
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departmental jurisdiction over the issue and an understanding ear to the complaints of 
Henry Hyde and Jesse Helms. Watt agreed that it would be “a sad day when ‘artistic 
freedom’ controls what America should stand for.”290 Watt stalled his department’s 
approval of the plans, but deferred to the White House, whose position in January 
1982 was defined by a National Security Council memo: “a role other than that of a 
‘fair arbiter’ by the Executive Branch in the controversy is likely to be a no-win move 
– inviting attack from either side.”291 The impasse, however, was resolved in a 
meeting between the VVMF and its critics, arranged by Senator Warner, which found 
a compromise in the agreement to include a flag, a sculpture and an inscription in the 
memorial. The following year, Watt was stalling again, this time over the placement 
of the new features in the otherwise built and unofficially dedicated site. Special 
Assistant to the President Jim Cicconi warned that “if a delay in Watt’s decision 
enhances prospects of renewing the Memorial controversy, we may not be lucky 
enough to sidestep it a second time.”292 This is when the White House took an active 
role in enabling the completion of the memorial, and burying the controversy. A week 
before Watt’s announcement to delay, Elizabeth Dole, the head of the Office of Public 
Liaison, had recommended to the Reagan troika that they suggest to Watt he forward 
three options to the FAC, and leave them with the final decision.293 This was exactly 
what Watt did, just days after his public refusal. Patrick Hagopian has revealed the 
pattern of what happened, involving determined lobbying by the VVMF of the White 
House, in particular Vice President Bush, the positive action by Meese, Deaver and 
Baker to influence Watt, and the insistence on keeping the White House’s role a 
secret.294 
 This demonstrates a White House that was not only conscious of but very 
interested – to the level of the NSC – in the question of how to commemorate the 
Vietnam War. This interest, however, did not translate into deliberate argument or 
action about the commemoration, rather an alert passivity which sought to avoid 
involvement in a tense symbolic conflict. This position was decided by political 
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considerations. The president could not afford to openly defy an important part of his 
own political base, who were using his own language and ideas to criticise the 
memorial, but nor was it a battle worth joining when a majority of Americans rejected 
Reagan’s view of the war, and the memory of Vietnam was informing opposition to 
his Central American policy.295 Moreover, the memorial did not necessarily diverge 
from Reagan’s understanding of the war or hopes for how its memory would be 
represented in his America. While his views on the design are hard to gauge, he did 
record a meeting with the columnist Jack Kilpatrick, a notable conservative supporter 
of the project, who wept as he tried to tell Reagan of his experience at the wall’s 
dedication.296 After his own first visit following the final settlement over the 
memorial’s design, Reagan recorded: “It’s quite a place – a very impressive & 
moving experience.”297  
As well as appreciating the memorial’s dramatic nature, Reagan understood its 
effort to promote national reconciliation over the war through the focus on veterans. 
At the 1983 Conservative Political Action Conference, just days after Watt had 
reversed his stance, Reagan addressed an audience which presumably included 
several who had opposed the memorial design. The president spoke of his “belief that 
the days of division and discord are behind us and that an era of unity and national 
renewal is upon us,” raising the memorial in evidence. Emphasising the symbolism of 
its use, at the dedication, rather than its aesthetics, Reagan related an anecdote of 
some visiting veterans being applauded by some students – a vivid reversal of 
Vietnam era imagery. “We Americans have learned again to listen to each other,” said 
Reagan, “to trust each other.”298 Here, however, and the following year at the 
interment of the Unknown Soldier of the Vietnam War where the sentiments and 
words were repeated almost verbatim, this reunification of the people was framed in 
terms of the distrust of government and its failures: “We've learned that government 
owes the people an explanation and needs their support for its actions at home and 
abroad.” 299 Reagan recognised the division the war had wrought and acknowledged 
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its tragedy, but laid blame implicitly on the distant machine of government, rather 
than on the ideologies which motivate it, or the people who manage it.  In this way, 
Reagan embraced the meaning pursued by the VVMF, endorsing Jan Scruggs’s 
assessment that “a lot of healing went on,” but defining the division in terms of the 
failure of government, and the healing in spite of it.300 Reagan finally made an official 
visit to the memorial on Veterans Day, 1984, at the official dedication of the finished 
monument, and just days after his re-election as president. With a certain 
magnanimity, Reagan only slightly more specifically addressed the division in 
America caused by the Vietnam War: 
 
There were great moral and philosophical disagreements about the 
rightness of the war, and we cannot forget them because there is no 
wisdom to be gained in forgetting. But we can forgive each other and 
ourselves for those things that we now recognize may have been wrong, 
and I think it's time we did.301 
 
The writer of the speech, Peggy Noonan, had found her own conversion to 
conservatism cemented by her experiences amongst the anti-war left, and later wrote 
of the quiet unease and guilt she perceived in the former protestors.302 In this sense, 
the speech is far from a concession of fault or apology for supporting the war, but a 
suggestion that critics of the war might acknowledge their own part in American 
division, and their own mistakes. The commemorations of both Martin Luther King 
and the Vietnam War both challenged Reagan’s narrative of American unity. They 
did not promote national division, but put the spotlight on Reagan’s part in it as a 
political opponent of Civil Rights and supporter of the Vietnam War. Reagan’s 
response to each was defined by his presidential role, which limited him politically. 
He was lead by his duty as a consecrator of national memory, and the imperative of 
avoiding controversy and promoting unity. While this role did not allow him to decide 
the subject or means of national commemoration, it did allow him to define and 
appropriate it in terms of his political narrative. His success in this, however, is 
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questionable. On the first national Martin Luther King Day on January 18, 1986, a 
poll revealed that 56% of African Americans believed the president was a racist, but 
where only 9% had approved of Reagan’s performance in August 1983, 23% now 
did.303 Reagan, in his radio address that day, conceded that “our country won't be free 
until we're all free” but argued that under his presidency, African Americans shared in 
the country’s increasing prosperity.304 Whether Reagan’s increased standing amongst 
African Americans was due to his symbolic appropriation of Martin Luther King, or 
broader political reasons, his image was still significantly racially defined. 
Meanwhile, his presidency failed to convince the majority of Americans that Vietnam 
was a “noble cause”. In 1980, 66% of Americans considered the war “unjustified”, 
and in 1986 the same proportion considered it “more than a mistake, fundamentally 
wrong and immoral”.305 The public memories of these issues were outside of 
Reagan’s control, and he was positioned against the tide of public opinion. As 
president, he did not engage in a battle over recent memory – as he might have, were 
he still a radio commentator and syndicated columnist. Instead, he consecrated and 
sought to define a consensus that supported his general narrative of American myth, 
while adapting his rhetoric, and even his views, to the imperatives of national 
memory.  
 
 
The Second World War 
 
The commemoration of the Vietnam War during Reagan’s presidency displayed an 
adherence to traditions in war commemoration. This was quite deliberate in the 
interment of the Unknown Soldier, which addressed Vietnam in the symbolic 
conventions of previous wars, an effort complicated by the forensic ability of the 
armed forces to identify their dead.306 Benedict Anderson considered the tombs of 
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unknown soldiers to be the most “arresting emblems of the modern culture of 
nationalism.”307 Equally, the placement of a Veterans Memorial amongst the edifices 
of Washington D.C. had a distinctly nationalist function. The subsequent use of the 
wall, meanwhile, as a participatory site for personal mourning, expressed a different 
trend of war commemoration. Its combination of these aspects, the official and 
unofficial, the national and the personal, represent its commemorative success.308 
President Reagan’s commemorations of the Second World War can be described in 
these terms as well, where the success of his remembrance of D-Day was based on its 
effective combination of nationalist themes and the personal experiences of 
Americans, and the failure of the ceremony at Bitburg Cemetery was the result of its 
distance from both subjects. This is fundamentally related to the symbolic presidential 
role, where as chief of state he is a national symbol to which Americans can 
personally connect.309 The Reagan White House initiated and maintained control over 
the commemorative events at Normandy and Bitburg. This point, which makes them 
extraordinary in the general history of presidential commemoration, is all the more 
important in that they both became defining moments of Reagan’s presidency. A 
comparative approach to their causes, purposes and legacies can reveal much about 
the potential and the limits of presidential commemoration, and how Reagan 
approached the role.  
 The commemoration of D-Day responded to current trends in American 
memory. The Second World War increased in significance as its veterans entered old 
age, and as its popular image as a victorious and moral war resonated in the aftermath 
of Vietnam. Bitburg, used here as shorthand for both the wreath-laying ceremony at 
the German War cemetery and the accompanying visit to Bergen-Belsen, had no such 
convergence with the broad trends of American culture, responding instead to 
considerations external to the priorities of both the Reagan presidency and of 
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American memory, and, indeed, to the success of the D-Day ceremony in meeting 
tradition and setting precedent. Reagan’s visit to the Normandy beaches can be seen 
as part of a tradition of battlefield commemoration. Reagan had already participated 
in such an event at Yorktown, while previous Presidents Franklin Roosevelt, 
Woodrow Wilson, and, of course, Abraham Lincoln had articulated the themes of 
national identity of the consecrated field of Gettysburg. In that the D-Day 
commemoration occurred abroad, it was unprecedented, and in that it involved the 
gathering of several foreign heads of state, it was a uniquely presidential event. 
However it met the precedent of Gettysburg, where the presence of veterans at the 
fiftieth and seventy-fifth anniversaries underlined presidential expressions of national 
identity.  
“We’d like it to be like the Gettysburg Address,” Peggy Noonan was told by 
various White House staffers as she prepared Reagan’s primary speech, to be 
delivered at the unveiling of the Rangers Monument atop the promontory of Pointe de 
Hoc.310 Noonan understood this simply as an instruction for a “tear-jerker”, but it 
suggests the level of expectation that was invested in the speech. The speechwriter 
was more motivated by the knowledge that the veteran Rangers who had taken the 
point would be in the audience: “I…knew the veterans would be there, and I wanted 
justice to be done to them…I wanted to honor them and those that had died beside 
them as they stormed those cliffs.”311 Reading her speech, Reagan directly addressed 
these veterans, and translated their experience into one of national themes:  
 
You all knew that some things are worth dying for. One's country is worth 
dying for, and democracy is worth dying for, because it's the most deeply 
honorable form of government ever devised by man…The Americans 
who fought here that morning knew word of the invasion was spreading 
through the darkness back home. They…felt in their hearts, though they 
couldn't know in fact, that in Georgia they were filling the churches at 4 
a.m., in Kansas they were kneeling on their porches and praying, and in 
Philadelphia they were ringing the Liberty Bell.312 
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Reagan had frequently used parables of the Second World War, whether based in 
reality or fiction, to express himself, or to capture an audience. Here, in the presence 
of his and America’s heroes, with the blessing of their attention and their emotion, 
and the authenticity of their memories, Reagan could present America with a 
celebratory understanding of itself. The speech also related the exploits of the Rangers 
and others in the landings, an aspect which drew only one criticism from the many 
readers of the original draft. Phil Rivers, the Superintendent of the Normandy 
American Cemetery, remarked that the speech “is like a B-movie,” pointing out that 
one of the incidents recounted had been enacted in film by John Wayne.313 His 
critique was ignored, though it seems he identified something of what made the 
speech successful. 
 The second speech of the day, delivered at the American Cemetery, made a 
further effort to make the soldiers’ experience a national one. This was done through 
the words of Lisa Zanatta-Henn, the daughter of a D-Day veteran whose letter to the 
president asking if she might attend the ceremony had found its way to the desk of the 
speechwriter, Tony Dolan. Reagan’s speech drew heavily from the letter, which 
related less of Robert Zanatta’s experience of D-Day than his daughter’s memory of 
him, as defined by this experience. “Through the words of his loving daughter,” 
Reagan said, “a D-day veteran has shown us the meaning of this day far better than 
any President can.”314 The emphasis on this familial bond, and the pilgrimage Zanatta 
made on behalf of her father (and with the aid of the White House), personalised the 
national commemoration, combining the official context of the ceremony with one 
symbolically “ordinary”. This was reflected in the American media coverage in the 
two weeks between Memorial Day and the anniversary which frequently found local 
veterans whose stories framed the remembrance.315 Oral history of the war also found 
substantial expression that year in Studs Terkel’s The Good War, which set the 
precedent and the standard for the common use of soldiers’ recollections in the 
“memory boom” that occupied America for the following two decades.316  
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Terkel’s ambiguously titled book, however, was a response to “disturbingly 
profound disrememberance of World War Two,” that might have been represented in 
Reagan’s unambiguously advanced narrative of the definitive morality of the war. 
This was in contrast and response to the difficulty of the Vietnam War in American 
memory. The commemoration of D-Day was in near concert with the contemporary 
internment of the Unknown Soldier in the effort to resolve the confusion of American 
identity and purpose. The Second World War was a “balm for the divisions that had 
come with the Vietnam War…Remembrance of the unifying ‘good war’ might 
sublimate the divisions of the Vietnam era.”317 In the 1984 Memorial Day issue of 
Time, in an article read and annotated by Peggy Noonan, Lance Morrow wrote that 
“the experience of Normandy…has a kind of moral freshness in the American 
imagination, a quality of collective heroic virtue for which the nation may be 
wistful…The morals of sacrifice, so clear then, are more confusing now.”318 Noonan 
herself “wanted to express the moral dimension of the War, why the West did what it 
did.”319 In an interview following the Pointe de Hoc ceremony, Walter Cronkite, who 
as a UP correspondent had accompanied a bombing mission in support of the landings 
and was now brought out of retirement by CBS specifically for the commemoration, 
asked the president: “World War II was called a popular war, as opposed to actions 
we’ve had recently, Vietnam, Lebanon, Grenada. What are the conditions that made 
that a popular war?” In his answer, Reagan did not elaborate on the comparison, but 
did reemphasise the war’s moral character: “here was a case in which the issues of 
right and wrong were so clearly defined before we even got into the war, and then we 
didn’t choose to pull the trigger.”320 Though healing was not a specifically stated 
purpose of the commemoration, it did address the anxiety of the memory of the 
Vietnam War and its continued effects on American self-perception and purpose.  
Bitburg, while it also responded to the resurgent national interest in the war, 
demonstrated none of the cultural convergences or strategies that made the Normandy 
trip a successful commemoration. Instead, Bitburg’s commemorations responded to 
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political considerations. Reagan’s remembrance of D-Day, too, was invested with 
political purpose. Michael Deaver’s efforts directed the event towards the re-election 
campaign of the summer, timing the Pointe du Hoc address to overshadow news of 
the Democratic Californian primary the same morning, and using footage of the 
president and the veterans in the campaign film, A New Beginning (1984).321 The 
State Department and the NSC, meanwhile, employed the event as an expression of 
foreign policy, a reassurance to European allies and the continuation of a freshly 
conciliatory stance towards the Soviet Union.322 These efforts, however, capitalised 
on the event’s setting and themes, while the events of the Bitburg trip were conceived 
for political purpose. Bitburg had its roots in one of the few controversies of the 
Normandy ceremony: the reported disappointment of Chancellor Helmut Kohl at his 
exclusion from the proceedings.323 Kohl did participate in another ceremony at 
Verdun later in the year, where he and President Mitterrand made a commitment to 
the reconciliation and alliance between France and West Germany at the battlefield 
cemetery where soldiers of both countries were buried. On a visit to the US in 
November, the chancellor described this event to President Reagan, who agreed that a 
similar gesture of US-German reconciliation would be appropriate for VE Day in 
1985. Reagan understood this in terms of the needs of the Germans, noting that they 
“suffer a great guilt complex over the Nazi period”, and resolving to celebrate “when 
the hatred stopped & peace & friendship began”.324 Whether Kohl, whose party faced 
crucial elections the following summer and possibly wished to replicate Reagan’s 
own use of the D-Day commemorations, “manipulated” Reagan or not, it is clear that 
Bitburg was conceived to address issues of German memory and identity, rather than 
American.325 Furthermore, as Richard Jensen indicated, Reagan had to choose 
between two versions of German identity – one represented by Kohl and the needs of 
German memory that Nazi rule represented an aberration, and the other broadly 
represented by Jewish memory, that saw the German people as complicit in Nazi 
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atrocity.326 Reagan chose the former, alienating the latter, but the very existence of a 
choice suggested that the American president was operating beyond his natural arena 
of American memory. 
The purpose of the commemoration was the political support of an ally, but its 
themes developed in political response to the controversy that erupted following the 
announcement in April that the president would be visiting and honouring a cemetery 
of German war dead during his European trip the following month. The symbolism of 
such an act, intensified by the discovery that Bitburg Cemetery contained the graves 
of forty-nine SS soldiers, provoked a month of unabated criticism, domestic and 
international, that amounted to the biggest political crisis of Reagan’s presidency until 
Iran/Contra. The story is significant for various reasons. It reveals the processes of 
commemoration and crisis in the new structure of Reagan’s second administration; it 
raises familiar questions about his personal understanding of history; it demonstrates 
the contemporary perceptions of the Reagan White House as a fundamentally 
symbolic institution. Here, however, I focus on how in the event of Reagan’s own 
personal decision to hold a commemoration, he challenged the narratives of American 
morality and unity that had successfully framed his previous commemorative 
ventures. While at Normandy, the war had been easily expressed and understood as a 
good fight against an uncomplicated evil. The president’s participation at Bitburg 
threatened to absolve and normalise America’s Nazi enemies. Norman Podhoretz 
argued that Bitburg would be “the grave of the great idea that has given…moral 
purpose to Mr. Reagan’s foreign policy.” This was the identification of totalitarian 
regimes as exceptional and unappeasable. Honouring its soldiers would vindicate 
Nazi Germany as an “ordinary nation”, and weaken Reagan’s moral stance against 
Communism as an exceptional threat.327 Implicit in this critique was the potential loss 
of America’s exceptionalism, as the reconciliatory equation of American soldiers with 
their Nazi enemies undermined the central reference point for American moral 
purpose. Reagan’s speechwriters read Podhoretz and other right-wing critics, and 
received substantial friendly advice from their colleagues that urged the clarification 
of Reagan’s moral stance. Peggy Noonan and William Safire, for instance, advised 
that Reagan should stress that he still recognised good and evil, and that “it is not 
                                                 
326 Jensen, Richard J., Reagan at Bergen-Belsen and Bitburg (College Station: Texas A&M University 
Press, 2007), pp. 73-4. 
327 Podhoretz, ‘The Worst Effect of Bitburg’, The New York Post (April 23, 1985), Folder: ‘Bergen-
Belsen Timmons/Ken Khachigian’, Box 208, Speechwriting, White House Office of: Research, RRPL.  
  
109 
 
man’s job to forgive evil, it is God’s.”328 Mark Klugmann suggested Reagan affirm 
the morality of the occasion by emphasising the modern alliance between the USA 
and Germany against totalitarianism.329  
These ideas were expressed in the speech Reagan gave at the Bitburg Air Base 
– a better location for an articulation of the US-German alliance than the cemetery. 
However, while to an extent the commemoration specifically sought to raise and 
resolve the issue of American memory of its enmity with Germany, this raised the 
extra but vital question of the Holocaust. This was poorly anticipated by Reagan, 
which is perhaps surprising considering his strongly felt personal connection to the 
revelation of the Nazi genocide.330 A trip to Dachau had initially been scheduled, but 
was abandoned due to second thoughts on the German side, and opposition from 
Nancy Reagan, reluctant to see her husband subjected to such emotive horror. This 
neglect brought the most ardent criticism of Reagan, compounded by his awkward 
press conference justification that the draftees buried at Bitburg “were victims, just as 
surely as the victims in the concentration camps.”331 A visit to the concentration camp 
at Bergen-Belsen was planned in response to the opprobrium, but this did not satisfy 
the prominent Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel, who took the opportunity to publicly 
appeal to Reagan to cancel his Bitburg visit when receiving the Congressional Gold 
Medal at the White House on April 19: “That place, Mr. President, is not your place. 
Your place is with the victims of the SS.”332 Though Reagan’s visit to Bergen-Belsen, 
and his speech there, did not assuage the hostility of Jewish opinion to his presence at 
Bitburg, it was a concession to it, and the theme of Holocaust memory dominated 
both events. Reagan’s commemoration became defined by the particular imperatives 
of Jewish memory, even though American public opinion was predominantly 
concerned with the president’s treatment of the memory of American soldiers, rather 
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than of the Holocaust.333 The friction between the two priorities was felt in the White 
House. Marshall Breger, the official for Jewish Affairs, felt “tensions, but not a 
dichotomy” in representing both the president and the American Jewish community. 
Pat Buchanan saw a greater division, reminding a visiting group of prominent, 
dissenting Republican Jews that they were “Americans first”. Their continued 
opposition caused him to frustratedly write in his notes, and in sight of one of the 
guests: “Succumbing to the pressure of the Jews”.334 Though the distinction between 
Jewish and American identity was not always so meanly perceived, it was significant. 
While the Holocaust was gaining an increasing place on the American cultural 
landscape – literally, in the form of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, whose 
groundbreaking on the Mall took place in October that year – it was not part of 
American national memory. “The Holocaust is simply too remote from the experience 
of Americans”, Peter Novick argued, for it to inform American identity in any real 
way.335 
Bitburg failed to directly address the concerns of American national memory 
and identity, as Reagan’s other commemorations had, whether successful or not. It 
threatened to undermine the narratives that Reagan had previously promoted, by 
bringing into question the idea of America’s moral identity, and responding to 
priorities other than those of the dominant interests of American memory, conceding, 
to some extent, the multiplicity of identities in America. For these reasons it was a 
failure. Though its initial purpose saw some success in the political support the event 
gave to Reagan’s ally, Helmut Kohl, it came to represent the difficulty of combining 
politics with contested and complex historical memory. In this way it became 
definitive of Reagan’s presidency as an instruction in the issues of collective memory. 
Afterwards, Elie Wiesel, another symbol of memory, acknowledged that the exchange 
of words over the issue may have had a positive effect, but expressed a reluctance to 
talk further about it, and declined the offer to contribute to the literary theorist 
Geoffrey Hartman’s edited collection, Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective.336 
Hartman considered the affair “a symbolic and symptomatic event with high 
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visibility, from which much can be learned.”337 Meanwhile, Richard Jensen called it a 
“seminal symbolic disaster”, nevertheless concluding his rhetorical analysis by 
suggesting that Reagan’s speeches were exemplary, containing lessons for public 
speakers and future presidents.338  
The success of the D-Day commemoration lay also in its lasting symbolism. 
Tom Brokaw, a central figure in the memory boom of the 1990s, argued: “I believe 
that Reagan’s the Boys of Pointe du Hoc speech was the beginning of the rekindled 
awareness of what we owe the World War II generation. He opened the window, so to 
speak, so we could all see through it.”339 It set a precedent for presidential 
commemoration, followed by Bill Clinton in 1994, George W. Bush in 2004, and 
Barack Obama in 2009. Clinton’s staff obtained video footage of Reagan’s speeches 
from the Reagan Presidential Library in preparation for the fiftieth anniversary.340 
Bush’s commemoration of the sixtieth, meanwhile, made explicit reference to 
Reagan, who had died the previous day. Clips of Reagan at Normandy scattered the 
televised retrospectives, overshadowing Bush’s own efforts, and more firmly 
connecting Reagan with the act of commemoration and the event itself. Memory of 
Reagan became intertwined with the memory of D-Day, and the Second World War, a 
conflation represented in Douglas Brinkley’s Boys of Pointe du Hoc (2005), which 
told the stories of the Rangers and of Reagan in a single narrative – and which earned 
Brinkley the invitation to edit Reagan’s diaries.  
Bitburg and D-Day were both commemorations which Reagan chose and 
initiated. This level of control is rare in presidential commemoration, made possible 
by the events’ international nature. However, this presidential leadership was 
constrained by the interests and priorities of contemporary myth. At Normandy, this 
was not a problem, as Reagan’s narrative of the war as an affirmation of victorious 
exceptionalism dovetailed with prevailing and popular nationalist themes. At Bitburg, 
Reagan’s unsuccessful attempt to redefine this narrative for incongruous political 
purposes, and his reactive concession to the demands of Jewish identity, resulted in an 
incoherence that revealed the political artifice behind the commemoration. Reagan 
could not realign the politics of memory, but was dependent on and subject to mythic 
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imperatives outside of his control. Nevertheless, Reagan’s initiative, and the extent of 
both his success and failure to engage and reflect the memory of his times, confirmed 
him as a distinctly and definitively mythic president.   
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
After Bitburg, the Reagan presidency did not abandon commemoration, but engaged 
in only broad, bland celebrations of national memory in a traditionally consecrative 
role. Reagan represented the presidency at the opening of the Constitution 
Bicentennial in 1987, which was chaired by the retiring Chief Justice Warren Burger, 
and which lasted four years.341 He had a more central, but still performative role in 
Statue of Liberty Centennial in 1986, a vast celebration organised by Lee Iacocca 
which rivalled the national bicentennial a decade before. Reagan’s involvement 
further confirmed his mythic distinctiveness. In response, Lance Morrow of Time 
called Reagan a “masterpiece of American magic – apparently one of the simplest, 
most uncomplicated creatures alive, and yet a character of rich meanings, of 
complexities that connect him with the myths and powers of his country in an 
unprecedented way.”342 Mike Wallace, an essayist on American memory, charged 
Reagan with “perpetuating myth”, albeit a “deadly one” about enterprise and 
immigration.343 Reagan’s commemorative acts demonstrate his conformity to the 
symbolic traditions of the presidency and the thematic and political constraints that 
are put upon the office, generally making it passive or cautious in the negotiation of 
national memory. However, they also show that Reagan took unprecedented initiative 
in national commemoration, distinguishing his presidency if not always helping it. D-
Day and Bitburg became definitive events of Reagan’s presidency, and in the 
landscape of American memory – connecting the two in history. Both events have 
become the subjects of individual books; Reagan’s address at Bergen-Belsen was, 
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indeed, what inspired Morris to become his biographer.344 Reagan’s engagement with 
the politics of national memory became a central part of his history, and his myth.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
344 Morris, Dutch (1999), p.3 
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Chapter 4 
“Historical Fantasies”: Partisan Myth, the Cold War Victory and Iran/Contra 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The politics of commemoration engaged the Reagan presidency and have helped 
define it historically. While the images and themes of Reagan’s performances at 
Pointe du Hoc, Bitburg and the Statue of Liberty are vital components of his historical 
image, his presidency and legacy is judged predominantly on its political 
achievements, failures and consequences. This chapter considers those judgements, 
and how they respond to and support Reagan’s association with myth, in relation to 
two seminal events of Reagan’s presidency, the end of the Cold War and the 
Iran/Contra affair. As matters of foreign policy, these events are directly related to 
presidential action, and thus more clearly indicate Reagan and his historical 
symbolism than broad narratives of America’s economic, spiritual and cultural 
recovery or decline. Moreover, they represent Reagan’s greatest perceived 
achievement in the Cold War victory, and his greatest failure in the Iran/Contra 
scandal. This symmetry demonstrates the partisan division in the interpretations of 
Reagan’s presidency, while each event relates to the mythic themes of Reagan’s 
presidency and ideology. The Cold War victory, as we have seen, was made part of 
the narrative of Reagan’s life by Paul Kengor, tied to the concept of American destiny 
in which Reagan believed. Iran/Contra, meanwhile, has been understood in terms of 
Reagan’s televised image, and issues of fiction, deception and reality.  
The politicised historical narratives that seek to explain Reagan’s presidency 
introduce a new aspect to his relationship to American mythology. They divide over 
the consequences of his leadership and thus his broad significance to national and 
global history, but the divide goes beyond historical issues of cause and effect. The 
debate over Reagan contains argument over how history should be understood, and 
the meaning of American history. Reagan’s role in the Cold War raises the question 
of the role of individuals and “greatness” in history against that of wider forces. 
Iran/Contra implies not only constitutional issues, but broad questions about the 
nature of American government and democracy, and about the morality inherent in 
the exceptionalist concept of the American system. Meanwhile, there is a contextual 
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argument about who in America is responsible for the construction of history. This is 
an institutional and philosophical battle in the Culture Wars. Conservatives distrust 
the dominance of the media and the academy in crafting history, while liberals distrust 
the politicised scholarship of conservative think-tanks, and the political use of history 
by conservative politicians. These arguments are mostly implicit in the historical 
literature on Reagan, but his emergence as a contested symbol of and about American 
history has had a discernible influence on the tone, themes and extent of his 
historiography. Before considering the specific treatment of the Cold War and 
Iran/Contra, I will introduce the context of the field, and arena, to which they belong.  
 
 
Reagan and Partisan History 
 
The partisan mythologisation of Reagan has complicated his historiography. In 2008, 
Hugh Heclo felt the need to justify his offering of an objective and mixed assessment 
of President Reagan’s legacies. He did this by defining his analysis in terms of how it 
might “honor” Reagan: “We pay our greatest respect to a person by studiously and 
honestly weighing what it meant that he or she passed through this troubled world.” 
Heclo did this in response to Reagan’s “iconographic” status as “a foil in today’s 
partisan wars”.345 Meanwhile, Gil Troy felt the need to insist: “Yes, I can write a 
balanced work about Ronald Reagan without being a rightwing Neanderthal”. After 
publishing Morning in America, Troy asked of Reagan historiography, “Why have we 
done such a lousy job?”, concluding that “the intense partisanship emanating from 
both Washington, D.C. and the academy” made Reagan a forbidding subject for 
historians.346 He had not, however, been a forbidding subject for publishers. An 
extensive literature on Reagan had developed since during his presidency, much of it 
defined by partisan lines. Scholars such as Robert Dallek and Michael Rogin wrote 
their contemporary analyses of the president with undisguised disdain for his politics. 
Towards the end of the decade, journalists published collections chronicling their 
                                                 
345 Heclo, Hugh, ‘The Mixed Legacies of Ronald Reagan’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 38 (4) 
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116 
 
despair of the Reagan years.347 Journalists dominated the early accounts of the Reagan 
presidency after its close. While Lou Cannon, unique in his familiarity with Reagan, 
largely escaped accusations of partisanship for The Role of a Lifetime, Haynes 
Johnson was, again, openly critical of Reagan and the decline he presided over in 
Sleepwalking through History (1991).348  
Defences of Reagan were initially found only in the memoirs of his loyal 
confederates, and the memoir, as we have seen with Peggy Noonan’s When Character 
was King, has continued as a central genre for the celebration of Reagan.349 
Conservative historical argument about Reagan’s presidency later found form also in 
polemic, hagiography, scholarship and, notably, the publication by the Hoover 
Institution of Reagan’s letters and radio addresses. All this was in conscious response 
to the prevalence of liberal criticism of the president and his policies. Dinesh 
D’Souza’s rehabilitation of Reagan, Ronald Reagan: How an Ordinary Man Became 
an Extraordinary Leader (1997), was as much an attack on the “the elite”, “the 
intellectuals,” and “the wise men” of the liberal media and academy. In the language 
of the Culture Wars, he labelled Reagan’s detractors “revisionist critics” who viewed 
history through a distorting ideological lens.350  The partisan paradigm to Reagan 
literature still exists, as represented recently by William Kleinknecht’s The Man who 
Sold the World, a backlash to Reagan’s improved reputation which places the 
recession at his feet.351  
This overview of Reagan literature describes the partisan context in which his 
history has been written. Authors are conscious of Reagan’s current importance as a 
                                                 
347 For example, see Blumenthal, Sidney, Our Long National Daydream: A Political Pageant of the 
Reagan Era (HarperCollinsPublishers, 1988); Cockburn, Alexander, Corruptions of Empire (New 
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349 Early defensive memoirs include Anderson, Martin, Revolution: The Reagan Legacy (San Diego: 
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historical symbol, and self-conscious about their own political identity. Stephen 
Hayward and Sean Wilentz both wrote histories that sought to define The Age of 
Reagan, and each opened with a defence of the value of their work despite their 
political stances. Wilentz conceded his liberalism and even his personal involvement 
in part of his narrative, as a witness for Clinton in his impeachment trials and as a 
supporter of Al Gore’s candidacy. He went on to assert his commitment to historical 
objectivity, his ability to suspend his own beliefs and to judge fairly and, indeed, that 
the work had challenged and changed his mind on some issues.352 Hayward, a 
conservative and, like Dinesh D’Souza, an American Enterprise Institute scholar, 
admitted in the preface to his first volume that “this narrative is hard on liberals and 
liberalism” but expressed a hope that it would nonetheless be accepted in the spirit of 
thoughtful political debate and promised that the second volume would cast a critical 
eye on conservatism.353 These authors thus concede that their histories belong to a 
context of partisan division over Reagan, but plead that their works are distinguished 
by fairness and objectivity. In other words, they argue that they do not contribute to 
partisan myths of their subject. However, they do represent an acknowledgment of 
Reagan’s significance as a symbol in contemporary political discourse and make it 
part of their task to define that symbolism. Moreover, the politicised, partisan contest 
over Reagan’s meaning is a process of myth and counter-myth which reinforces his 
symbolism. As with interpretations which see Reagan as both an agent and emblem of 
American myth, the political division over Reagan’s relevance has made him both 
subject and symbol of partisan myth.   
 
The Cold War Victory  
 
Reagan’s Cold War victory is the central story to his conservative mythology. 
Its central premise is the attribution to Reagan, as the American president and as the 
leader of American conservatism, of primary responsibility for the fall of 
Communism and the Soviet Union. In its simplest form, this narrative collapses a 
drawn out series of related events into one, and appeals to Reagan as both a symbol of 
American power and of conservative rectitude. Will Bunch has described the 
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pervasiveness of this narrative in the common televisual juxtaposition of Reagan’s 
1987 sound-bite, “Tear down this wall!”, with footage of the Berlin wall breached in 
1989.354 More expansive narratives involve Reagan’s moral confrontation with the 
Evil Empire, his support of anti-communist regimes and rebels across the world, his 
military build-up and his uncompromising statesmanship, all leading to a victory 
represented by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Holding this strategy together was 
Reagan’s vision, expressed to his future National Security Advisor Richard Allen in 
1978: “My idea of American policy toward the Soviet Union is simple…It is this: We 
win and they lose.”355 This narrative is an historical argument which seeks to resolve 
and revise a specific question about Reagan’s role. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. represented 
the generous liberal opinion in giving Reagan credit for “taking Mikhail Gorbachev 
seriously [and] abandoning his zero-sum fallacy”.356 Essentially, this argued that 
Reagan’s transformation from fiery Cold Warrior to agent of disarmament was a 
reaction to Gorbachev. Conservatives advanced evidence of the consistency of 
Reagan’s strategy, and argued that it had forced Gorbachev to react.357 However, in 
their rhetoric of victory and by infusing this narrative with political purpose, 
conservatives engaged in partisan myth. 
As the Cold War waned in the last years of Reagan’s presidency and ended in 
1989, Reagan received mixed tributes. When the wall came down, the Wall Street 
Journal asserted that “America’s victory in the Cold War was consummated by 
Ronald Reagan.”358 Morton Kondracke of the New Republic labelled Ronald Reagan 
the right’s “easy (and plausible) two-word explanation for how victory was snatched 
from the jaws of defeat.”359 However, acclamation was gradual, because of 
conservative disapproval of Reagan’s negotiations with Gorbachev and persistent 
suspicion of the Soviet Union. Richard Viguerie, following the signing of the INF 
Treaty in 1987, had called Reagan “a useful idiot for Soviet propaganda” in an 
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356 Schlesinger, Arthur Jr., ‘Some Lessons from the Cold War’, Hogan, Michael (ed.), The End of the 
Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 61. 
357 This interpretation was also advanced in international relations scholarship in Bell, Coral, The 
Reagan Paradox: American Foreign Policy in the 1980s (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1989) 
and Fischer, Beth, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (Columbia, MO: 
University of Missouri Press, 1997). 
358 Quoted in Kinsley, Michael, ‘Who Killed Communism?’, The New Republic (December 4, 1989), p. 
4.  
359 Kondracke, Morton M., ‘The World Turned Upside Down’, The New Republic (September 18 & 25 
1989), p. 28. 
  
119 
 
extreme example of the broad disappointment with Reagan on the right for his 
conciliation with Gorbachev.360 In 1989, President Bush distanced himself from 
Reagan’s legacy of negotiation with Gorbachev while Secretary of Defence Dick 
Cheney, who warned against those who would “give away their overcoats on the first 
sunny day in January,” had his department prepare a long-term strategy against an 
aggressive and expansive Soviet Union.361 Even in 1990, Howard Phillips was 
warning the Conservative Political Action Conference that that “our leaders are 
intoxicated with premature self-congratulation which has clouded their judgment and 
blinded their eyes to ominous reality.”362 As conservatives accepted the finality of the 
events of these years, meanwhile, they revealed division over the future of American 
policy, and their conceptions of American purpose and identity.363 In the immediacy 
of the end of the Cold War, conservatives undoubtedly appreciated Reagan and the 
role he played, but it was not until after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and, indeed, 
that of George H.W. Bush’s presidency, that conservatives turned to Reagan as a 
unifying symbol of triumph.  
Whether in polemic, political rhetoric or scholarly historical revision, the 
elevation of Reagan as Cold War victor emerged as a response to the American left. 
Reagan and his achievement were a symbol of conservatism, and his diminishment by 
liberal journalists and academics were attacks on this symbol. Conservatives sought to 
demythologise the left’s image of Reagan as a man engaged in fantasy, and promote 
him as a man of vision and strategy. This effort revolved around the meaning of the 
Strategic Defence Initiative which was not only, after Rogin, widely attributed to 
Murder in the Air, but received the nickname Star Wars, popularised by Ted 
Kennedy. It was associated with other movie narratives as well. Lou Cannon saw it as 
an expression of Reagan’s fondness for science-fiction jeremiads such as The Day the 
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Earth Stood Still (1951).364 Garry Wills saw in it Western themes, where it fulfilled 
Reagan’s “narrative requirement that a single hero (or hero nation) save the day by a 
decisive act,” and was “much like the Lone Ranger’s silver bullet which he used only 
to knock guns out of the bad guy’s hands.”365 More broadly, Frances Fitzgerald 
considered it as rooted in old themes of American exceptionalism and identity, 
particularly as expressed by mid-century western isolationism where “magical, or 
symbolic, thinking” envisaged sea and air power allowing “America both to pursue its 
God-given mission abroad and to remain the virgin land.”366  
Conservative responses sought to counter the criticism of SDI’s imaginary 
quality, by establishing its real effects as, in Margaret Thatcher’s words, the “one vital 
factor in ending the Cold War”.367 The argument, however, is problematic, 
considering that it is based primarily on perception. It is convincing in its point, 
argued most fully by Paul Kengor in The Crusader (2006), that the Soviet Union took 
the idea seriously enough to fear it and attempt to match it, causing great expense in 
confidence and resources.368 However, Reagan’s sincere commitment to a $26 billion 
system widely regarded as unfeasible, and which never made it out of research stages, 
has to be addressed. This commitment was demonstrated at Reykjavik, where Reagan 
showed he did not consider SDI to be a bluff, a bargaining chip or a strategic ploy. 
Conservatives reconciled this problem in terms of visionary leadership. “Reagan’s 
vision,” wrote D’Souza, “proved to be superior to all the strategic machinations of the 
arms control establishment” while the polemicist Ann Coulter claimed that it 
“transform[ed] America’s mission” as part of Reagan’s moral redefinition of the Cold 
War.369 In the end, conservatives found Reagan’s victory partly in the faith he put and 
expressed in imagination.  
 The case for Reagan’s victory was also a political response to a Cold War 
narrative that emphasised the continuity and consensus of American leadership, 
arguing instead that the end of the Cold War vindicated the conservative movement. 
Gil Troy summed up the former narrative: “The cold war victory was a joint 
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achievement of all the presidents from Harry Truman through George Bush. It is a 
tribute to the bipartisan consensus that kept America strong but not too aggressive in 
the face of Communism.”370 The historiography of the Cold War has generated varied 
explanations for its end. Where an American victory is conceded, while Reagan’s role 
has gained increasing credit over the years, accounts emphasise the consistency of 
American strategy and institutions over the course of the conflict.371 The mythic 
elements of this idea have been indicated by Allen Hunter, who described it as a 
“vindicationist” national narrative which “claims more than mere triumph” but also 
that triumph proves the righteousness of American institutions and ideologies.372  
Conservative responses have treated the argument in terms of American 
political division. Ann Coulter, whose popular work has sought to define conservative 
identity, scorned the “liberal” idea that “Harry Truman won the Cold War during the 
Reagan Administration”, insisting that Reagan’s presidency was the converse and 
antidote to thirty years of treachery and failure, and the only solution to victory.373 
D’Souza is also insistent on Reagan’s singular role; “the true victor in the cold 
war…he foresaw it…he planned it, and…he brought it about.”374 Again, this 
depended on the reversal of orthodox ideas – the “wise men” of the left and right. The 
details of this narrative span the breadth of Reagan’s rhetorical, diplomatic, military, 
economic and covert policies. The connecting theme, however, is that Reagan pursued 
victory, where others sought appeasement. The notion of Cold War victory was tied to 
the conservative movement at home, recalling the slogans of old heroes of the right: 
Joseph McCarthy lambasting Dean Acheson’s and George Marshall’s “retreat from 
victory”; Barry Goldwater asking the Democratic foreign policy establishment,  “why 
not victory?”375 While victory differentiated Left from Right, it also galvanised for 
conservatives the political war at home. In the pages of the National Review, where 
not long before Reagan’s late Soviet policy had been lamented as retreat and 
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surrender, the Cold War victory was interpreted in terms of the culture war with the 
American left.376 Essentially, the case for Reagan’s Cold War victory was made 
polemically, to distinguish conservative anti-communism from the orthodoxies of 
containment and détente. D’Souza wrote in the depth of the Clinton presidency, and 
Coulter at the beginning of the War on Terror, with the mythic purpose of defining 
their party’s identity and entitlement in terms of Reagan’s achievement.  
The phenomenon of conservative political mythology about Reagan’s Cold 
War role has prompted reaction, but little engagement. “The central and most 
insidious myths about Reagan and his presidency,” stated Sean Wilentz, “concern the 
ending of the cold war.” Wilentz rejected the idea that Reagan had a deliberate 
strategy which foresaw and implemented the collapse of the Soviet Union, singling 
out books by Peter Schweizer, Victory (1994) and Reagan’s War (2002), as “spurious 
revisionist” accounts, which are simply “ex post facto historical fantasies.”377 Despite 
his reference to “dissolving the Reagan myth”, he makes no attempt to engage with 
Schweizer’s claims or scholarship, dismissing it out of hand as politically 
motivated.378 This characterises other identifications of conservative myth about 
Reagan’s Cold War victory. Michael Schaller’s essay in the collection Deconstructing 
Reagan: Conservative Mythology and America’s Fortieth President (2007), a book 
which seeks to restore a “balanced and rational approach” to the historical discourse 
on Reagan, also fails to engage with the arguments it dismisses.379 In 1992, Schaller 
had concluded that Reagan had been largely inconsequential, if not harmful, to the 
war’s peaceful end.380 His account fifteen years later is more generous, but still 
negative in its focus on Reagan’s policies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Schaller seeks 
“balance” with the conservative victory narratives, but again, fails to engage with 
their arguments, as historical scholarship or as myth.381 The most recent discussion of 
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the subject is in Tear down This Myth (2009) by the journalist Will Bunch. His focus 
is on political rhetoric by contemporary Republicans and the cultural image of 
Reagan, rather than historical literature. His discussion rests, like Wilentz and 
Schaller, on a broad acceptance that conservative arguments that Reagan won the 
Cold War through his own deliberate and farsighted effort are myth, by virtue of the 
associated support they provide to contemporary political debates and images. In 
short, despite the level of reference to conservative mythology about Reagan’s 
victory, there is no effort to engage with its historical arguments, nor demonstrate 
their mythic process.  
The scholarly efforts to make the historical case for Reagan’s victory can be 
distinguished from polemic by their engagement with and advancement of the field by 
their use of new sources and original interpretations. Such identification is abstract, 
since they have been generally regarded not to have advanced the field, operating only 
as myth. This assumption has some validity, but it is also a representation of how the 
discourse of myth and the historical legacy of Reagan have limited his historiography 
with political rigidity. The central texts arguing Reagan’s victory are Peter 
Schweizer’s Reagan’s War, and Paul Kengor’s The Crusader (2006). The two authors 
are connected. Paul Kengor wrote that his idea for a book revealing Reagan’s personal 
role in the defeat of the Soviet Union stemmed from a conversation with Schweizer 
about his earlier book, Victory, which focused on the covert activity of Bill Casey and 
the CIA, and particularly the cooption of Saudi Arabia in the economic war on the 
Soviet Union.382 Schweizer’s Reagan’s War is also an expansion of his earlier work to 
emphasise Reagan’s individual importance, taking a long view of his anticommunist 
campaign, starting with his presidency of the Screen Actors Guild. Both authors are 
fellows of the Hoover Institution, a conservative organisation closely aligned with 
Reagan, and their histories can be thus understood as part of a broader effort to 
rehabilitate Reagan’s historical status.383 Each makes the argument that the collapse of 
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the Soviet Union was Reagan’s objective when he came to the presidency, which was 
pursued with deliberate strategy in the White House, and with ultimate success.  
Their arguments, based on extensive interviews with key players, as well as 
newly opened records at the Reagan Library and in the Soviet Union, have value in 
their revelations. Schweizer demonstrates the overlooked consistency of not only 
Reagan’s attitude towards the Soviet Union, but his unconventional beliefs about how 
it should be confronted.384 Kengor provides a more thorough insight into Reagan’s 
presidency, which establishes the administration’s covert efforts to undermine the 
Soviet Union’s economy and the integrity of its regime, the coherence of the 
administration’s actions in relation to its ambitious strategic plans, and to some extent 
the responses in the Soviet Union which demonstrate the success of the 
administration’s efforts to undermine its enemy psychologically. Kengor reveals 
various other secret efforts to reduce the Soviet Union’s cash flow, corrupt its 
intelligence network and aid its internal enemies, specifically Solidarity in Poland. 
Central to his argument are the series of National Security Decision Directives 
developed during Bill Clark’s tenure, which set the course of administration Soviet 
policy. NSDD-75 is identified in particular as the culmination of the planning, and as 
“revolutionary, turning on its head the doctrine of containment”, in its stated ambition 
to effect internal reform of the Soviet Union.385 This is important, but Kengor’s 
indication of its “prophetic” nature is not fully convincing. Jack Matlock, Reagan’s 
ambassador to the Soviet Union, also believed NSDD-75 to be important in its 
redefinition of US policy, but found in it “no suggestion of a desire to destroy the 
Soviet Union.” Indeed, he also condemned the conflation of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union as a state with the end of the Cold War as a distortion of history in favour of 
drama.386  
An overreaching argument is not an indication of myth, but Kengor and 
Schweizer’s scholarship, amounting at least to a valuable gathering and presentation 
of evidence, is overlooked or dismissed as political myth by historians such as 
Michael Schaller and Sean Wilentz. This is due to their celebratory tone, their 
political affiliation and the association of their argument with overtly mythic 
narratives in political discourse and commemoration of Reagan. It might also relate to 
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the mythic forms of their narratives, which are not only selective, ignoring areas 
which might represent the failures of Reagan’s Cold War strategy, in the Middle East 
and in Iran/Contra, but are also highly dramatic. Kengor places emphasis on a 
remembered encounter between two Reagan supporters where one, “closely involved 
with the 1980 campaign,” reveals to the other Reagan’s real intention “to bring down 
the Soviet Union,” swearing him to secrecy.387 Reminiscence and drama serve to 
support the emotive impact of the narrative, but not its evidential basis. Each, 
meanwhile, takes a biographical approach, emphasising Reagan’s character and 
individual action, a single-minded method which necessarily neglects broader factors 
in a complex global event. They make an argument for Reagan’s greatness, an issue 
which Stephen Hayward addressed in Greatness: Reagan, Churchill and the Making 
of Extraordinary Leaders (2005). This short book, which unlike The Age of Reagan 
contained no apology for its partisan viewpoint, expressed a defiance of the 
conventions of academic history and political science. Hayward criticised the 
academy for its “egalitarian temper” and “reductionist methodology”, which 
overlooked and deprecated concepts of “greatness”.388 Hayward’s treatment of the 
parallels between Reagan’s and Churchill’s lives, beliefs and actions is a mythic effort 
to place Reagan in an heroic, historical iconography, or pantheon, but it is also an 
argument about “the role of great individuals in shaping history” against the emphasis 
on “subrational or material causes”.389 Further, Hayward stresses that great men are 
and must be learned from by later generations. The sense that Reagan should be 
learned from, is palpable in the writings of Schweizer and Kengor. These conservative 
historians undermine the reputation of their work through their embrace of mythic 
form and function in their arguments, but they do so gladly because they are engaged 
in an argument about history itself, in which Reagan is a symbol. 
This argument goes beyond partisan lines. John Diggins might be described as 
a conservative, but his work does not correspond with the polemical or political 
appropriation of Reagan seen in “conservative mythology”. However, Diggins had, 
before writing Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom and the Making of History (2007), 
argued about the nature of history. Diggins criticised the influence of deconstruction 
and political correctness on American history, believing that the past could yet be 
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appealed to for “truth and wisdom”. Events such as the founding of America, and 
figures such as Abraham Lincoln, who offered “a redeeming vision for our tawdry 
times,” could allow for American critical self-awareness without sacrificing a sense of 
defining principle.390 Diggins' view correlates with that of his student, David Harlan, 
who argued: 
 
Just as we each have to rig up our own line to the past, so we each have to 
populate that past with our own heroes, our own moral and intellectual 
exemplars – people who can help us say: ‘This is how we mean to live, 
but do not yet live.’391 
 
Diggins offered an unconventional assessment of President Reagan, presenting him 
within an intellectual tradition of American classic liberalism, and an heir of Emerson. 
His central comparison, though, was between Reagan and Lincoln, which was not a 
claim of ideological connection, but symbolic historical analogy which emphasised 
Reagan’s victory over Communism – an accomplishment on a par with Lincoln’s over 
slavery. Both presidents “confronted the moral dimensions of their century’s greatest 
and most momentous political struggles.”392 Diggins also represented Reagan as a 
great president based on his victorious struggle against Communism, but where others 
did so in an effort to vindicate conservatism, Diggins had another purpose. He 
criticised those who saw Reagan as “an image more visual than real”, but also those 
who made a legend of him: “To rescue Reagan from many of today’s so-called 
Reaganites may help rescue America from the pride of its present follies.”393 Diggins 
turns to Reagan for a confirmation of the continuity of moral leadership and thought 
in American history, in an exercise which implicitly argues for the restoration of the 
moral imagination to the historical process. Again, Reagan is doubly mythic, a 
symbol from which we can draw lessons about the present and future, but also which 
represents a way of understanding the past. The historical argument about Reagan and 
his role in the end of the Cold War is one which has been complicated not only by 
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political division and the myths it creates, but by the argument inherent to that 
division about the meaning of the American past and its uses.  
 
Iran Contra 
 
 The end of the Cold War was a complex of historical factors which could be 
symbolically defined through the actions of President Reagan. Iran/Contra was an 
event which stemmed only from the actions of the Reagan White House, but which 
engendered complex and varied symbolic representation about American government, 
history and culture. “Iran/Contra” itself is a symbolic term. Just as “Watergate” came 
to represent more than the burglary of the DNC headquarters, but the range of Richard 
Nixon’s use of presidential power to wage internal political warfare, the scandal, 
cover-up and investigation that ensued, the consequence of Nixon’s downfall and the 
associated revelations about secret governmental action, “Iran/Contra” represented a 
broad narrative. Indeed, Watergate was part of this narrative, affecting the 
interpretation of the scandal – “Irangate” – and the procedure and “ceremony” of the 
investigation.394 Reagan himself made the comparison, writing soon after the story 
broke that the “media looks like it’s trying to create another Watergate”, one of 
several suggestions that the affair was a manufactured outrage designed to undermine 
or destroy his presidency.395  
 The premise of the argument for Reagan’s Cold War victory is the coherence 
of his strategic vision. The strands of Iran/Contra, Reagan’s polices towards the 
Middle East and Central America, challenge that idea. The Reagan Administration’s 
Nicaraguan policy was part of this vision in its implementation of the Reagan 
Doctrine, which promised aid to anti-communists action the world over. The 
administration cultivated and supported proxy “Contra” armies to hamper and 
presumably depose the revolutionary Sandinista regime, an ally of Cuba and the 
Soviet Union, and, in Reagan’s view, a proxy of their policy to export communism 
throughout the Americas. However, this activity also represented the historical 
context of US imperialism in the region, a paradigm which prompted international 
opposition and domestic dissent which, along with the fear of being dragged into a 
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new Vietnam, resulted in Congress blocking the administration’s funding of the 
Contras with the Boland Amendments.396 Reagan’s policy towards Iran and its wider 
region represented an even greater disruption of a coherent Cold War vision. 
Generally, Reagan attempted to define the Middle East and its problems in terms of 
Soviet expansion. Revolutionary Iran and its religious ideology belied this definition, 
converging with the US in resisting the Soviets in Afghanistan, but also attacking the 
US and its ally, Israel, through its proxies in Lebanon. The memory of the Tehran 
hostage crisis, which ended on the first day of Reagan’s presidency, determined 
Reagan’s stance on Iran – irretractably hostile, but desperate to avoid a repeat of the 
crisis that haunted America, and Carter’s presidency, while hostages continued to be 
taken, piece-meal, in Lebanon. 
 Iran/Contra speaks of failure. The Iranian initiative, which saw the transfer of 
arms to the Islamic Republic to secure the release of hostages held in Lebanon and to 
cultivate a moderate alternative to the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini, failed on both 
counts.397 The efforts of “The Enterprise”, directed by NSC staffer Lieutenant Colonel 
Oliver North, to secure funds and deliver material to the Nicaraguan Contras, 
represented Reagan’s failure to convince Congress and the public to support his war 
in Central America (and, more generally, the failure to prosecute that war 
successfully). The Tower Commission, the investigative body ordered by Reagan to 
investigate the Iranian initiative after the revelation that profits from the arms-sales 
had been diverted to aid the Contras, concluded that the failure was in Reagan’s 
management style and operation of his staff. The Congressional investigations 
concluded that it was a constitutional failure of Reagan’s presidency (while the 
minority report argued that the affair represented the overreach of a politically 
motivated Congress to inhibit the executive). However, Reagan had some success in 
that the scandal did not destroy or irretrievably damage his presidency, nor define his 
historical legacy.398  
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Where the dominance of myth has made a historical problem of assessing 
Reagan’s role in the end of the Cold War, the lack of a clarifying mythic meaning has 
made Iran/Contra a diminished historical subject. D’Souza offered a hopeful forecast 
that the Iran/Contra scandal “may become a historical footnote that future generations 
will not even remember.”399 To some extent, this prediction seems to have been borne 
out; Iran/Contra has generated far less literature since D’Souza’s comment than in the 
years before it.400 There are various reasons for this, including its diminishing 
importance as a contemporary event, its lack of consequential conclusion, and the 
absence of any new relevant material to support new histories. It is also, simply, 
confusing. It is a story riddled with obfuscation and uncertainty, whose central 
symbolic hook, the diversion of funds, fails to describe either the greater issues of the 
White House’s actions or Reagan’s role in them. This lack of clarity has contributed 
to its confused symbolic meaning, which also helps explain its decreasing historical 
significance. Despite its consistent interpretation in symbolic terms since its 
occurrence, it has failed to impart a clear mythic meaning that correlates with broad 
national myths, or indeed, increasingly dominant myths of Ronald Reagan. 
 On its occurrence Iran/Contra attracted considerable attention, which would 
continue as the scandal played out over the following five years. A common 
interpretation was that it represented not just the political failure of Reagan’s 
leadership, but the disruption of his mythic command of America. Sidney Blumenthal 
considered it a failure of Reagan’s fantastic ideology, whose revelation would destroy 
his mythic hold on America. On the release of the Tower Commission Report, the 
first official investigation into the affair, he asked, “What happens to a magical ruler 
whose powers fail him?”401 Garry Wills was reportedly glad that he had finished 
Reagan’s America before the scandal broke, because he felt Iran/Contra threatened to 
damage Reagan’s illusory romance with America.402 Lou Cannon later lyrically 
summed up the effect of the scandal: “Reagan was no longer the magical sun king, no 
longer the Prospero of American memories who towered above ordinary politicians 
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and could always expect to be believed.”403 However, the affair also affirmed the idea 
of a presidency consumed by fantasy. The affair brought to the fore Reagan’s “ability 
to disconnect from reality” and his “extraordinary power of self-delusion”, present in 
the equivocal confession of the speech that, along with a thorough staff shake-up, 
saved his administration and recovered his poll-ratings – “A few months ago I told the 
American people I did not trade arms for hostages. My heart and best intentions still 
tell me that’s true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is not.” 404 More than a 
reflection on Reagan, the layers of deception involved in the affair and its aftermath 
became symbolic of something greater, in concert with Reagan’s own representation 
of American fantasy, illusion and spectacle. On the “politics of illusion” that it 
involved, Anne Wroe called it “the perfect scandal for our morally ambiguous and 
mixed-up times.”405 For Michael Lynch and David Bogen, the authors of The 
Spectacle of History (1996), the televised hearings represented a model of the 
postmodern social and political construction of history, in terms of their purpose to 
create an official narrative of the events, confronted with fabrication and cover-up, 
and self-conscious of their own historical significance. Meanwhile, the theatricality of 
Oliver North’s testimony at the Congressional hearings, combined with his own 
growing reputation for deception and fantasy, became part of Reagan’s cinematic 
symbolism. Richard Reeves suggested that “Ronald Reagan might have been cast as 
Ollie North, the patriot, the hero, all based on a true story – even if it were a true story 
of lies and deception in places high and low.”406 Joan Didion described the common 
understanding between Reagan and North of “what makes a successful motion 
picture,” which was a “fight against the odds: undertaken, against the best advice of 
those who say it cannot be done, by someone America can root for.”407 The 
Iran/Contra affair both challenged Reagan’s relationship with American mythology, 
by tainting his public persona crafted from common belief in American symbols, and 
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affirmed it, through its defining themes of patriotism, fabrication, illusion and 
spectacle. 
 Iran/Contra also had broader implications about American history and 
government which spurred its moral interpretation. At its extreme this is represented 
in the incorporation of the affair into mythic conspiracy narratives which offer a 
secret history of American power in the Cold War and question the legitimacy of 
American government.408 Moral urgency can also be found in the prominent scholar 
Theodore Draper’s rationale for penning his authoritative history of the 
administration’s actions, A Very Thin Line (1991), described as a “deed of citizen 
responsibility.”409 Through telling the story, Draper hoped the reader would glimpse 
“just how our government really works,” warning that if “the story of the Iran-Contra 
affairs is not fully known and understood, a similar usurpation of power by a small, 
strategically placed group within the government may well recur before we are 
prepared to recognize what is happening.”410 Liberals responded to the televised 
hearings in the summer of 1987 with this kind of civic anxiety. Johnson saw in the 
televised hearings a “chance to do something rare in modern government: to educate 
the public about the political process…and to draw lessons that would be learned far 
beyond the Washington beltway.” In this, the hearings – “a televised summer soap 
opera” – failed.411 Karp’s similar hopes of “a citizenry awakened, revived and 
riveted” were not entirely dashed: 
 
Perhaps the deep, evident unhappiness with the Iran-Contra hearings, the 
deep evident bewilderment over so many lies and so little truth; perhaps 
our reported wish to be governed by those who ‘play by the rules,’ are 
signs of a deeper awakening, little sprouts of life in the barren ruins of 
civic life left by the dying demagogy of Ronald Reagan.412 
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These hopes were later put to the test by David Thelen in his study of public reaction 
to the hearings, Becoming Citizens in the Age of Television (1996). This was an 
active, populist work of political science, in which the author, a self-confessed 
“partisan”, questioned his own dual identity as a scholar and a citizen.413 Challenging 
the impressions of media and political elites about a manipulable mass populace, 
responsive only to entertainment and in thrall to “Reagan’s magic” and “Olliemania”, 
Thelen demonstrated an engaged citizenry, who both watched the hearings and 
participated in them, amongst themselves and by making their opinions known to 
their representatives. Iran/Contra was but a case study here, and a symbol of how an 
increasingly mediated and self-referential political discourse failed to respond to the 
complex and varied, but interested demands of the public. The meaning of 
Iran/Contra, quite beyond its constitutional implications, is defined by dichotomies, 
where it represents both the failure and success of Reagan’s mythic leadership.  
 
Conclusion 
 
These politicised narratives compete with each other, and not just in terms of whether 
or not Reagan’s presidency was a success or failure. Their interpretations of Reagan’s 
symbolic meaning in a broad national narrative also clash. The Cold War victory 
narrative is based on Reagan’s articulation of moral clarity and his confidence in 
American destiny – the ultimate triumph of democracy over communism, of good 
over evil. To place Iran/Contra at the centre of Reagan’s historical narrative is to 
emphasise the moral uncertainty of his foreign policy and his disregard of the 
American democratic system. The former sees Reagan represent the inherent strength 
of the American system, while the latter emphasises its fragility to the abuse of power, 
and its disconnection from the American people. The partisan divide over these and 
other issues, such as in the dual image of Reagan as a champion of American 
enterprise and as an exponent of American greed, reinforce Reagan’s presidency as a 
historical symbol for understanding American cultural identity, which is based on 
Reagan’s articulation of mythic American identity, whether considered sincere and 
truthful, or manipulative and hypocritical.  
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 Partisan representations of Reagan’s myth complicate Reagan’s 
historiography, where some historians choose to be complicit in their construction, 
such as Paul Kengor, but also where the weight of Reagan’s symbolism either deters 
historians, as Gil Troy claimed, or where it defines the themes and purpose of their 
work, as with Hugh Heclo and Sean Wilentz. More broadly, these representations 
challenge and complicate any development of Reagan as a national icon. In the 
conservative claim of Reagan’s victory is a rejection of liberal and moderate 
anticommunism and nationalism which failed to defeat the Soviet Union before 
Reagan’s ascendancy. It is an exclusive claim which conflates conservative identity 
with national identity – distinctly expressed by Ann Coulter: “only authentic 
Americans loved Reagan”.414 This demands that Reagan be a divisive symbol in a 
continuing political battle. Iran/Contra as a symbol suggests political division itself, 
and, moreover, a narrative of conspiracy, secret war and, in its most extreme, the 
oppression of the American people. Such themes are compelling and persistent in 
American culture but for obvious reasons could never form the basis for a popular and 
publicly articulated American identity. The next chapter considers, in part, how these 
narratives are represented, and how the problem of Reagan as both a partisan and 
national myth is approached, in the commemorative, political and historical functions 
of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.  
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Chapter 5  
“A Sacred Bequest”: Myth and History at the Ronald Reagan Presidential 
Museum and Library 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The national commemoration of President Reagan has often been understood as a 
partisan goal, but in its greatest realisation, at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library 
and Museum, it conforms and appeals to non-partisan presidential tradition. The 
prevalence of the former idea was parodied in a 2003 meeting of the Springfield 
Republican Party, which began by reviewing “our efforts to rename everything after 
Ronald Reagan”. “All Millard Fillmore schools are now Ronald Reagans,” reported 
Dr. Hibbert to local members including Montgomery Burns, Krusty the Klown and 
Bob Dole, and “the Mississippi River is now the Mississippi Reagan.”415 The 
portrayal of the commemoration of Ronald Reagan as an ambitious partisan venture, 
absurd and insidious in equal measure, stemmed from the efforts of the Ronald 
Reagan Legacy Project, founded by Republican activist Grover Norquist in 1997, 
with the aim of “naming significant public landmarks after President Reagan in the 50 
states and over 3,000 counties of the United States”.416 The project has had some 
success in this mission, most visibly in the renaming of Washington, D.C.’s National 
Airport, while it has persistently, if so far vainly, campaigned to see Reagan 
commemorated further with a presidential memorial on the Mall, and his face on US 
currency and on Mount Rushmore. This is most certainly a partisan movement, with 
its roots in the Republican Party and its aims tied to that organisation’s future as a 
conservative institution. As such, it has received singular attention where the 
commemoration of Reagan has been studied. Will Bunch described the Legacy 
Project as a “guerrilla operation” responsible for an unprecedented assault on 
American memory – “this nation has arguably never seen the kind of bold, crudely 
calculated, and ideologically driven legend-manufacturing that has taken place with 
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Ronald Reagan.”417 Niels Bjerre-Poulson, meanwhile, has considered the project in 
terms of its failures and limitations, identifying its dilemma that “the more successful 
they are in promoting Reagan as a cultural icon, the less he will be able to serve as a 
political model.”418 As Reagan, or any president, gains prominence in the broad 
landscape of American memory, he ceases to have specific political meaning. Both 
descriptions suggest an inorganic nature to Reagan’s commemoration, that it is either 
disturbingly exceptional in the way it seeks to control American understanding of the 
past, or that its political efforts are unmatched to the priorities of national memory. 
However, neither description suits the Reagan Library at Simi Valley, California. 
There, both the partisan promotion and nationalisation of Reagan’s memory occur 
within a commemorative tradition that combines public and private functions.  
 The Reagan Library is the world’s most important example of Reagan’s 
commemoration because it represents the integration of his and his supporters’ 
intentions with the institutions of national government. It carries Reagan’s expressive 
endorsement in his choice of the library as his burial ground, and in the institution’s 
operation by the Reagan Foundation, an organisation of Reagan’s key supporters set 
up in 1985 to build the library. Meanwhile, the existence and maintenance of its 
archive, the Library’s raison d’être, depends on the legislated support of the federal 
government in the form of the National Archives and Records Administration. It is a 
site of historical preservation, personal, partisan and national commemoration, and of 
political activism. The Reagan Library and its multi-faceted nature conform to the 
traditions of the presidential library system, even as the library promotes Reagan’s 
individual significance in its historical, commemorative and political functions. This 
chapter examines these functions and how the tension between them and the interests 
they serve are reconciled in their common governance by American national myth, 
and their varied efforts to locate Reagan within it. This institutional study, while 
belonging to this thesis’s examination of Reagan’s relationship to American 
mythology, also contributes to the emergent scholarship of presidential libraries, 
which, though it has raised important issues, has neither focused in detail on the 
Reagan Library, nor fully addressed the mythic implications of the institutions’ varied 
functions.  
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 The chapter’s first part deals with the history of the Reagan Library, from 
conception to dedication. This story, covering the controversial attempt to site the 
library at Stanford University, and the eventual choice of its Simi Valley location, 
reveals the tensions in the perceived functions of presidential libraries. It also suggests 
the varied influences on the direction of the library beyond the intentions of the White 
House. As well as the demands and expectations of the site and its hosts, the library 
was subject to the imperatives of tradition and law. The presidential library system 
had seen haphazard development from its beginnings in Franklin Roosevelt’s library, 
opened in 1941, to its legal establishment by the Presidential Libraries Act of 1955, 
which received Truman’s papers, and to the Presidential Records Act of 1978, which, 
following the seizure of Nixon’s records, decided the public ownership of presidential 
papers. The system allowed the dual management of the libraries, with its archives 
owned and operated by the federal government, and the rest of the institution run by 
the president’s private foundation, which also built the institution. This meant the 
development of the libraries’ multi-functioned nature. Though some precedents, such 
as the museum, were firmly established, there was no definite model for the Reagan 
Library to follow.419 The second part of the chapter considers the functions that 
emerged in Simi Valley, archival, commemorative and political. The archives are 
considered in terms of their conceptual relationship to American history, the tradition 
this belonged to, and its emergence in the political fight over Reagan’s papers, and 
what they represented, during the George W. Bush administration. The 
commemorative function of the library, best represented in the museum, is more 
overtly mythic. This is the aspect of presidential libraries that has received most 
scholarly attention. The art historian Benjamin Hufbauer considered the libraries to be 
essentially part of a tradition of presidential commemoration. Though they represent a 
shift away from the austere, monumental examples of the Lincoln Memorial or Mount 
Rushmore, he argued, they are still devoted to promoting and shaping public memory 
of their presidents, but through new technologies and methods.420 Though Hufbauer’s 
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analysis pays little attention to the Reagan museum, focusing instead on Roosevelt, 
Truman and Johnson, his themes of power, heroism and history can certainly be found 
in the Simi Valley, and in particular, in the exhibition of Air Force One. The focus on 
visual and material commemorative processes has neglected the active 
commemoration of the political function. The vital image of Reagan in the 
Republican Party since his presidency has seen his library become a platform and 
agent in partisan politics. This political role developed from one of policy research to 
one of memory, represented by the library’s hosting of the GOP primary debates for 
the 2008 presidential election. Here, I consider these functions together, in terms of 
how they locate Reagan within American national memory, and how this converges 
with or diverges from his partisan identity. 
 
 
Creation 
 
The Reagan Library was first conceived in terms of its scholarly potential, but in a 
context that magnified its political identity and which would raise serious scrutiny of 
its functions. The question of a presidential library was first brought to the White 
House on February 24, 1981, barely a month after Reagan’s first inauguration, by 
Glenn Campbell, the Director of the Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and 
Peace at Stanford University, who invited the president to house his library on 
Stanford campus. Campbell, who had held this position since 1960, was an old 
associate of the new president. Appointed by Reagan to the University of California’s 
Board of Regents in 1968, Campbell had furthered their relationship by making the 
former governor an honorary Hoover Fellow in 1975 and receiving his gubernatorial 
papers into the archive. This affiliation was enhanced by the institution’s conservative 
identity, suggested in Herbert Hoover’s chartered purpose for the archive “to protect 
the American way of life from evil ideologies and to reaffirm the validity of the 
American system.”421 Campbell pursued this purpose beyond the abstract means of 
research and publication with the aim of influencing the contemporary political 
process. This effort that saw it became a resource for policy advice in Reagan’s 
presidential runs of 1976 and 1980, and for personnel in the formation of his 
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administration. Mikhail Gorbachev would later insist that the Soviet Union had 
regarded the weighty Hoover publication, The United States in the 1980s (1979), as 
the blueprint for the policies of the Reagan administration, and that it had later proved 
to be so.422 In January, 1982, Reagan addressed a reception honouring the Institution 
in Washington, D.C. “Under the leadership of your director…and with your hard 
work and diligence,” he told his audience, “you built the knowledge base that made 
the changes now taking place in Washington possible.”423  
 Campbell’s invitation worked to cement this relationship, and further raise the 
profile of his organisation. He was sincere in his flattery and explicit in his hopes: 
  
It would dramatically augment and expand the Hoover Institution 
complex. It would bring a priceless resource of documentary material and 
Presidential records to an Institution and a University that has been 
justifiably proud of its association with you as its first and most 
distinguished Honorary Fellow.424  
 
The Hoover director first imagined the library as an extension of his own institution, 
close in its function and output, and built in the shadow of the Hoover Tower. This 
plan, though, involved more than the relationship between Hoover and Reagan, but 
also the relationship between Hoover and Stanford University. Hoover’s autonomy 
had always ensured it an awkward reception with the rest of Stanford, but its 
increasing size, wealth and political activity had made its position on campus more 
controversial. Its attainment in 1980 of real political influence in a conservative 
presidential administration prompted a backlash from considerable sections of 
Stanford’s faculty and student body. Professor of Political Science John Manley 
helped launch a campaign in 1982 to have Hoover investigated over issues of partisan 
activity, funding and its position within Stanford, with the eye of having it brought 
under the control of the university administration. As Manley argued in 1983: 
 
The central question should be: Is an institution which finances a large 
public relations effort to propagandize for a particular ideology, which 
actively promotes the advancement of particular political candidates, and 
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which can lay valid claim to the title ‘leading conservative think thank in 
the country,’ compatible with a University whose professed values are the 
non-partisan, non-political, objective search for the truth?425 
 
Defenders of Hoover responded with similar accusations of political bias and claims 
of academic objectivity. The Visiting Hoover Scholar Arnold Beichman expressed 
this view most thoroughly in the pages of the National Review, demonstrating the 
ideological mix of his colleagues and highlighting the leftist political activity of 
Stanford Faculty since the Vietnam War.426 This evoked an earlier era, when 
Governor Reagan had gained the enmity of California’s campus radicals, and Glenn 
Campbell had himself confronted anti-war protestors in front of Hoover Tower.427 
This was a conflict of ideology and partisanship, the local politics of university 
structure and of personal grievances. Disingenuousness and distrust existed on both 
sides of a political battle about academia. The conflict was also the context through 
which the first ideas for the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library were formed. 
 An official response from the White House was slow in coming, but in 
January 1983, Campbell received a letter from the president affirming his interest in 
the idea, and suggesting that planning for the library get underway.428 The White 
House envisaged at this stage a library in three parts: the presidential archive, a 
museum, and a Centre for Public Affairs, a policy research institute which would run 
in affiliation with the Hoover Institution. Campbell had secured the agreement of the 
president of Stanford University, Donald Kennedy, in issuing his invitation. Kennedy, 
a judicious figure who attracted the resentment of both Campbell and Hoover’s 
critics, now had to guide the plan through Stanford’s political system. Both Kennedy 
and Campbell anticipated criticism. The Hoover Institution archivist, Charles Palm, 
prepared a preliminary defence of the library’s academic value. After emphasising the 
scope and longevity of the collection’s scholarly importance, he downplayed the role 
of the museum in the proposed complex: “Some critics have felt that the museums 
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represent little more than mausoleums for enshrining presidents…However there is no 
inherent reason why the exhibits, in moderation, cannot be as educational as exhibits 
produced elsewhere on campus.”429 Glenn Campbell had also sought to reassure 
Kennedy on this point, stating that “President Reagan is a secure gentleman of great 
stature and, thus, does not wish to see a museum glorifying his career as President on 
the scope and magnitude of some of the existing presidential museums.” The museum 
would represent the presidency, not the life and achievements of Ronald Reagan. At 
the same time, Campbell addressed doubts over the third branch of the complex, the 
Center for Public Affairs. He asserted that an offer which excluded one or two parts of 
the “inseparable whole” would be “unacceptable” to the President.430  
Days after this letter, on July 21, an appointed Board of Overseers voted to 
proceed with the project “without further delay”. Kennedy urged that “there is 
something worse than a little delay, and that is a kind of incendiary situation that 
results when careful work is not done to structure a sound plan, and in fact, support 
for it first.”431 With this in mind he set up an advisory committee to structure such a 
plan, and consult with faculty over the idea. One reason for caution was the recent 
example of President Nixon’s attempt to find a home for his own library at Duke 
University. Manipulative pressure from Nixon’s staff had caused Duke’s leadership to 
accept the proposal hurriedly and unilaterally, prompting such a backlash from the 
faculty that not only was the acceptance of the library embarrassingly revoked, but the 
chairman of the board of trustees was forced out, and the president of the university 
only narrowly escaped the same fate. On July 25, Kennedy wrote to his counterpart at 
Duke asking for advice. The professor who had chaired Duke’s Academic Council at 
the time sent a full account of the affair to the advisory committee, with the warning 
that it would “give you an idea of the noise that can be generated when Presidential 
Libraries are considered by an articulate faculty.”432 Kennedy did not face quite the 
same circumstances, but the committee was careful to canvass faculty opinion on the 
library proposal, and respond to it in its report. Many responses were broadly 
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supportive of bringing the Reagan papers to Stanford, which were recognised as 
having both considerable historical significance and relevance to a wide range of 
disciplines. The dissenting responses, however, were openly partisan and interpreted 
the library as a monument to Reagan and his politics. As one faculty member put it, 
the “idea of those thousands of foolish tourists coming to gawk at it, turning Stanford 
into a Disneyland annex, is most distasteful.”433 
 The committee report was attentive to the political climate and implications of 
the library, seeing that a decision either to accept or decline it would be viewed as a 
political act, and even suggesting that the decision be delayed until after the following 
year’s presidential election.434 This advice was not followed by the University, but 
other suggestions in the report were, specifically those concerning the political and 
memorial aspects of the proposed Reagan Library Complex. Following a Faculty 
Senate resolution, the Stanford Board of Trustees gave conditional approval to the 
library on December 13, 1983. The conditions reflected the desire for an academic 
resource and no more. The museum was to be small, with exhibits drawing only on 
the archive material rather than personal memorabilia, while the Reagan Center for 
Public Affairs, if it were to be situated on campus, would have to be integrated into 
Stanford’s normal academic and administrative structure. The limitations on the 
museum were accepted by the White House without argument, but the policy centre 
was more vigorously defended. Meese wrote to Kennedy in March 1984, asserting: 
 
I cannot stress too strongly that President Reagan views this center not as 
a vehicle to defend or praise his own administration, but rather as an 
important resource for inquiry into the structure and processes of the 
American government system.435 
 
Meese’s assurance did not resolve the struggle over the proposed centre’s 
administration and the conditions were soon accepted, with the understanding that the 
Reagan Center for Public Affairs would operate independently but off-campus, 
located somewhere in the Bay area. 
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 Dissent met the trustees’ decision, and escalated through 1984. Students 
organised a protest group, SCAReU? (Stanford Community Against Reagan 
University), warning of the prospect of a “Super Hoover” controlled by Campbell, 
and registered their disapproval through rallies and letter-writing.436 John Manley and 
his confederate, Professor Ronald Rebholz, a Shakespeare scholar, continued to press 
their case in the Senate. “The problem of the proposed Ronald Reagan Library,” 
argued Manley, “is the problem of the Hoover institution, and the problem of the 
Hoover institution is that…it is…unmistakably a political organisation.”437 While his 
colleagues remained largely unconvinced, he was able to keep the issue alive in the 
local media, particularly through his connection with Mary Madison of the Peninsula 
Times Tribune.438 Such protest maintained a steady murmur as plans progressed over 
the next two years, but it was Glenn Campbell who ultimately proved more damaging 
to the project. In the 1986 Hoover Institution annual report, Campbell wrote that: 
 
it is not only the Hoover Institution that can boast of a ‘Reagan 
connection,’ but the entire university…Stanford trustees [chose] to honor 
President Reagan by locating his library on campus. The location of the 
library at Stanford and the cordial feelings that location shows toward 
President Reagan are evidence that the Stanford-Hoover crisis truly was 
‘the crisis that should never have been.’439 
 
This did not simply antagonise the usual suspects, but provoked a unanimous 
resolution from the Faculty Senate condemning the remarks for implying the 
university’s political support for Reagan. Campbell’s position was now also 
complicated by his new role as Chair of the Reagan Foundation, set up to oversee the 
project on behalf of the White House, and which included on its board administration 
figures such as Ed Meese, Michael Deaver, Bill Clark and Martin Anderson.   
On April 3, 1987, the Faculty Senate voted to postpone making a final 
decision on approving the design. This reflected local opposition, and evidence of 
their growing concern about the impact the library might have on Stanford, both 
substantially and symbolically. This was not all political, at least not in the partisan or 
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national sense, but included vocal dissatisfaction from residents over the library’s 
location, and unhappiness with its design.440 Faculty unease was heightened by the 
national coverage the story was receiving, whether it was critical of Stanford for 
accepting the library or critical of them for opposing it on partisan grounds. This 
national attention may have also influenced the decision of the Reagan Foundation 
Board of Trustees on April 23, to withdraw their proposal to Stanford, and find an 
alternative site for the library. The official reason for the turnaround was the 
separation of the library from the Centre for Public Affairs – something that had been 
known and agreed upon for three years. It seems highly likely then, that the reportedly 
“frustrated” trustees felt that weathering the apparently inexhaustible protest, 
objection and mockery on Stanford campus was too high a price to pay for a project 
smaller than was initially envisioned. The perception that the library had been 
defeated by political agitation was widely held, not least amongst its opponents. An 
elated Dr. Rebholz announced, “It’s one of the few political victories I’ve had in my 
life.”441 The story demonstrates some of the varied intentions and perceptions 
regarding the use and meaning of presidential libraries. The decision to affiliate the 
library with a university, in the tradition of Kennedy, Johnson, Ford and Carter, 
represents the intention to define it as a scholarly institution and resource. At 
Stanford, this definition was pursued at the cost of other functions, as seen in the 
willingness to limit the size and scope of the museum – deliberately deemphasising its 
potential as a memorial or monument to Reagan. Equally, the agreement to keep any 
Reagan legacy think-tank geographically and administratively separate from the 
Stanford facility was a sacrifice of the political function for the scholarly, based upon 
the perceived conflict between ideological activism and academic objectivity.  
Reagan had no great involvement during this process, leaving the detail to 
Meese or Campbell. An entry in his diary from March 1983 (over a month before the 
delaying action of the Stanford Senate) briefly mentions a conversation with Meese, 
who was on his way to meet with the Foundation Trustees: “They are going to discuss 
                                                 
440 Hugh Stubbins, the architect commissioned by the Reagan Foundation, produced a design praised 
by critics as “a welcome contrast to the overscaled presidential libraries that have been built in recent 
years”, but which was considered too large and imposing by many at Stanford. Stubbins’ comment that 
his building would compare well with the “ugly” architecture of Stanford did not help. ‘Stubbins 
Associates Design’, Architectural Record (Vol. 3, October 1986), RRL Library File 3, Box 1, SC 423, 
DSC, SUA. 
441 Barasan, Mark Z., ‘Reagan Library Won’t be Built at Stanford’, San Francisco Chronicle (April 24, 
1987), RRL Library File 3, Box 1, SC 423, DSC, SUA. 
  
144 
 
whether to take [the library] away from Stanford since there are demonstrations 
protesting it being there. I’m in favour of USC.”442 Reagan, it seems, was personally 
uncommitted to Stanford, but supportive of an academic site for his library. The next 
step was to find a less politically self-conscious campus in Southern California. In 
June, however, the Reagan Foundation was presented with a new option when Donald 
Swartz, a Ventura County businessman, offered to donate one hundred acres of a 
property he held just outside of Simi Valley. The donation was apparently made “to 
recognize [Reagan’s] leadership and spirit of volunteerism”; though it is likely Swartz 
was aware of how a presidential library might enhance the rest of his property.443 
After a visit from the First Lady, the offer was accepted and construction began in 
November, 1988.  
The specific environment of the Simi Valley site would affect the 
interpretation of the library, and its self-image. It was politically suitable, a city of 
wealthy white-collar commuters who voted Republican consistently. Part of 
California’s 24th District, Simi Valley was and is represented in Washington by the 
conservative Republican Elton Gallegly, who in November 2008 won his twelfth term 
in Congress. Speaking of his district in 1991, the same year that the library opened 
and that the city failed to convict the police officers in the Rodney King case, 
Gallegly told the Los Angeles Times: “It’s Reagan Country, my friend. There’s no 
other way to describe it.”444 Simi Valley was also aesthetically and thematically apt. 
Its surrounding western landscape and history, represented by an old film set in the 
hills where several Westerns had been shot during Hollywood’s heyday, appealed to 
Reagan. Some environmental objection was raised, relating to the library’s 
development of green belt land, while some objection was political. The former 
mayor of nearby Moorpark, John Galloway, who led local efforts to curb the project, 
argued: “In future years, public money should not be spent maintaining a sanitized 
revision of history. Will the people be permitted to view the paper shredder…or will 
our attention be distracted to viewing a piece of the Berlin Wall?”445 This objection, 
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and others warning of a “Disneyland West” where “schoolchildren will be 
bused…and the myth of Reagan will be perpetuated”, focused on the function of the 
library as a museum and tourist attraction.446 This was also the aspect that attracted 
most of Simi Valley to the project, which was anticipated to bring unique educational 
benefits for local schools, and generate business in the community.447 The Simi 
Valley site shifted attention from the scholarly to the popular use of the library. 
The dedication of his library, held on November 4, 1991, was not the first such 
ceremony Reagan had attended. In the first year of his presidency, he had travelled to 
Grand Rapids, Michigan for the opening of the Ford Presidential Library. A 
considerable diplomatic retinue accompanied him because the event, with the urging 
of fellow guests President José Lopez-Portillo of Mexico and Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau of Canada and the blessing of President Ford, had become an opportunity for 
a mini tri-lateral summit.448 Five years later, in October, 1986, Reagan went to Atlanta 
for the dedication of the Carter Presidential Library. This trip was made with some 
reluctance by Reagan’s staff, unhappy with Carter’s criticism of the administration.449 
In each case, Reagan’s presence was defined by political considerations: Ford’s was 
an opportunity for diplomatic leg-work and the restatement of his economic 
programme, while Carter’s was a necessary duty of magnanimity and bipartisanship 
in the approach to the midterm elections.450 In Reagan’s remarks at both there was a 
common theme of shared experience and presidential unity, which expressed the 
broader message of national unity and continuity. It was this symbolic tone which 
dominated Reagan’s own dedication, a typically well-staged affair, characterised by 
celebrity and ceremony, where issues of political expediency related only to President 
George H. W. Bush, still a year away from potential re-election.  
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The Reagan Foundation provided a budget of at least $500,000 and drew on the 
skills and connections of board members Michael Deaver and MCA chairman Lew 
Wasserman to plan the elaborate event.451 Charlton Heston gave the opening speech, 
introducing the select audience to the event’s main guests – Presidents Nixon, Ford, 
Carter, Reagan and Bush, at that point the largest ever presidential gathering in 
American history. “Each of these men inherited more than just a constitutional 
legacy,” remarked Heston, “each will be forever wrapped in legend and myth,” and 
each was also “the lineal descendent of Washington and Adams, Jefferson and 
Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson, Roosevelt. Through them, they are linked to the very birth 
year of our Republic.”452 The event was self-conscious of its own historicity, the 
presidents collectively representing the nation’s recent past, and symbolising the 
tradition and continuity of its ancient past. Calling the scene “the nation’s profile,” 
Hugh Sidey communicated this heady aura for Time magazine: “There was a kind of 
sad joy on that parched hilltop 2,700 miles west of the real Oval Office. It was a perch 
of aging eagles. History made, history remembered, history fading.”453 Earlier, the 
group had toured the building, at one point entering together the museum’s Oval 
Office replica, a moment of poignancy as related by Fred Ryan: “Just seeing the 
expressions on their faces..,” he marvelled, “they walked in and you could tell they 
each had this look on their faces, remembering something.”454 As spontaneous and 
mysterious as those memories might have been, there was a clear deliberacy to this 
historic occasion. When it seemed that Jimmy Carter might be held up in Zambia 
where he was overseeing elections, Lod Cook, then the Reagan Foundation Director 
and CEO of Arco, smartly provided him with a corporate jet to carry him to Simi 
Valley in time.  
The crux of the ceremony saw Reagan hand the key of the library to the 
National Archivist, symbolically passing the library into the ownership of the 
American people. This gesture was prescribed by the law of the Presidential Records 
Act, but it matched a theme that Reagan had commonly expressed, significantly at the 
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groundbreaking ceremony for the library exactly three years earlier: “I must say that it 
is not my Presidency, any more than the White House has belonged to me these 8 
years. The Presidency of the United States is a trust – a public trust from the great 
people of this land.” He went on to make another promise of the library: 
 
What we know best is this: We owe all we have to our forebears who built 
our land and our government and gave it to us as a sacred bequest. And 
today, in this stunning setting, we begin to pay our debt to them and to our 
own posterity by breaking ground for this library that will bear my 
name.455 
 
Here the library was pledged to American history, or rather a mythic idea of the past 
to which Reagan as president and the people as nation were beholden. The library 
would serve to honour the nation by adding to its story. This gift to America was 
complicated, or perhaps enriched, by the Reagans’ request in 1990 to be buried on the 
site, following the precedent set by Presidents Truman and Eisenhower. In one sense 
this act was the ultimate donation to his country, offering his body to American soil 
and the ownership of the American people. In another, it represents the ultimate mark 
of ownership, Reagan’s full personalisation of his library. Either way, it was a 
recognition and assurance of a mythic or spiritual role to the library, making it, in 
part, literally a mausoleum and a shrine.  
This would not have been possible in the Stanford foothills. The story of the 
Reagan Library’s conception and creation demonstrates that its function beyond a 
repository of his records was dependent on more than the wishes of Reagan and his 
surrogates. The library’s nature would be defined by its location and environment and, 
moreover, by the intentions and priorities of its hosts. The failure to site the library at 
Stanford was a result of clashing priorities and perceptions of its function. Broadly 
speaking, Stanford wanted a prestigious academic resource, Hoover wanted an 
influential policy centre, and while the White House wanted both of these things, it 
may also have resented limitations on the commemorative opportunities of the library. 
This is reflected in the enthusiasm with which the Reagans embraced and 
symbolically personalised the Simi Valley site. The library at Simi Valley would 
eventually pursue the commemorative function at the cost of its previous scholarly 
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ambitions. However, this was also a response to the needs and priorities of its 
location, isolated from an academic environment, while suited and encouraged to act 
as a tourist attraction.  Reagan’s legacy, and his myth, was subject to external 
influences.  
 
 
Operation 
 
 The Reagan Library was dedicated as a complex of three parts: the archive, the 
museum and the Center for Public Affairs. While the former was to be managed by 
NARA, and the latter two by the Reagan Foundation, each addressed the historical 
meaning of Reagan’s presidency and how it belonged to the broader narratives of 
American history. The accumulated papers of Reagan’s presidency represent the 
primary purpose and the rationale of the library. The nature and meaning of this 
archival function should thus be considered first. The contents of the archive relate 
specifically, of course, to President Reagan and his administration and thus hold 
central importance in determining his history. However, the meaning of this purpose 
extends further, relating to the myth of Reagan, and to national myth. Some of the 
archive’s users have responded to the archive as a symbolic space, and its contents as 
symbolic objects. Peggy Noonan recalled asking for the originals of some short 
stories Reagan wrote as a young man:  
 
You sit in the reading room of the Reagan Library in Simi Valley, 
California, where they used to make westerns in the brown scrubby 
hills…As you sit, another scholar is making dry writing sounds. It’s so 
quiet you can hear the pencil on the paper. They give you the young 
Reagan papers. You hold them in your hand, delicate old papers once 
white but now beige with age. 
 
It is here in this hallowed space, through this sensational experience, “where you find 
young Ronald Reagan.”456 Paul Kengor related a similar story:   
 
As I huddled in a remote research room perched high upon a hillside 
overlooking a balmy, picturesque landscape in Simi Valley, California, an 
archivist brought over a cart of materials from the Presidential 
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Handwriting File…In Box 9, Folder 150, I met the real Evil Empire 
speech – and the real Reagan.457 
 
The experience of researching Reagan is related in terms of place, both the landscape 
of the library and the atmosphere of the reading room, and of objects, the material of 
Reagan’s papers. Reagan is found in each. The significance of the surroundings, the 
temple-like quality of the room – isolated, high and quiet – and the authenticity of the 
documents, bearing Reagan’s own mark, all guide the researcher to finding the true 
Reagan. Douglas Brinkley, in his introduction to the first edited volume of Reagan’s 
diaries, described a similar experience of Reagan’s presence on his first encounter 
with the books, writing “I was astounded…For a moment, I just looked at them.” 
Later, reading them, “I could almost hear his voice.”458 The diaries are the most 
important publication to emerge from the Reagan Library, and along with the 
collections of his letters and radio broadcasts, have contributed to a revised historical 
opinion of Reagan, his inner-life, his involvement and his ability. Here is suggested an 
alternative importance to them, as mythic objects which, in their historicity and 
authenticity, assert in themselves the significance of Reagan. Their presence as 
artefacts in the museum further attests to this.  
 The meaning of the collection extends beyond its connection to and evocation 
of Reagan. It is also relevant to the mythic ideal articulated by FDR when he 
dedicated his library: 
 
It seems to me that the dedication of a library is in itself an act of faith. To 
bring together the records of the past and to house them in buildings 
where they will be preserved for the use of men and women in the future, 
a Nation must believe in three things. It must believe in the past. It must 
believe in the future. It must, above all, believe in the capacity of its own 
people so to learn from the past that they can gain in judgement in 
creating their own future.459 
 
 
 
Historical preservation was an act of national preservation. The Reagan Library was 
the first presidential archive to which the 1978 Presidential Records Act applied. This 
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act identified the records of the presidency as essential historical material in need of 
federally managed preservation and federally ensured openness. No similar legislation 
to place congressional or judicial records in public ownership was enacted, though it 
was proposed in the reports of the Public Documents Commission which led to the 
PRA.460 The act gave custody of the publicly owned papers to the Archivist of the 
United States, who as the head of NARA would oversee their preservation and 
release, scheduled for five years after the end of the presidency. The act allowed the 
president certain restrictions on access, to last twelve years after he left office. Of the 
six categories identified, most are identical to exemptions within the Freedom of 
Information Act, covering, for example, information relating to national security and 
personal privacy. Also covered, though, are information relating to appointments and 
confidential communication between the president and his advisers. It is this latter 
category, labelled the P5 restriction, which later brought scrutiny to the issue of 
access to the Reagan archives and presidential records in general.  
The issue of limited access to Reagan’s papers has affected his historiography 
and been raised by his historians. Both John Diggins and Sean Wilentz mention in the 
introductions to their studies of Reagan the inaccessibility of most of his papers, as 
has Edmund Morris, whose special access only related to Reagan’s personal 
records.461 This problem may explain the styles of their books, each broad in theme 
and without great attention to the details of policy process. Richard Reeves, 
meanwhile, who has made the most systematic use of the available records at the 
library, noted that the archival research for Triumph of the Imagination was “much 
more difficult” than for his works on Kennedy and Nixon.462 Wilentz and Reeves both 
refer to the Bush administration’s role in determining access to the Reagan papers. 
The inauguration of George W. Bush coincided with the lapse of the twelve-year 
period of Reagan’s restrictions. The archivists at the Reagan Library had so far 
identified and held back some 68,000 documents under the P5 restriction, which were 
now scheduled for release. The new administration sought to delay this process, using 
powers granted to incumbent presidents by one of the last executive orders of the 
Reagan presidency. White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez ordered the archivist to 
delay the documents’ release three times before, on November 1, 2001, President 
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Bush issued his own Executive Order 13233, “Further Implementation of the 
Presidential Records Act”. In the new implementation, not only would the former 
president be able to review requests and withhold releases beyond the initial twelve 
years, but so would his surrogate, the former vice president and ultimately, the 
incumbent president. Meanwhile, the researcher wishing to view the document would 
be obliged to establish in their request a “demonstrated, specific need” for the release 
of the document. The order, which the White House argued would effect a “much 
more orderly process” through which “more information” would be released, 
potentially allowed the president to withhold documents from public access 
indefinitely.463 
 The White House’s actions attracted protest from the media, from Congress 
and from historians. A Los Angeles Times editorial claimed the order suggested a 
“secrecy fetish” in the administration; it was a return to a shadowy Cold War model, 
and an “attack on the principle of open government.”464 The House Government 
Reform Subcommittee on Government Efficiency held hearings immediately and its 
chairman, Representative Stephen Horn (R-CA) introduced a bill the following year, 
H.R. 4187, “The Presidential Records Act Amendments of 2002”, which sought 
effectively to revoke the executive order. Meanwhile, multiple plaintiffs including the 
Washington, D.C. based group Public Citizen, the American Historical Association 
and the Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the Press, filed a lawsuit against the 
U.S. Archivist seeking to overturn the order, on the grounds of it being a violation of 
the PRA and an unconstitutional use of executive power. Further arguments were put 
forward in congressional hearings in 2002 by Robert Dallek and Richard Reeves, 
which advanced historical interpretations of the issue. Dallek voiced patriotic ideals to 
rival Reagan’s own:  
 
Every president uses history in deciding current actions. The principal 
victim of President Bush's directive will be himself and the country. The 
study and publication of our presidential history is no luxury or form of 
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public entertainment. It is a vital element in assuring the best governance 
of our democracy.465 
 
Reeves was less earnest in the defence of the historical profession, saying, “I need 
those papers…this is how I make my living.” Then in the midst of writing Triumph of 
the Imagination, Reeves had sent President Bush copies of his books on Kennedy and 
Nixon, suggesting that such works might become impossible now. However, he also 
articulated a public role for himself and other historians: “I do battle for them. 
President Bush is on the other side of this game.” For him, such history was defined 
by the conflict between the public’s right to know and the secrecy of power, and this 
was simply another episode in a story that went back to George Washington’s 
protection of his own papers from Congress’ prying eyes.466  
 President Obama revoked the order on his first day in office, while issuing his 
own that maintained the right of review for the incumbent – as established by Reagan. 
This was a symbolic end to what had been largely a symbolic struggle. The 68,000 
documents in question had been released by the White House in March 2002, 
excluding some personnel files relating to the appointments of still-serving judges. It 
was the potential of the Bush order, rather than a continuing restriction, which 
animated the controversy. The documents themselves, when restricted, had essentially 
symbolic meaning, representing the potential of some vital truth of America’s past, 
and the centrality of the presidency to American history and self-knowledge. The 
Reagan archives became briefly the subject and symbol of a contest over the 
ownership of American history, illustrating the tensions that govern the issue of 
presidential archives. This is all the more apparent considering that the documents 
apparently contained no smoking gun or devastating secret. The withholding of the 
papers and Executive Order 13233 may speak of the reflexive urges of the Bush 
White House for secrecy and power, but were not a determined effort. Reagan 
himself, it should be said, cooperated with NARA at every instance after his 
presidency in the easing of restrictions and the acceleration of the process of 
release.467 Meanwhile, the limited access to Reagan’s papers continues to be a 
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problem simply because of the difficulty of a small number of people processing 
some fifty million documents. One archivist, Sharon Fawcett, has estimated that it 
will take more than a century, at the current rate, to see the task completed. This, 
Fawcett argued, is in part an unintended consequence of the PRA, which based 
release on FOIA requests rather than systematic processing, and subjected records to 
more rigorous management.468 The Reagan archive faces practical difficulties which 
have been interpreted through symbolic arguments about the meaning and purpose of 
American history. These difficulties exist despite and, in part, because of an attempt 
to legislate according to the ideal of open and accessible history that both represents 
and furthers the American democratic system. The Reagan library in its central 
function thus responds to and is the product of a mythic idea of the historical 
presidency as a resource of American self-knowledge. 
 While the archives represent the library’s primary purpose, its most visible 
function is the Reagan Museum. There, the commemorative and selective 
representation of history also makes it the most overtly mythic aspect of the 
institution. The choice of the Simi Valley site removed any conditions on the size of 
the museum and content of its exhibitions, as well as any concerns over visitor 
numbers. Instead, attracting visitors has become a key interest of the library. This was 
only a moderate success in the library’s first decade. Though it had welcomed over a 
million visitors by 1998, averaging about one hundred and eighty thousand visitors a 
year, it did not reach the popularity of other libraries, such as Johnson’s and 
Kennedy’s.469 Moreover, it could not retrieve the level of interest it received in its first 
year, and the great majority of visitors were local, thus having less impact than 
expected on the local economy.470 Through this period, the library saw three directors 
come and go. The first director, the former Reagan aide and management specialist 
Ralph C. Bledsoe, was replaced in 1994 by Richard Norton Smith, previously the 
director of the Hoover and Eisenhower Libraries, who had been made director of the 
Reagan Foundation and Center for Public Affairs the previous year. Smith, the “P.T. 
Barnum of presidential library directors” who believed that “history is too important 
to be left to historians”, reinvented the Reagan Library as a popular attraction. He 
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oversaw a renovation of the museum in 1995, updating its technologies as well as its 
tone – one reviewer described it as “kinder, gentler” and less partisan.471 Smith left for 
the Ford Library in 1996, to be replaced by Mark Hunt, who as a professional 
museum director, sought also to expand the library’s popular appeal. Hunt himself left 
for the Franklin Roosevelt Museum in 2000. Since then, the library has remained 
under the directorship of R. Duke Blackwood, brought in from USC for his 
fundraising skills and education connections, and who, like Smith before him, later 
became director as well of the Reagan Foundation. Blackwood has talked about being 
more “aggressive” and “entrepreneurial” than his predecessors, and wanting to “make 
[the library] more visible, make it more visited, [and] make it more exciting and fun 
as opposed to a sleepy little museum.”472 His chief success was in the expansion of 
the museum in 2004, when the Air Force One Pavilion was opened. This saw a large 
and sustained growth in visitor numbers, which, of course, coincided with the 
increased interest following Reagan’s death and funeral.  
 Because of the changes, both broad and gradual, in the museum’s permanent 
exhibition, the constant variety of temporary exhibitions, and the fact that it faces a 
full renovation to meet the centennial of Reagan’s birth in 2011, a full discussion of 
the museum’s contents will not be attempted here. Instead, I focus on two issues of 
relative permanence. First, the question of political objectivity in relation to the 
representation of Iran/Contra, and secondly, the museum’s use of commemorative 
objects as demonstrated by its exhibition of Air Force One. No extensive data exist on 
the demographics of the visitors. Reagan expected “ordinary people of all ages, 
background and political persuasions eager to examine their past and explore a history 
not always learned in school” to visit the museum.473 Duke Blackwood, meanwhile, 
explained that “[we don’t] want to attract a specific demographic, what we want is to 
create an experience for people that want to come up here… The idea is to present the 
picture of an icon, and that icon happens to be Ronald Reagan.”474 A presupposition 
of the enthusiasm of the museum’s visitors for Ronald Reagan is reflected in his 
portrayal there. The positive representation of Reagan’s presidency, and the omissions 
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this might entail, were anticipated before the museum’s opening, as seen in Moorpark 
Mayor Galloway’s concerns. This was even acknowledged by the museum’s 
designers. “Nothing is going to put the president in a bad light,” said one during the 
very early stages of the plans, referring to the Reagan’s own involvement in deciding 
the exhibits.475 Anticipating criticism on the unveiling of the museum, another 
warned, “The exhibits tell the story from the President’s point of view. It is not going 
to be totally objective, nor highly critical.” While the Reagans had reportedly asked 
for the Iran/Contra affair to be “tackled head on”, its representation in the exhibit 
amounted to a few newspaper headings and a two hundred word account. 476 
 This scant reference, and its lack of context or interpretation, was frequently 
remarked upon by journalists and critics. One described it as part of a strategy by the 
designers, “a self referential revisionist ‘history’ in service of mytho-political 
Truth.”477 William Davis of the Christic Institute, a think-tank consistently critical of 
Reagan’s Central American policies, lamented that “the people are further denied 
their own history. They’re not allowed to appreciate what really happened.”478 Others, 
notably historians, were relatively unconcerned. Douglas Brinkley reasoned that it 
was simply too early to expect a negative retrospective. “Why start on such a low 
mark?” he asked. He anticipated that in the future, after the affair had been fully 
researched by historians, it would receive greater and more honest attention, although 
with an inevitably pro-Reagan slant. “As long as the viewer understands that,” he 
argued, “I think there’s no problem with that.” Robert Dallek, meanwhile, was 
unsurprised that the “Reagan folk” would pass over the incident, but confident that it 
“doesn’t mean the historians will pass over it.”479 This distinction is interesting in the 
way it relates to the dual function of the library. The myth articulated in the 
commemorative context of the museum would be countered, or nullified, by the work 
conducted by historians in the reading room on the other side of the building – 
provided, of course, the public audience was conscious of each.  
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 Brinkley has not yet been proved right. While the coverage of Iran/Contra 
increased after Richard Norton Smith’s renovation, it has now all but disappeared 
from the museum’s narrative of the Reagan presidency, receiving no reference in the 
objects, images or text of the exhibition. Blackwood nevertheless pointed out that in 
the short film which introduces the exhibition, Reagan is shown in his television 
appearance taking full responsibility for the affair.480 While the detail and 
consequence of Iran/Contra are overlooked, Reagan’s presidential acceptance of it is 
highlighted. Benjamin Hufbauer speculated that this was the result of pressure by 
Reagan’s family and his supporters on the institution.481 Whether there was direct 
interference or not, the removal of Iran/Contra from the main exhibition probably 
corresponded with the reinvention of the museum after Reagan’s death in 2004. The 
fleeting but meaningful representation of Iran/Contra through an image of Reagan in 
the Oval Office affirming his leadership corresponds with the current methods and 
themes of the museum. Instead of detailed interpretation, visitors now find Reagan 
explained through symbols. Film clips, images, quotes and objects indicate and 
celebrate the meaning of Reagan’s presidency through the shared context of national 
memory and identity. The museum’s commemorative nature has been fully realised 
through the mythic use of its exhibits. 
 The museum, like any other, is a space designed to impart to its visitors 
knowledge through its collection. Its subject is specifically defined, and its authority 
is plain to the visitor, ultimately affirmed by Reagan’s gravesite outside. Moreover, it 
is a national site, whose subject is not just Ronald Reagan, but through him the 
presidency, and through that America. The objects and representations within it 
convey knowledge to the visitor about these subjects through the framework of their 
mythology. Ludmilla Jordanova has written of the process found in museums:  
 
Objects are triggers of chains of ideas and images that go far beyond their 
initial starting-point. Feelings about the antiquity, the authenticity, the 
beauty, the craftsmanship, the poignancy of objects are the stepping stones 
towards fantasies, which can have aesthetic, historical, macabre or a 
thousand other attributes…The ‘knowledge’ that museums facilitate has 
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the quality of fantasy because it is only possible via an imaginative 
process.482  
 
In the Reagan Museum, such fantasy is generated within the context of pre-
understood and shared national myths about American power and history. This is 
present throughout: in the situation of Reagan’s diaries amidst the portraits and 
paraphernalia of earlier presidents; in the recurring association of Reagan with the Old 
West; and in the familiar narrative of presidential biography suggested by the 
reconstruction of Reagan’s childhood kitchen. Replicated spaces are a frequent tool of 
the museum, seen prominently in the recreation of Reagan’s Oval Office. While the 
five presidents may have entered and found personal memories, for the visiting public 
the room draws on their collective memory. The Oval Office replica has become an 
established feature of presidential museums. Benjamin Hufbauer wrote of the first 
example in the Truman Library, describing its resonating symbolic appeal to the 
American people. Through its mystique as well as its familiarity, the replica is “an 
empty set, a space for visualizing allegories of American power.”483 It is a metaphor 
for the presidency, for the solemn purpose of the library, and for the narratives about 
Harry Truman that the library contains and presents.  
The analysis fits the Reagan replica and any of the others, but in the Reagan 
Library visitors find a similar experience in the exhibition of Air Force One. Here, 
though, not only is the space authentic rather than a replica, it is also more specifically 
associated with the events and achievements of Reagan’s presidency. Inside, it has 
been refurbished to replicate his use of it, complete with half-written speeches and 
jars of jellybeans. Outside, the context of the adjacent displays firmly associates it 
with the pageantry of Reagan’s foreign travel and with his Cold War successes. In the 
upper gallery of the pavilion, exhibits detail Reagan’s foreign trips, his so-called 
“Flights of Freedom”, and present them in a narrative of achieving Cold War victory, 
year by year. This narrative is continued in various exhibits emphasising the 
rhetorical, ideological, technological and diplomatic efforts that brought an American 
victory, each led by Reagan. Air Force One is central physically and thematically to 
the display. It operates as an object of Reagan’s presidency but also a familiar symbol 
of the modern presidency and of American global power. This particular plane flew 
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Presidents Kennedy through Bush, Jr., containing within it the history of the latter half 
of the twentieth century, and thus of the Cold War. Its exhibition in the Reagan 
Museum does not just confirm him within this quarter of presidential history; it 
affirms him as its most significant actor. Reagan flew most on the plane, he put it to 
best use, and with it, he won the war. Recalling Bjerre-Poulson’s conclusion that the 
commemoration of Reagan could only succeed as it transformed him from a partisan 
icon to a national, cultural one, we can see this process in the Reagan Library and its 
Air Force One Pavilion.  
This, however, must be considered next to the library’s third function, the 
political activity of the Reagan Center for Public Affairs. Unlike Jimmy Carter’s 
active role in the operations of the Carter Center, and unlike Lyndon Johnson’s 
permanent presence at his library, where he used the Oval Office replica as a personal 
office, Reagan’s use of the library and the space set aside for him was largely casual 
and ceremonial, until his disease removed him from public life completely. The 
direction of the library’s political activity, and thus Reagan’s legacy, was left to the 
Reagan Foundation. Following the library’s dedication, the centre was expected to act 
as the policy unit that had been conceived in the Stanford plans. However, while the 
museum and archives opened, the office space marked for the Center for Public 
Affairs remained largely empty. This slow start, combined with the departure of Ed 
Meese, Bill Clark and Martin Anderson from the board of the Reagan Foundation, left 
some wondering about the library’s commitment to furthering conservative policy.484 
John Herrington, the remaining administration veteran on the board except for Fred 
Ryan, now Reagan’s Chief of Staff, submitted his resignation in response to director 
Lod Cook’s failure to renew his colleagues’ appointments. “I had hoped we might 
structure a public affairs board with their talents, ideals and loyalty that could carry on 
your legacy,” he wrote to the president, “I finally understood…that this is not to 
be.”485 The subsequent appointment of George Shultz reassured some about the 
direction of the library and the centre. “My concerns are allayed,” said Martin 
Anderson.486 Meanwhile, a press release later that year announced the intentions of 
the Center for Public Affairs. Vowing to reach “back through history and help carry 
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the vision of the Reagan years into the future”, the centre promised an extensive 
publication programme, series of seminars and conferences, and to provide a forum 
for international and national leaders – a “permanent summit”.487 This was the vision 
of John J. Midgley, the political scientist director of the centre. In 1993, however, this 
scholarly and ideological direction was abandoned by the Reagan Foundation, which 
on appointing Richard Norton Smith as its director also gave him Midgley’s position. 
The centre would now focus on an “event-oriented program that would boost library 
attendance”. Smith explained his own vision to encourage public participation by 
featuring “real people, interesting practitioners, rather than theorists and academics…I 
don’t want to remake the Hoover institution,” he said, “I’m more interested in 
appealing to the general public.”488  
This new direction took the Center for Public Affairs away from a productive 
role and towards a passive one, to become a theatre for the promotion of visiting 
guests. This is not to say it withdrew its sense of political identity, but rather than 
defining itself a vision of Reagan’s legacy, it let those attending appropriate Reagan’s 
image and political legacy. From the beginning, it has operated largely as a 
Republican platform, with Democrats and liberals attending as exceptions to prove the 
rule. During the nineties, indeed, it seemed to act as a stage for criticism of the 
Clinton presidency, often by veterans of the Reagan administration. In 1994, General 
P.X. Kelley, once Reagan’s chairman of the Joint Chiefs, attacked Clinton’s defence 
budget.489 Similarly, James Baker repudiated the president for failing to understand or 
enact the lessons of Ronald Reagan’s global leadership, and Jack Kemp gave a talk 
entitled “The Relevance of the Reagan Revolution for the 1990s,” a pointed lesson for 
the current administration.490 Later, the library became a stop on the trail towards the 
2000 Republican presidential nomination. John McCain made two visits, where he 
emphasised his loyalty to Reagan personally and to his patriotic, conservative values: 
“For his faith, his optimism, his principles, I will always be grateful to Ronald 
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Reagan, a genuine American hero.”491 George W. Bush made his first major foreign 
policy speech at the library in November 1999, his reputed weakness in that area 
buoyed by the association with Reagan, which was reinforced by Bush’s companion 
at the event, former Secretary of State George Shultz.  
 During the more recent Republican primaries, all of the candidates were 
awarded the opportunity to appear at the Reagan Library and make the case for their 
nomination, but in direct competition for the appropriation of Reagan’s image. Two 
televised Republican debates were hosted by the library. All ten declared candidates 
gathered there on May 3, 2007, for the first debate of the campaign, but by January 
30, only four remained for the final GOP debate before the primaries. Both of these 
took place within the Air Force One pavilion, the second with the candidates 
positioned on the upper gallery with the presidential plane behind them. The 
symbolism of the presidency and the power each candidate sought was thus 
remarkably apparent during the debate, but it was specifically Reagan’s symbol which 
most influenced the shape of the debate and the candidate’s rhetoric. One portion of 
the event demonstrated particularly the importance of the idea of Reagan and its 
mythic hold on the proceedings. The moderator, Anderson Cooper, directed a 
question at Governor Mike Huckabee which addressed his views on abortion and 
judicial appointments. This was asked in reference to Reagan’s appointment of Sandra 
Day O’Connor and the criticism this got from the Christian right. Cooper supported 
this by reading directly from Reagan’s diary:  
 
I'm a little too nervous to actually even touch it, but that is Ronald 
Reagan's original diary. And in it, he wrote by his hand, he said, ‘Called 
Judge O'Connor in Arizona and told her she was my nominee for Supreme 
Court. Already the flak is starting, and from my own supporters. Right-to-
life people say she's pro-abortion. She declares abortion is personally 
repugnant to her. I think she'll make a good justice.’ 
 
“That's Ronald Reagan's words from his own book,” Cooper emphasised, “Governor 
Huckabee, was she the right choice?” Challenged not just with one of Reagan’s 
positions, but with a physical artefact representing him, Huckabee answered 
cautiously: 
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History will have to determine that, and I'm not going to come to the 
Reagan Library and say anything about Ronald Reagan's decisions. I'm 
not that stupid. If I was, I'd have no business being president. 
 
The candidate declined to question or disagree with Reagan while essentially in his 
presence. Between the four of them, the candidates mentioned Reagan a total of 
thirty-eight times in this debate, in apparent common agreement with Mitt Romney 
that the Republican party “has a choice, what the heart and soul of this party is going 
to be, and it’s going to have to be in the house that Ronald Reagan built.” The 
resolution of this apparent paradox is that the party could choose the meaning of 
Ronald Reagan. The debate ended with the question, “Would Ronald Reagan endorse 
you?” allowing the candidates to define Reagan’s political legacy, and how they 
represented it. Mitt Romney simply asserted that Reagan would have agreed with him 
on every particular issue he was supporting that particular day. Ron Paul mentioned 
previous support that Reagan had given him, and their common positions on monetary 
policy. John McCain made a more interesting attempt to define Reagan’s legacy as 
one of character, of sticking to principles and political courage. Huckabee, however, 
articulated a broad, national idea of Ronald Reagan: 
 
What made Ronald Reagan a great president was not just the intricacies of 
his policies… It was that he loved America and saw it as a…great nation 
because of the greatness of its people…It's that spirit that…makes us love 
our country whether we're Democrats or Republicans. And that's what I 
believe Ronald Reagan did – he brought this country back together and 
made us believe in ourselves. And whether he believes in us, I hope we 
still believe in those things which made him a great leader and a great 
American.492 
 
While the focus that night was on the frontrunners McCain and Romney, many 
observers gave Huckabee points for style, and some declared him the winner of the 
debate, a judgement based at least partly on this Reaganesque closer. The Reagan 
Library thus functions not as an active agent within American national politics, but 
more as a tool to be used within it. For the Republican party, it is either a stage from 
which Reagan’s memory can be called up to diminish the opposition, or it is an arena 
in which they contest the mantle of Reagan and are tested against his memory. In this 
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way its political function is also commemorative. As Barry Schwartz said, in the 
context of Lincoln’s memory, “commemoration transforms historical facts…into 
objects of attachment by defining their meaning and explaining how people should 
feel about them.”493 This occurs in the museum, and in an abstract way with the 
archive. In the presidential debates, this happened actively, as Reagan’s presidency 
became an object of attachment whose meaning the candidates competed to explain. 
Though this was in a specifically partisan context, relating, as Romney said, to the 
future of the Republican Party, it was a contest which would have national 
consequence and needed, as Huckabee argued, to be thought of in national terms. The 
Reagan Library acted as a presidential and thus national symbol, focusing partisan 
discourse.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Reagan Library is part of a national system of presidential libraries, and though, 
as Paula Span said, “system may be too methodical a word” considering the variance 
in their legal governance and their autonomous styles, it must be asked how much it 
represents that system and is part of a tradition of presidential commemoration, and 
how far it can be considered unique within it.494 As we have seen, Reagan was not the 
first president to find difficulty in siting his library on a university campus. Only a 
few years previously the attempt to house the Nixon Library at Duke University had 
been defeated by unanimous opprobrium from the faculty. Nor has this been the last 
instance of such controversy. The choice of the Southern Methodist University in 
Dallas, Texas, Laura Bush’s alma mater, as the site for George W. Bush’s presidential 
library was confirmed in February, 2008, but only after three years of debate and 
opposition from both faculty and Methodist leaders, who have a role in the 
university’s administration. Much of the criticism has resembled that seen on 
Stanford, being levelled primarily at the policy centre component of the library, to be 
named the Freedom Institute, and the danger that it will function ideologically rather 
than academically.495 When built, the George W. Bush Library will break the trend of 
universities rejecting Republican presidents, and will contain the first university-
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affiliated Republican presidential think-tank. Amongst Democrats, this is a well 
established tendency, from the Kennedy School of Government, affiliated with 
Harvard, to the Carter Centre, affiliated with Emory. On Stanford’s loss of the Reagan 
Library, Martin Anderson commented, “President Carter has taken the lead in making 
the libraries enormously important to scholars…These libraries are beginning to have 
the role that think-tanks have had all to themselves…What a great opportunity we had 
– it’s gone now.”496 The collapse of the Stanford plan seemed, in the context of the 
presidential library tradition, to confirm a distinct difference between the options, if 
not the ambitions, of Republican and Democrat presidents, that has now been defied 
by President Bush.  
 The celebratory tone of the museum, and the edited nature of its narrative, is in 
common with tradition. Despite Lyndon Johnson’s assertion at his library’s dedication 
that, “It’s all here: the story of our time – with the bark off. There is no record of a 
mistake, nothing critical, ugly or unpleasant that is not included in the files,” 
reviewers were quick to notice that the museum, at least, was quite the opposite.497 
With many of the exhibits focussing on the achievements of the Great Society, there 
was almost no mention of the still ongoing Vietnam War. Meanwhile, the rest of the 
museums have all faced similar criticism for not detailing the failures or 
unpleasantness over which their subjects presided. Benjamin Hufbauer has explained 
this in terms of the origins of the libraries as personal projects of the presidents and 
their supporters, and the control they exert over the institution in its first years or 
decades.498 However, a key point here is that this is a temporal phenomenon. When 
the proprietary and partisan nature of the library’s administration passes, new routes 
are available. Hufbauer points to the example of the Truman Library and Museum 
where, since a renovation and rededication in 2001, the exhibits now “provide [what] 
is essentially lacking in nearly every other presidential library: a conviction that it is 
important to convey that history is contested ground.”499 While this reflects 
contemporary concerns in museology, it also emphasises that presidential libraries are 
not static, historical artefacts in themselves. The Reagan Library and Museum belong 
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to a tradition that is subject to more than, and will outlast, the interests and influences 
of those who built it and supported it in its first decades.  
 The Reagan Library can make some claims to distinction, and these largely 
relate to Reagan’s own distinctive presence in contemporary American memory. The 
hosting of the presidential debates points to how Reagan dominates the discourse and 
self-image of his party in a way which no other recent president does, and few have 
historically. The presence of Air Force One is consistent with the iconography of 
presidential libraries, but represents a claim on history, an increasingly accepted one, 
that Reagan was the most significant American statesman and president of the Cold 
War. Reagan’s burial at his library was not unusual, nor was his honouring with a 
state funeral, though one hadn’t been seen since Lyndon Johnson’s death in 1973. 
However, the pageantry of his funeral and attention it received, eclipsing that of 
Gerald Ford three years later, made it unparalleled in recent American history. 
Reagan’s body lay in state at both Simi Valley and the US Capitol, attracting more 
than one hundred thousand viewers at each site. The final ceremony at the library 
blended the public and private, the personal and the national, in the imagery of the 
presidency. Exclusively attended by Reagan’s family and friends, it was organised 
around nationalist and military ritual, while being broadcast to the watching nation. 
While the library functioned as the personal ground of the Reagans and their grief, it 
was also a centre of national attention and celebration, and belonged to America. The 
Reagan Library, in its separate functions, represents the varied development of 
Reagan’s historical, public and political memory. In each case, however, it works to 
incorporated Reagan into mythic national narratives which speak to American identity 
through the institution and iconography of the presidency.  
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Conclusion 
Reagan in the Twenty-First Century 
 
 
The names of some Presidents are invoked by spokesmen of both pol. 
parties as “men for all seasons,”…epitomizing the greatness of America, 
Washington, Lincoln, Jefferson etc. Then there are Presidents whose 
names are brought up in party circles, hailed as great but if… 
acknowledged by the other party…at all with NOT quite the same 
enthusiasm.500  
 
 
Ronald Reagan’s relationship to American mythology involves his life, his beliefs and 
his presidential leadership. It has also involved the contribution of American political 
and historical discourse. This involvement is more layered and more nuanced than has 
previously been understood, representing a process greater than his idolisation by his 
supporters and would-be inheritors. Where Reagan sought to pursue the American 
dream, his biographers have granted him an exemplary presidential life story, 
representative of American history. Reagan performed and absorbed the narratives of 
Hollywood, and his analysts made his presidency the creation and conduit of 
American fiction and fantasy. President Reagan’s singular commemorative 
engagements made his mark on national iconography and tradition, but also 
represented his instruction by the imperatives of American memory. They were also 
instructive, both to later leaders and to academic observers, of the power and meaning 
of collective remembrance. His communication of an American myth of destiny and 
moral exceptionalism became the defining factor of his presidency, whether 
understood cynically or with acclaim. Commentators and historians interpreted the 
achievements and failures of his presidency in terms of his mythic communication, 
and also made them representative of greater narratives and meanings of American 
history. Reagan’s official commemoration, meanwhile, in the tradition of presidential 
libraries, is involved equally with his partisan image as it is with the ideals of historic 
preservation and its implications for national identity and continuity. The central 
discovery of this thesis is that Reagan’s association with myth - an expansive 
consequence of tradition, Reagan’s own beliefs, and his political and historical 
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interpretation - has become a symbolic idea in itself. To respond to Reagan is to 
respond to American myth. 
However, the exploration of Reagan’s relationship to American mythology has 
revealed a consistent problem which demands further attention. This is the tension 
between Reagan’s conservatism and his Americanism, his representation of his 
nation, and of a specific political ideology and movement. Reagan’s perception of the 
past had broad nationalist themes, but was shaped by the interests of his conservatism 
and its application to contemporary political issues, at the expense of its internal 
integrity – in his disregard of America’s divisive history, and in the paradox between 
his rejection of historical determinism, and his evocation of American destiny. As 
president, the consistency of his political mythology was challenged by the duties of 
his office to represent the unity of a nation in conflict over its recent past. While 
responding to widely popular trends in American memory, such as in Normandy or at 
the Statue of Liberty centennial, allowed Reagan to associate, to some extent, his 
conservatism with national identity. More contentious issues of memory, such as 
Martin Luther King Day or the Bitburg visit, forced Reagan to mute his positions and 
tailor his articulation of the past in recognition of other interests. Meanwhile, this 
tension exists in the Reagan Library, where Reagan is opened to historical judgement 
according to the ideals of national history and self-knowledge, commemorated 
traditionally as part of an heroic presidential narrative, but also maintained as a 
distinctly Republican symbol. This issue, of how far Reagan is defined by political 
division and how far he represents a national figure, must be addressed here, and can 
be illustrated by considering Reagan’s presence and meaning in the twenty-first 
century – in relation to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and in the response to his 
death in 2004.  
The 2001 terrorist attacks on America have helped shape the history of 
Reagan. In Wilentz’s The Age of Reagan this occurs outside of the textual narrative, 
in an evocative use of punctuating double-page images. Opening the narrative is a 
view of Manhattan, the World Trade Centre centrally placed, on America’s 
bicentennial. Immediately before the epilogue, the reader is confronted with the 
charred silhouette of the broken towers.501 Wilentz’s use of these images to bookend 
his narrative is a testament not only to the visual symbolic strength of 9/11, but also to 
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its mythic power in defining recent American history. It does not mark the end the 
Age of Reagan, but the introduction of its most radical phase, as represented by the 
Bush presidency’s expansion of executive power. The mythic influence of 9/11 on 
Reagan narratives can be seen even more clearly in the example of Peter Schweizer’s 
Reagan’s War, though again outside of the text. In the Face of Evil: Reagan’s War in 
Word and Deed (2004) is a documentary film based on Schweizer’s work, which he 
praised, beyond its presentation of his argument, as “very moving, very emotional,” 
and “very artful”.502 While the film makes use of his book, it goes far beyond it in 
scope, presenting a thesis of monolithic evil in the world, named “the Beast”, which 
encompasses all of America’s enemies from the First and Second World Wars, 
through the Cold War, to the War on Terror. Reagan’s life and presidency represent 
not just a historical narrative of how Communist evil was defeated, but also an 
example of how moral leadership and perseverance may defeat the current threat of 
“Islamofascism”. The film relies on a visual narrative which rarely lingers, weaving 
footage of Reagan, familiar and recovered, with signifying images of the twentieth 
century. “History has to be burned into the Imagination,” the narrative opens, quoting 
Thomas Macaulay, “before it can be received by the Reason.” Its coda, which dwells 
on several slow-motion shots of the Twin Towers attack, associates images of Islamic 
militants with the fascist and communist enemies of the twentieth century. Images of 
9/11 and Reagan’s war are burned together into the viewer’s imagination.503 
While the film made its own argument, it also became part of a current 
cultural argument about political film. In the Face of Evil was produced in time to 
meet a new movement of conservative film. Premiered at the first Liberty Film 
Festival, “Hollywood's first conservative film festival” designed “to celebrate free 
speech, patriotism, religious freedom and democracy,” In the Face of Evil also won 
Best Documentary at the American Film Renaissance festival, established in 2004.504 
These organisations and others, designed to produce as well as promote conservative 
films, were set up in reaction to the perceived liberal and anti-Christian bias in 
Hollywood, as well as to the vogue for leftist political documentary, most successfully 
represented by Michael Moore’s attack on President Bush’s War on Terror, 
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Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004).505 In the Face of Evil became in July, 2005 a central feature 
of the Traverse Bay Freedom Film Festival, an ad-hoc event set up in direct 
opposition to Moore’s own Traverse Film Festival.506  Reagan’s narrative, then, not 
only became shaped in terms of 9/11, but also a means of arguing post 9/11 politics – 
both in cultural and policy terms.507 
 Peter Schweizer concluded Reagan’s War with a comment on its 
contemporary relevance:  
 
Understanding Reagan’s struggle and final triumph over communism… 
provides us with wisdom and hope for the struggles of today and 
tomorrow. Reagan’s hope that we be guided not by fear but by courage 
and moral clarity is as apt today as it was during the height of the Cold 
War.508  
 
He also made this point to a wider audience in the National Review, suggesting 
Reagan’s strategy and leadership as a model for George W. Bush and later comparing 
the two favourably in terms of political courage.509 Reagan became a regular 
reference point for conservatives in their discussions of how to respond to 9/11, and 
pursue the War on Terror and in Iraq. Other conservative authors on Reagan applied 
him to contemporary debates in the national media, combining policy advice with 
moral lessons. Andrew Busch found practical relevance in Reagan’s Cold War 
strategy, while also urging that “we dare not forget what our fortieth president taught 
us: …fortune favors the brave.”510 Former White House Counsel Peter Wallison 
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argued that President Bush’s foreign policy after 9/11 was an extension of Reagan’s 
own.511 This was just one of several commentaries in the aftermath of Reagan’s death 
which drew connections between Reagan’s Cold War and Bush’s Iraq War.512 
President Bush himself made these connections following Reagan’s death, equating 
the War on Terror with America’s lengthy, ideological struggle with Communism, 
and thereby drawing on Reagan’s victory as evidence of future victory. “We have 
confidence in our cause,” he said at the opening of the Reagan Library’s Air Force 
One Pavilion in October 2005 “because we have seen the power of freedom overcome 
the dark ideologies of tyranny and terror.”513  
Bush’s increasing use of the Cold War as an historical model for 
understanding the War on Terror might be seen as a response to decreased confidence 
in him and the complex and ambiguous military conflicts into which he had led 
America. As the Iraq War became increasingly difficult and unpopular, conservative 
voices started to distance Reagan from Bush, where they had previously been 
celebrated together. “It's not a Ronald Reagan type of idea to ride on our white horse 
around the world trying to save it militarily,” argued Richard Viguerie, “Ronald 
Reagan won the cold war by bankrupting the Soviet Union. No planes flew. No tanks 
rolled. No armies marched.”514 Paul Kengor, meanwhile, wrote a series of articles 
finding lessons for Bush’s Middle-East policy in Reagan’s Cold War strategy that did 
not, like the earlier examples, emphasise optimistically the similarities between the 
two men and their challenges. Instead, Kengor focused on the point that “Reagan 
found non-militaristic means to defeat the enemy,” while “George W. Bush has lost 
thousands of precious lives and, in the process, has not been able to convince America 
that victory is in sight.”515 If Reagan had fluid meaning in conservative discourse, his 
significance to 9/11 was even more disparately understood in wider American 
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discussion. One central strand of thought related again to covert action and the dark 
undercurrent of US policy. John Diggins summed it up: 
 
Reagan held that morality must become an instrument of the 
anticommunist struggle…Yet in Afghanistan the CIA supported Islamic 
“freedom fighters,” whose jihadist followers would later highjack jet 
airliners and crash them into the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon…In deserts, mountains, and jungles American morality 
descended into the heart of darkness.516 
 
For some, this narrative is a partisan stick with which to beat the Republicans.517 This 
is consistent with partisan uses of presidential symbolism, where historical blame is 
accorded to past presidents to discredit their successors. Elsewhere, it contains the 
ambiguous meaning that Diggins suggests. Charlie Wilson’s War (2007) – in which 
Reagan is an invisible presence – recounts the US effort to aid the Afghan Mujahidin 
against the Soviet invasion in an essentially triumphal, happy narrative, yet carries an 
undertone of helpless foresight. The story, scripted by Aaron Sorkin of The West 
Wing, is about is about American power, rooted in a pluralist, democratic and moral 
culture, but entangled in the ambiguous, and ultimately dangerous, branches of its 
empire.  
 Reagan has become involved in the 9/11 narrative in other ways beyond those 
of political lessons or consequences. In a reflection on the second anniversary of the 
attacks, Larry Kudlow remarked how the reflection on Reagan, his faith and 
achievements, had helped his response: 
 
Reagan frequently said that America is the “last best hope of man on 
earth,” and that America has a “pre-ordained destiny to show all mankind 
that they too can be free.” When I think of these words I get calmer and 
my anger begins to recede. The sadness of 9/11 gives way to a sense of 
mission and purpose.518 
 
The idea here of Reagan acting as a symbol through which to respond personally to 
9/11 can be found in a broader sense, where American culture as a whole responded 
to the attacks through the image of Reagan. This is expressed in one way by Gil Troy, 
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whose Morning in America ascribes to Reagan a pervasive influence over American 
culture during his presidency and beyond. “Ronald Reagan invented early twenty-
first-century America as well as the 1980s,” Troy claims, as seen in “the post-
September 11, flag drenched mixture of sentimentality and patriotism” and “the 
unapologetic and overconfident imperial vision in Afghanistan and Iraq.”519 J. David 
Woodward presents a similar argument in The America That Reagan Built (2006), 
which offers a binary definition of American culture, with Reagan representing 
traditional “modernism” contrasted by and in conflict with the “postmodernism” of 
Bill Clinton. 9/11, Woodward suggests, caused the victory of the former over the 
latter. Reagan provided the foundation for a successful response to catastrophe 
through the reassertion of the cultural values he represented.520 Reagan is credited 
with setting the themes for America’s reaction to 9/11. He is not just a reference point 
for political argument, but an active agent in American thought and identity that is 
revived and amplified by tragedy. It is here where we see Reagan mythically defined. 
There is a further case to be made that has not been fully advanced, which returns us 
to the interpretations of Reagan as a symbol of America’s cinematic thought and 
identity. The extent to which In the Face of Evil lingers on footage of the World 
Trade Centre’s destruction makes an unintended association between the perpetual 
screen presence of both 9/11 and Reagan. Each is experienced through the screen and 
fundamentally associated with it, to the extent that their cinematic nature directed 
their mythic meaning. Jean Baudrillard at the end of the eighties spoke of the America 
that Reagan created in his image, “his euphoric, cinematic, extraverted, advertising 
vision”, whose filmic artifice concealed real poverty and war.521 In the aftermath of 
9/11, he spoke of the cinematic fantasy of the attacks, suggesting American’s 
confusion of reality and film.522 The recreation of Reagan as a cinematic event, as a 
text to be interpreted, and as a symbol of America’s televisual and media-regulated 
self-perception is a forerunner of similar treatment of 9/11. In the same way that 
Hollywood has been understood to have prepared America for Reagan, it has been 
understood also to have prepared America for the spectacle of the Twin Towers’ 
                                                 
519 Troy, Morning in America (2005), p. 333.  
520 Woodward, J. David, The America That Reagan Built (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), pp.249-50. 
521 Baudrillard, Jean, America (New York: Verso, 1988), pp. 108-13. Also see Rubenstein, Diane, ‘The 
Mirror of Production: Baudrillard and Reagan’s America’, Political Theory, Vol. 17, No. 4 (November 
1989), pp. 582-606. 
522 Dixon, Wheeler Winston, ‘Introduction’, Dixon (ed.), Film and Television after 9/11 (Carbondale, 
IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2004), p. 4.  
  
172 
 
destruction. These symbolic, textual readings of President Reagan and 9/11 both 
speak of the same contemporary condition of America, and reinforce their iconic, 
mythic meaning. 
In June, 2004, Ronald Reagan’s funeral services expressed and implied many 
of the themes of this thesis, confirming in his commemoration his layered relationship 
to American mythology. The illustrious speakers at the National Cathedral service in 
Washington, D.C. on June 11 gave eulogies which celebrated and elevated Reagan’s 
achievements and character, but also his meaning for America. Margaret Thatcher’s 
pre-recorded address claimed that “Ronald Reagan carried the American people with 
him in his great endeavours because there was a perfect sympathy between them; he 
and they loved America and what it stands for.”523 The notion of “sympathy” recalls 
Sidney Blumenthal’s use of The Golden Bough to describe the “sympathetic magic” 
which bound the king-like Reagan with his people.524 The contemporary critic was 
dubious about the substance of this symbolic link, and considered it under threat from 
the revelations Iran/Contra, while the reminiscent ally regarded as mutually 
strengthening and enduring. Each, though, accepted the reality of this bond, investing 
Reagan with the power of myth, and reinforcing a myth that explained his presidency. 
Thatcher elaborated on this sympathy, rooting it in Reagan’s Hollywood identity: “As 
an actor in Hollywood’s Golden Age, he helped to make the American dream live for 
millions all over the globe.” Moreover, “his own life was a fulfilment of that 
dream”.525 President George W. Bush repeated this idea in his own eulogy, remarking 
that in Hollywood, Reagan played “the all-American good guy”, and that he did this 
by “being himself”.526 Reagan was a realisation of an American myth which he had 
performed and dramatised. 
 Bush’s evocation of Hollywood was also part of a biographical narrative 
which emphasised and revealed Reagan’s presidential qualities. The president praised 
Dixon as the town which formed Reagan, emphasising its Christian community, but 
also the “hardship, struggle and uncertainty” that the Reagans’ faced. Vice President 
Cheney, speaking a few days earlier at the ceremony which laid Reagan’s body in the 
US Capitol Rotunda, had also described the formative nature of Reagan’s youth in the 
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“small town on the prairie”, where his parents had taught him the values of hard work 
and prayer, preparing him for the immediacy of the Depression, and his distant public 
office.527 In the eulogies of a state funeral, Reagan’s early years suggested the themes 
of the mythic presidential life-story. President Bush went on to echo symbolism that 
was specific to Reagan’s biographies. His association, for example, of Reagan’s life 
guarding to his protectorship of America resembled Edmund Morris’s central theme. 
Overall, a continuing theme was Reagan’s embodiment of America. Dennis Hastert 
said that his “story and values” were “quintessentially American”.528 Bush concluded 
that “through his belief in our country and his love of country, he became an enduring 
symbol of our country.”529 Reagan’s Mid-Western roots and Western journey, his 
professional and historical experiences and his character were expressed through 
memory as shared roots, experiences and character.  
 The ceremony also saw representation of Reagan’s historical perception. “The 
ideology he opposed throughout his political life,” Bush said, “insisted that history 
was moved by impersonal tides and unalterable fates. Ronald Reagan believed instead 
in the courage and triumph of free men.”530 Implicit in this was the paradox between 
the belief in freedom, and the power of individuals to make their own fate, and the 
belief in triumph, the inevitable victory of good over evil. Reagan’s religious faith in 
American destiny was most forcefully expressed in the framing of the National 
Cathedral service by the words of John Winthrop and the image of the Shining City. 
Following the opening prayer and bible reading, Sandra Day O’Connor gave a 
reading of Winthrop’s speech on the Arabella. This was then reinforced in the 
Archbishop of Washington, D.C. Cardinal McCarrick’s reading from the Sermon on 
the Mount: “You are the light of the world. A city on a hill cannot be hidden.” 
Together, these readings expressed Reagan’s faith in the American founding and in 
Christianity, and implicitly his exceptionalist belief in America’s divine destiny.  
 Destiny was not overt theme at Reagan’s funeral, but religious faith was. 
Reverend John Danforth, the former senator and ambassador who officiated the 
service, sought to articulate the meaning of Reagan’s faith, for him and for America, 
in the homily. “The Winthrop message became the Reagan message,” he began, 
collapsing three hundred years of history, and redefining Winthrop’s puritan jeremiad 
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for the political context of the late seventies, as one of optimism and internationalism. 
Danforth found a greater meaning in the message’s theme of light, as a beacon and as 
a weapon. Reagan was a “child of light,” said Danforth, recalling Reinhold Niebuhr 
and St. Paul, “he was aglow with it.” This light had a new importance for 
contemporary America, now bereft of it: 
 
You and I know the meaning of darkness; we see it on the evening 
news…An enduring image of 9/11 is that on a brilliantly clear day, a 
cloud of darkness covered lower Manhattan. Darkness is real and it can be 
terrifying…The question for us is what do we do when darkness 
surrounds us? 
 
The answer was to “walk as children of the light”, as Reagan had done. “President 
Reagan taught us that this is our mission both as individuals and as a nation,” one 
based on faith in the ultimate victory of light over darkness, and life over death.531 
Reagan’s imagery, and the religious and nationalist message of destiny and purpose it 
contained, was invoked for its spiritual and political relevance to a nation at war.  
 The funeral can also be seen in the context of presidential commemoration. 
Reagan planned elements of the event himself well in advance of its occurrence, 
securing its symbolism in, for example, asking Justice O’Connor to read from 
Winthrop while still in his first term and, of course, in choosing his burial site.532 
Other details were arranged by Nancy Reagan and the US military. It was the First 
Lady who officially invited the younger President Bush to speak. Bush had come 
from his own commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of D-Day, where his efforts 
to frame America’s democratic mission and to reconcile with President Chirac had 
been drowned out in the media by Reagan’s death and the recollection of his 
commemoration twenty years previously. Reagan’s image would dominate even more 
in his speech at the National Cathedral. Bush’s role at the funeral was in the tradition 
of presidential commemoration – ceremonial and passive, but approached with 
political deliberation. Both he and his Democratic challenger in the 2004 election, 
Senator John Kerry, suspended overt political campaigning in the wake of Reagan’s 
death, but Bush’s presidential duties gave him a platform to assert his leadership, and 
define his political agenda in terms of American memory. His speech, however, 
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refrained in the end from direct political rhetoric, only containing unremarkable 
associations. Reagan “acted to restore the reward and spirit of enterprise”, he 
“defend[ed] liberty wherever it was threatened”, and when “he saw evil…he called 
that evil by its name”.533 These evocations of Bush’s policies and rhetoric were 
unavoidable for a president who bore close comparison with Reagan anyway, and 
were bland and downplayed in that respect. In the end, any political boost Bush 
received from the event was indiscernible. Various reasons can explain this. Firstly, in 
an interview in Normandy with Tom Brokaw after his speech there, he praised 
Reagan, but on being asked if he considered himself as a “Ronald Reagan 
Republican”, he responded, “[I] think of myself as a George W. Bush Republican, 
different era.”534 President Bush had no wish to see his own political identity 
subsumed by Reagan’s. 
Meanwhile, Bush had very little need to make a partisan statement – the 
ceremonial speakers were uniformly Republican or conservative. At the National 
Cathedral, Bush was accompanied by his father and Danforth, and by conservative 
Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and Brian Mulroney of Canada. When Reagan’s 
body was laid in the Capitol, the speakers reflected the contemporary Republican 
ascendancy: Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, Senate President Pro Tempore Ted 
Stevens, and Vice President Cheney.535 A continuing theme at Reagan’s 
commemorations, and indeed of previous presidential commemorations such as 
Roosevelt’s at Gettysburg or Gerald Ford’s bicentennial, was the healing of national 
wounds and division. The partisan uniformity and the contextual pressure of the 
election campaign ensured that this was not a theme at Reagan’s funeral. Political 
division or dissent during the Reagan era was not mentioned, and full voice was given 
to the central conservative myth of Reagan as the Cold War victor and the “Great 
Liberator”. Presidents Carter and Clinton were in the audience, and it was reported at 
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the time that Clinton had wished to speak, but had been refused by Nancy Reagan.536 
Ten years previously, at Richard Nixon’s funeral, President Clinton’s eulogy had 
necessarily dealt with issues of division and reconciliation, due to both the two men’s 
partisan differences, and Nixon’s own divisive reputation. Clinton alluded to 
Watergate, and asked that America stop “judging President Nixon on anything less 
than his entire life and career”. His achievements and talents were listed, but Clinton 
made his strongest appeal in terms of national identity. Nixon, from whose “humble 
roots…grew the force of driving dream”, represented America: 
 
President Nixon's journey across the American landscape mirrored that of 
his entire nation in this remarkable century. His life was bound up with 
the striving of our whole people, with our crises and our triumphs. 
 
Clinton ended with a brief prayer – “Grant that I may realize that the trifling of life 
creates differences, but that in the higher things, we are all one.”537 Ironically, because 
of the memory of division and crisis that Nixon evoked, and because his eulogist 
represented his opposition, his funeral provided material for a more convincing 
expression of common national identity than that heard at Reagan’s. 
 Unlike Nixon’s, Reagan’s was a state funeral which employed the full state 
pageantry of the US Military and of Washington, D.C., as well as the personalised site 
of the Reagan Library. The funeral itself commanded full coverage from the 
television networks, and followed a week’s worth of broadcasts of its preparations 
and of the public attendance as Reagan’s body lay in state at Simi Valley and then at 
the Capitol. Cable news channels devoted themselves to these events, including an 
hour long shot of the plane holding Reagan’s casket waiting on the runway in 
California, broken only by retrospective footage of the Reagan years and interviews 
with his confederates. The volume and tone of the coverage drew some criticism that 
recalled Reagan as the TV president, the actor whose stage-managed leadership 
bedazzled the media and the American people. Will Bunch noted later that the event 
was a direct continuation of the Reagan White House’s image construction, organised 
by two former Reagan advance men, Jim Hooley and Rick Aherne. They had been 
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planning ‘Operation Serenade’, as the funeral was dubbed, and its televising for 
years.538 They, amongst other things, ensured that fifty thousand miniature American 
flags were distributed to the crowds lining the highway at Simi Valley, and that in the 
Washington procession Reagan’s boots, reversed in the stirrups of a riderless horse, 
were “left scuffed but not dusty”.539 Bunch concluded, “the Reagan magic still 
worked.”540 While Hooley determined that the funeral would be a “legacy-building 
event” that established Reagan as “the man who won the Cold War [and] brought 
back America’s faith in itself”, Bunch saw it reinforce Reagan’s legacy as the 
centrality of the televised spectacle to American political culture. As Philip James, a 
Democrat strategist wrote: “In the end Reagan will be remembered most for his sense 
of political theatre.”541 
 Interpretation of the funeral as a staged and scripted television event contained 
the greater criticism that it was a false expression of national unity over Reagan’s 
memory. The television news was, in this view, not only overwhelmed by the 
manipulative spectacle planned by Reagan’s people, but were self-censoring in their 
under-reporting of dissent and failure during the Reagan presidency, and in their 
reliance on Reagan supporters to frame the story. Haynes Johnson suggested this was 
the result of an insecure media avoiding accusations of liberal bias, a continuation 
from the Reagan eighties.542 Meanwhile, the crowds who travelled to watch the 
procession, view the casket and leave small offerings at the Reagan Library, his 
boyhood home, or the Hollywood walk of fame, were considered an equally selective 
representation of America. Bunch referred to these people simply as “red America, a 
heavily Christian fundamentalist and conservative crew of talk-radio fanatics”.543 The 
political make-up of the public mourners, and much less those who participated 
through the television coverage, can only be guessed at, but it is safe to assume a 
majority of Reagan voters and their spiritual descendants. Nonetheless, the public 
grief presented alternative meanings to partisan division. Caryn James, a New York 
Times cultural critic, considered the displays as efforts to “break through” the 
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overwhelming media coverage. She also suggested that Reagan’s long suffering with 
Alzheimer’s disease touched a personal chord with American families, and that the 
“huge outpouring of emotion” stemmed from this identification as much as the 
political.544 
 Considering the 9/11 attacks and Reagan’s funeral together attests to his 
predominantly partisan symbolism. The terrorist attacks provoked a national response 
which does not compare in scale or in unambiguous expression of unity to that which 
met Reagan’s death.545 Meanwhile, Reagan provided a practical and emotive symbol 
in the immediacy of the attacks and in their long consequences, but only to 
conservatives. As far as others associated Reagan with 9/11, it was in terms of 
historical cause. Reagan’s death garnered full national pageantry and attention, but the 
apparent unanimity of tribute amongst politicians spoke mostly of the concession of 
the moment by Democrats to a Republican leadership, rather than a real effort to 
define Reagan’s broadly acceptable national meaning. The Democratic Party’s 
electoral successes since then, however, have put its leaders in a position to frame 
Reagan’s memory. 
 We have seen Harry Reid’s remembrance of Reagan’s Second Inaugural as 
Congress dedicated a statue of the former president in the Capitol Rotunda in June, 
2009. This event was the result of the Californian Legislature’s decision to replace 
one of its representatives, the abolitionist preacher Thomas Starr King, in the National 
Statuary Collection.546 To a mostly Republican audience, Speaker of the House Nancy 
Pelosi stressed Reagan’s “bipartisanship and civility”.547 President Barack Obama did 
not attend, but he also made efforts to explain Reagan’s meaning in broadly 
applicable national terms, both as part of the consecrative duty of the executive office, 
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and on his own terms. During his primary campaign, Obama compared the election 
America faced to that of 1980, and his own message to that of Ronald Reagan: 
 
I think Ronald Reagan changed the trajectory of America in a way that 
Richard Nixon did not and in a way that Bill Clinton did not. He put us on 
a fundamentally different path because the country was ready for it. … I 
think…he just tapped into what people were already feeling, which was, 
we want clarity, we want optimism, we want a return to that sense of 
dynamism and entrepreneurship that had been missing. 
 
Though he defined the dissatisfaction in 1980 in terms of “the excesses of the 1960s 
and 70s” and the fact that “government had grown and grown”, his characterisation of 
what Reagan brought was in entirely broad themes – hope and change.548 In this 
historical reflection, Obama also mentioned Kennedy’s election in 1960. More than 
associating himself with popular, iconic presidents of the past, Obama confirmed 
Reagan in a non-partisan narrative of American leadership. As president, Obama 
signed into law the Ronald Reagan Centennial Commission Act, a bill introduced by 
Elton Gallegly of Simi Valley, which prepares for the national commemoration of 
Reagan in 2011. With Nancy Reagan on his arm, President Obama emphasised 
Reagan’s relationship with Tip O’Neill.  
 
For all of the deepest of divides that exist in America…the bonds that 
bring us together are that much stronger… President Reagan helped as 
much as any President to restore a sense of optimism in our country, a 
spirit that transcended politics, that transcended even the most heated 
arguments of the day. 
 
Obama defined Reagan’s presidency for his “ability to communicate directly and 
movingly to the American people…That was powerful, that was important, and we 
are better off for the extraordinary leadership that he showed.”549 The president was 
required by Congressional Act to honour a political opposite, and as Reagan had done 
before him with Martin Luther King, Obama did so by interpreting him in national 
themes which echoed his own image. 
                                                 
548 Obama, Barack, quoted in Murray, Shailagh, ‘Obama’s Reagan Comparison Sparks Debate’, 
Washington Post, (January 17, 2008), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/01/17/obamas_reagan_comparison_spark_1.html (accessed 
September 15, 2009).  
549 Obama, ‘Remarks on Signing the Ronald Reagan Centennial Commission Act’, (June 2, 2009), 
GPO Access, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900423.pdf (accessed September 
15, 2009).  
  
180 
 
  Reagan may be emerging as a national symbol which transcends his political 
identity.550 The foundation of this symbol is Reagan’s faith in, and communication of, 
national myth. We can expect this theme to be revived when Obama presides over the 
celebration of Reagan’s hundredth birthday in 2011. We can also expect, however, 
that the specifically conservative message of Reagan’s American narrative, such its 
evocation of a definitive conflict between the individual and the inexorable growth of 
the state, to be emphasised by Obama’s opponents in America’s continued partisan 
division. The centennial may see some resolution of the Republican Party’s post-
election anxiety over its “nostalgia” for Ronald Reagan.551 Reagan’s political image 
and its application may be in flux, but this is the nature of myth, adaptable and 
contested. For his commemorators, biographers and historians, American mythology 
will remain a definitive concept of Reagan’s life, his presidency and his times. This 
association will remain essential, and Reagan will continue to be measured by it, 
depending on how American mythology is evaluated. Understanding myth as the 
manipulative distortion of history reveals Reagan as an emblem of American amnesia, 
whose degradation of the democratic process through stagecraft and fantasy cast an 
illusory, televisual veil over symbolic failures like Iran/Contra. Understanding myth 
as the visionary projection of essential moral truths reveals Reagan as a great leader, 
whose committed and sincere articulation of American identity and purpose 
invigorated the country, and achieved victory over its ideological antithesis 
represented by the Soviet Union. As far as Reagan’s presidency demanded of 
America an awareness of the processes, purposes and consequences of its mythology, 
it remains a vital and unique moment in American history.  
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